Saudi Arabia’s Soft Power

2012 ◽  
Vol 49 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 233-261 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giulio Gallarotti ◽  
Isam Yahia Al-Filali

When people are asked the question, what is the source of Saudi Arabia’s power, who would cite factors other than oil? This equation of Saudi power exclusively with its oil wealth is mistaken. Historically, a principal and the most consistent source of Saudi power at the domestic, regional and global levels has not been revenues from oil, but the cultural power that inheres in a nation that is both the capital of the Muslim and Arab worlds. This soft power accounts for as much, if not more, of Saudi influence than even oil itself. To a large extent, this power explains why Saudi Arabia has remained stout in the face of the shock waves of the Arab Spring. Saudi soft power also accounts for much of the leverage that the Kingdom enjoys in its region and the world at large. This article assesses the principal sources of Saudi Arabia’s soft power, discusses the modern day international, regional and domestic challenges facing Saudi Arabia, and finally analyzes how Saudi soft power can effectively deal with those challenges.

2018 ◽  
pp. 83-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Тimur Khairullin

A new force appeared in the face of the Qatar-Turkish Alliance during the events of the Arab spring on the political map of the Arab region. Using the pan-Arab network of the Muslim Brotherhood Association, as well as their ideology of moderate Islamism, the Qatar-Turkish Alliance temporarily managed to significantly strengthen its positions in Egypt. Proof of this is the coming to power in Egypt in 2012 of Muslim Brotherhood, which enjoyed financial and diplomatic assistance from Qatar and Turkey. However, a year later the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood was overthrown as a result of a successful counter-action by Saudi Arabia, which relied on the Egyptian military force and a number of Islamist groups of Salafi confession.


2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Hae Won Jeong

Summary What are the public diplomacy strategies for legitimising a pro-Islamist foreign policy? This research unveils how Turkey, which has been a vocal supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates across the Middle East since the Arab Spring, draws on pan-Islamic soft power, neo-Ottoman myth-making and public diplomacy strategies embedded in the precepts of the strategic depth doctrine to rationalise its pro-Hamas foreign policy position under the Justice and Development Party (AKP). By employing critical discourse analysis to the political speeches delivered by the Turkish government officials in domestic and international fora, this article suggests that Turkey has sought to legitimise its pro-Islamist foreign policy and subvert the terrorist designation of Hamas internationally through the humanitarian, Islamic and neo-Ottoman framings of the Palestinian issue. It is argued that Turkey’s public diplomacy of Hamas constitutes part and parcel of the AKP’s grand strategy to project Islamic soft power.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 14-20
Author(s):  
Hani Albasoos ◽  
Buthaina Al Hinai

Following the Arab Spring in 2011, Yemen’s devastating conflicts have deepened even further, leading the country to be the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. Despite the international community's multiple attempts to resolve this conflict, the conflict seems to have reached a stalemate. To make matters worse, resolving the conflict is made difficult by the large number of parties involved, internally and externally, and by the complex, dual and fluid nature of the relationships they share. Although the media and international community's focus is directed towards the binary conflict between the Hadi government and Saudi Arabia on one side and Iran and the Houthis on the other, the conflict is greatly multifaceted and far from being binary. This paper critically analyzes and explores other participating actors to comprehend the root causes of the conflict entirely. Although this conflict has been advertised as a proxy war, while others trace back the motivation to sectarianism, this paper argues how this analysis can be misleading and hindering the peace process.


China Report ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 53 (2) ◽  
pp. 172-187 ◽  
Author(s):  
L.H.M. Ling

The concept of ‘soft power’ impoverishes our understanding of politics. It assumes (i) the world has never encountered instances of ‘soft power’ before or knows no better when encountering it; (ii) culture cannot have any interests, agency or impact of its own; and (iii) it cannot capture the state. History—especially from India and China—debunks these assumptions. I propose a contrasting concept, cultural power. It turns ‘soft power’ on its head by (i) articulating the state as ontology, not instrument; accordingly, (ii) culture can generate its own centre (or centres) of gravitas that (iii) invariably outstrips the state in purpose and identity. To demonstrate, I draw on recent filmic representations from India and China. These replay the power of historical culture, like Hindu reincarnation and/or Confucian love, through a contemporary venue. I conclude with some implications of cultural power for politics, in general, and world politics, in particular.


2022 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 131-161
Author(s):  
G. G. Kosach

The paper examines the evolution of Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy in the context of wider changes in the Middle East and in the Arab world triggered by the Arab Spring. The author argues that during this decade the Kingdom’s foreign policy has witnessed a fundamental transformation: the very essence of the Saudi foreign policy course has changed signifi cantly as the political es-tablishment has substantially revised its approaches to the country’s role in the region and in the world. Before 2011, Saudi Arabia — the land of the ‘Two Holy Mosques’ — positioned itself as a representative of the international Muslim community and in pursuing its foreign policy relied primarily on the religious authority and fi nancial capabilities. However, according to Saudi Arabia’s leaders, the Arab Spring has plunged the region into chaos and has bolstered the infl uence of various extremist groups and movements, which required a signifi cant adjustment of traditional political approaches. Saudi Arabia, more explicit than ever before, has declared itself as a nation state, as a regional leader possessing its own interests beyond the abstract ‘Muslim Ummah’. However, the author stresses that these new political ambitions do not imply a complete break with the previous practice. For example, the containment of Iran not only remains the cornerstone of Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy, but has become even more severe. The paper shows that it is this opposition to Iran, which is now justifi ed on the basis of protecting the national interests, that predetermines the nature and the specifi c content of contemporary Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy including interaction with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), approaches towards the solution of the Israeli-Palestinian confl ict, combating terrorism, and relations with the United States. In that regard, the transformation of Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy has, on the one hand, opened up new opportunities for strengthening the Kingdom’s interaction with Israel, but, at the same time, has increased tensions within the framework of strategic partnership with the United States. The author concludes that currently Saudi Arabia is facing a challenge of diversifying its foreign policy in order to increase its international profi le and political subjectivity.


Author(s):  
Joanne Randa Nucho

This concluding chapter begins by summarizing the arguments in the preceding chapters. It then attempts to contextualize the present discourse about the Shi'a versus Sunni conflict within the region in the wake of the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011. It describes a “new sectarianism,” characterized by state actors, particularly in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, who “make decisions on the basis of a sectarian assessment of politics,” whereby Iran is presented as a Shi'a rival. The fact that these same state actors are opposed to Sunni Islamist groups makes it clear that the mobilization of sectarian rhetoric is, at least in some instances, a cynical tactic of scapegoating.


Author(s):  
John W. Young ◽  
John Kent

This chapter examines the unrest across the Middle East in the 2010s. The first section focuses on the civil war in Syria and the role of so-called Islamic State., examining the causes of the Syrian uprising and the development of protests against President Assad into civil war. It describes the growth of Jihadism, formation of Ahrar al-Sham, and emergence of ISIS, and the subsequent declaration of a Caliphate. The escalation and destructive impact of the conflict is examined in the context of increasing international intervention and the involvement of foreign powers in both exacerbation of the conflict and efforts to restore peace. The second section describes the growing regional importance of Iran alongside the 2015 nuclear deal and tensions with Saudi Arabia. The chapter concludes with the Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt, conflict in Yemen, and the downfall of Gaddafi in Libya.


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