Under the Law

2018 ◽  
Vol 99 (5) ◽  
pp. 76-77
Author(s):  
Julie Underwood

The right to an education is guaranteed by international law in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Similarly, UNESCO’s Constitution sets out the right to an education as necessary to “prepare the children of the world for the responsibilities of freedom.” No such right is mentioned in the U.S. Constitution, though. Perhaps Congress or the Supreme Court would be sympathetic, however, to an argument for educational rights based on the 14th Amendment’s guarantee of the rights of citizenship.

1973 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 62-66

A Declaration Adopted by the Uppsala Collogium, Sweden, June 21, 1972. In June 1972, in Uppsala, Sweden, legal and human rights experts from 25 countries joined in a colloquium to examine the meaning and implications of Article 13 (2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states: “Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.” Brought together under the auspices of the Law Faculty of Uppsala University, the Renέ Cassin International Institute for Human Rights, in France, and the Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights, in New York, the participants reviewed current policies and practices around the world related to the right to leave and to return. Taking as their springboard a group of draft principles approved in 1963 by the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, they adopted a Declaration on the subject.


2021 ◽  
Vol 115 (3) ◽  
pp. 553-558

In Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that a country's taking of property from its own nationals does not fall within the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) exception for “rights in property taken in violation of international law.” The case involved a claim that Nazi officials coerced a consortium of three art firms owned by Jewish residents of Germany to sell a collection of “medieval relics and devotional objects known as the Welfenschatz” to Prussia for “approximately one-third of their value.” The plaintiffs—descendants of the members of the consortium—argued that the coerced sale constituted genocide, thus bringing their claim within the FSIA exception. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that “the expropriation exception is best read as referencing the international law of expropriation rather than of human rights” and that international law does not bar a state's taking of the property of its own nationals. The Court declined to reach Germany's alternative argument that international comity required dismissal of the case, and it vacated and remanded a companion case, Republic of Hungary v. Simon, that also posed the comity question.


Author(s):  
Leah West

Since the swift passage of the Anti-Terrorism Act in 2015, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) has had the unprecedented and highly controversial authority to take ‘reasonable and proportionate’ measures to reduce threats to Canadian security. While there are some limits to the types of measures CSIS can employ, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act permits the use of measures that would otherwise contravene the laws of Canada or limit a right protected by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms so long as they are judicially authorized by the Federal Court. As new threats proliferate around the world, it is anticipated that CSIS will increasingly carry out this mandate overseas. Yet review bodies tasked with monitoring CSIS’s use of threat reduction measures (TRMs) report that CSIS has never sought judicial authorization to conduct a TRM. Why? One answer may be that CSIS has concluded that the Charter does not govern actions carried out abroad, and, as such, their extraterritorial conduct falls beyond the reach and oversight of the Federal Court. Whether the Charter applies to CSIS’s overseas conduct ostensibly lies in the Supreme Court of Canada’s leading case on the extraterritorial application of the Charter, R. v Hape. This article canvasses domestic and international law, as well as intelligence law theory, to explain why that presumption is wrong. Wrong, not least because the majority opinion in Hape is deeply flawed in its analysis and application of international law. But also, because intelligence operations are so distinguishable from the transnational criminal investigations at issue in Hape, the Court’s findings are inapplicable in the former context. In short, this article demonstrates that applying Hape to the actions of CSIS officers not only leaves their actions beyond the scrutiny of Canadian courts but also creates a significant human rights gap.


2006 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 477-503 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin S. Flaherty

For at least the past several decades, judges around the world have been looking beyond their own states' jurisprudence to international law and the decisions of foreign courts in order to apply domestic law. This widespread practice is part of a phenomenon that Anne-Marie Slaughter calls “judicial globalization.” The American judiciary, however, has exhibited a distinct diffidence toward the use of comparative and international law to decide domestic cases, a diffidence that extends to many elected officials as well… .Various defenses of the Supreme Court's reliance on international and comparative sources have been made, not least by some of the Supreme Court justices themselves. None of the defenses, however, have met the democratic objections head-on. Instead, justifications have mainly defended the general utility of referencing additional sources rather than the specific legitimacy of referencing sources from outside the U.S. legal system. The defenses to date fall short for at least two sets of reasons. They fail to grapple with legitimate concerns about the practice. In consequence, they offer no reasons for those opposed to this practice to reconsider their resistance.


Author(s):  
Carla Ferstman

This chapter considers the consequences of breaches of human rights and international humanitarian law for the responsible international organizations. It concentrates on the obligations owed to injured individuals. The obligation to make reparation arises automatically from a finding of responsibility and is an obligation of result. I analyse who has this obligation, to whom it is owed, and what it entails. I also consider the right of individuals to procedures by which they may vindicate their right to a remedy and the right of access to a court that may be implied from certain human rights treaties. In tandem, I consider the relationship between those obligations and individuals’ rights under international law. An overarching issue is how the law of responsibility intersects with the specialized regimes of human rights and international humanitarian law and particularly, their application to individuals.


Author(s):  
V.C. Govindaraj

In deciding cases of private international law or conflict of laws, as it is widely known, judges of the Supreme Court in India generally consult the works of renowned English jurists like Dicey and Cheshire. This volume argues that our country should have its own system of resolving inter-territorial issues with cross-border implications. The author critically analyses cases covering areas such as the law of obligations, the law of persons, the law of property, foreign judgments, and foreign arbitral awards. The author provides his perspectives on the application of law in each case. The idea is to find out where the judges went wrong in deciding cases of private international law, so that corrective measures can be taken in future to resolve disputes involving complex, extra-territorial issues.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 25-39
Author(s):  
Vera Rusinova ◽  
Olga Ganina

The article analyses the Judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada on the Nevsun v. Araya case, which deals with the severe violations of human rights, including slavery and forced labor with respect of the workers of Eritrean mines owned by a Canadian company “Nevsun”. By a 5 to 4 majority, the court concluded that litigants can seek compensation for the violations of international customs committed by a company. This decision is underpinned by the tenets that international customs form a part of Canadian common law, companies can bear responsibility for violations of International Human Rights Law, and under ubi jus ibi remedium principle plaintiffs have a right to receive compensation under national law. Being a commentary to this judgment the article focuses its analysis on an issue that is of a key character for Public International Law, namely on the tenet that international customs impose obligations to respect human rights on companies and they can be called for responsibility for these violations. This conclusion is revolutionary in the part in which it shifts the perception of the companies’ legal status under International Law. The court’s approach is critically assessed against its well-groundness and correspondence to the current stage of International law. In particular, the authors discuss, whether the legal stance on the Supreme Court of Canada, under which companies can bear responsibility for violations of International Human Rights Law is a justified necessity or a head start.


2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Masthuriyah Sa’dan

In Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), the right to choose a partner for a woman is set by families. This then becomes the spotlight of many circles who argue that fiqh is discriminatory against women. Muslim men have the right to decide with whom to marry. In contrary, Muslim women do not have such a right. Women right is taken over by parents in the name of Islamic law. In the World Conference on Population and Women in Cairo-Egypt in 1994, however, women were proclaimed to have their own reproductive rights that must be protected and maintained. One form of the demands of the reproductive rights is the right of women to determine their own life partner. This paper wants to examine the right to choose a husband for women from the perspective of Islamic law and international law on human rights. Keywords: the right to choose, women, Islamic law, human rights.


2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emma Stone Mackinnon

This article argues that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), by claiming certain inheritances from eighteenth-century American and French rights declarations, simultaneously disavowed others, reshaping the genre of the rights declaration in ways amenable to forms of imperial and racial domination. I begin by considering the rights declaration as genre, arguing that later participants can both inherit and disavow aspects of what came before. Then, drawing on original archival research, I consider the drafting of the UDHR, using as an entry point the reception of the NAACP’s Appeal to the World petition, edited by W.E.B. DuBois. I reconstruct conversations within the drafting committee about the right to petition, self-determination, and the right to rebellion, and the separation of the Declaration from the rights covenants, to illustrate the allegiances between US racial politics and French imperial politics, and their legacies for our contemporary conceptions of human rights.


2021 ◽  
pp. 136-146
Author(s):  
Tom Ginsburg

This chapter focuses on the abuse of international rights to political participation so as to facilitate a leader's remaining in office beyond the constitutionally mandated term. This involves not only the abuse of the interpretation of rights, but also the abuse of the doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendments, which has spread around the world in recent years. How does this happen and what, if anything, can international law do about it? After introducing a motivating case — the famous decision of the Colombian Constitutional Court in the second re-election decision, in which courts stood for the protection of democracy — the chapter examines recent 'bad' cases in which rights and constitutional amendments are abused to extend leaders' terms. It surveys recent developments in the law of term limits, and briefly proposes a normative interpretation of the right to political participation which ought to be consistent with the emerging doctrine. The chapter suggests that there is an emerging consensus, at least in some regions of the world, that there are limits in states' ability to modify term limits unconditionally.


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