Akrich: A Clear Delimitation without Limits

2005 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 241-252 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christophe Schiltz

In Akrich, the Court operated a clear delimitation of competences between Member State and Community level while at the same time protecting the fundamental rights of Union citizens, even in the absence of a deterrence to the exercise of their free movement rights. It is argued that it thereby contributes to the strengthening of Union citizenship rights. The article analyzes the relationship of the decision with existing case law, its impact on the fundamental rights protection in the Union and on reverse discrimination, as well as the implications for Member State competences. In conclusion, it will be argued that Akrich should be seen as a welcome development in the field of citizenship. It is however tainted by legal uncertainty surrounding its scope, which will have to be lifted in order for the decision to be an effective tool in the citizenship box.

Author(s):  
Elspeth Guild ◽  
Steve Peers ◽  
Jonathan Tomkin

This chapter details the right of residence provided for in the citizens’ Directive. The citizens’ Directive regulates and gives detailed expression to the right of free movement and residence conferred by the Treaties on Union citizens. At its simplest, the Directive regulates residence on the basis of the intended duration of a stay in another Member State. The chapter then evaluates case law which concerns the relationship between the right to equal treatment, on the one hand, and the right of residence, on the other, and whether mobile Union citizens could rely on the principle of equality as a basis for claiming a right to access social benefits and maintaining a right to reside in a host Member State.


2015 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
pp. 210-246
Author(s):  
Louise HALLESKOV STORGAARD

AbstractThis article offers a perspective on how the objective of a strong and coherent European protection standard pursued by the fundamental rights amendments of the Lisbon Treaty can be achieved, as it proposes a discursive pluralistic framework to understand and guide the relationship between the EU Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights. It is argued that this framework – which is suggested as an alternative to the EU law approach to the Strasbourg system applied by the CJEU in Opinion 2/13 and its Charter-based case law – has a firm doctrinal, case law and normative basis. The article ends by addressing three of the most pertinent challenges to European fundamental rights protection through the prism of the proposed framework.


Author(s):  
Emily HANCOX

Abstract Article 6 Treaty on European Union sets out two sources of fundamental rights in the EU—the Charter and the general principles of EU law—without specifying a hierarchy between them. Even though the Charter became binding over a decade ago, the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) is yet to clarify unequivocally how these two sources interact. In this article I argue based upon the relevant legal framework that the Charter ought to replace the general principles it enshrines. This leaves a role for general principles in the incorporation of new and additional rights into the EU legal framework. Such an approach is necessary to ensure that the Charter achieves its aims in enhancing the visibility of the rights protected by EU law, while also providing the impetus for more coherent rights protection within the EU. What an extensive survey of CJEU case law in the field of non-discrimination shows, however, is that the CJEU has struggled to let its general principles case law go, potentially hampering the transformative potential of the Charter.


2014 ◽  
pp. 45-52
Author(s):  
José Manuel Cabrita Vieira e Cunha

Based on the writings of Judge Cunha Rodrigues, the author finds that due to the current prevalence of the case law of the Court of Justice on fundamental rights, the primordial establishment of the principles of primacy and direct effect. He draws attention to the functionalist consequences of the case law of the Court of Justice regarding the relationship between the Union and the Member States and the birth of the concept of Union citizenship, contributing to overcome what had once only aspired to be the construction of a common market. Finally, he notes the Union deadlock after the creation of the single currency, divided between developing the political project and the intergovernmental retreat, supported by national electorates.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 185-215
Author(s):  
Elise Muir

This paper investigates the relationship between legislative provisions and fundamental rights by analyzing the Egenberger, IR, Bauer, Max-Planck and Cresco cases. This paper understands these cases as an invitation to reflect on whether, and if so, to what extent, EU fundamental rights' legislation, read in conjunction with the Charter, could have an impact on the scope of application, substance and/or legal effects of the Charter. This paper argues that the Court of Justice's recent case law can be understood as allowing for EU legislative guidance on fundamental rights to interact in an upward process with the rights enshrined in norms with the same rank as EU primary law. This paper sheds light on the constitutional implications of the overlaps between legislation and constitutional norms on fundamental norms while other contributions in this special issue address effectiveness and the right to an effective remedy in a broader sense.


2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-28
Author(s):  
Martijn van den Brink

Abstract It is almost ten years since Ruiz Zambrano decided that Article 20 TFEU precludes national measures which deprive EU citizens of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of their citizenship rights. The CJEU has since then clarified when the substance of rights test applies. This article highlights several inconsistencies and unresolved puzzles in the case law. First, contrary to what was initially suggested, EU citizens can be deprived of the substance of their rights. Second, contrary to what initial judgments suggested, the substance of rights test is not independent of but grounded in the right to free movement. This suggests that the same level of protection can be provided to EU citizens without this test, simply by relying on EU free movement law. The paper concludes by suggesting that these deficiencies can only be resolved by reconsidering the substance of rights test altogether.


Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (10) ◽  
pp. 830
Author(s):  
Kristin Henrard

This article begins with some reflections on the definition of religious minorities, their needs and rights and how this relates to the discussion about the need for minority specific rights in addition to general fundamental rights as rights for all human beings irrespective of particular identity features. Secondly, an overall account of the ambiguous relationship between religious minorities and fundamental rights is presented. The third and most extensive section zooms in on the EU and religious minorities, starting with an account of the EU’s general approach towards minorities and then turning to the protection of fundamental rights of religious minorities in/through the EU legal order. First, the EU’s engagement with minority specific rights and the extent to which these norms have been attentive to religious themes will be discussed. Second, the CJEU’s case law concerning freedom of religion and the prohibition of dis-crimination as general human rights is analysed. The conclusion then turns to the overall perspective and discusses whether the EU’s protection of religious minorities’ fundamental rights can be considered ‘half-hearted’ and, if so, to what extent. This in turn allows us to return to the overall focus of the Special Issue, namely the relationship between the freedom of religion for all and special rights for religious minorities.


Der Staat ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-41
Author(s):  
Carsten Bäcker

Analogien sind methodologisch hoch umstritten; sie bewegen sich an der Grenze der Gesetzesinterpretation. Dem methodologischen Streit um die Analogien unterliegt die Frage nach den Grenzen der Gesetzesinterpretation. In der Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts finden sich eine Reihe von Verfassungsanalogien. Diese Analogien zum Verfassungsgesetz werden zwar nur selten ausdrücklich als solche bezeichnet, sie finden sich aber in einer Vielzahl von dogmatischen Konstruktionen in der Rechtsprechung – wie etwa der Erweiterung des Grundrechtsschutzes für Deutsche auf EU-Bürger oder der Annahme von Gesetzgebungskompetenzen des Bundes als Annex zu dessen geschriebenen Kompetenzen. Die Existenz derartiger Analogien zum Verfassungsgesetz verlangt nach Antworten auf die Fragen nach den Grenzen der Kompetenz zur Verfassungsinterpretation. Der Beitrag spürt diesen Grenzen nach – und schließt mit der Aufforderung an das Bundesverfassungsgericht, die Annahme von Verfassungsanalogien zu explizieren und die sich darin spiegelnden Annahmen über die Grenzen der Kompetenz zur Verfassungsinterpretation zu reflektieren. Constitutional analogies. The Federal Constitutional Court at the limit of constitutional interpretation From a methodological point of view, the use of analogies in legal argument is highly controversial, for they reach to the limits of statutory interpretation. Underlying the methodological dispute over analogies is the question of what the limits of statutory interpretation are or ought to be. A number of analogies from constitutional law can be found in the case law of the Federal Constitutional Court. Although these analogies to constitutional law are rarely explicitly designated as such, in the case law they can be found in a variety of dogmatic constructions – for example, in the extension of Germans’ fundamental rights protection to EU citizens, or the assumption of legislative powers of the federal state as an appendix to its written powers. The existence of such analogies to constitutional law calls for answers to the question of the limits of the power to interpret the Constitution. It is the aim of this article to trace these limits, and in its conclusion it calls on the Federal Constitutional Court to explicate the adoption of analogies in constitutional law and to reflect on the assumptions found therein – respecting the limits of the power to interpret the Constitution.


2021 ◽  
pp. 453-479
Author(s):  
Margot Horspool ◽  
Matthew Humphreys ◽  
Michael Wells-Greco

This chapter discusses Union citizenship and free movement of persons rights in the EU for Union citizens and their spouses, partners, children and dependants. It examines the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, the Free Movement or Citizenship Directive and the principle of equal treatment. The chapter also considers the facets of Union citizenship and the political dimension of Union citizenship with reference to the European Citizens’ Initiative. It concludes with a discussion on some of the challenges of Union citizenship.


2021 ◽  
pp. 506-545
Author(s):  
Síofra O’Leary ◽  
Sara Iglesias Sánchez

This chapter maps the most relevant aspects of the evolution of the free movement of persons and services through the analysis of the main legislative and judicial developments in both fields. After looking at the salient legislative transformations in the last decades and the effects of codification—mostly through Directives 2004/38 and 2006/123—the chapter explores the parameters that delimit the three different freedoms concerned—workers, establishment, and services. A reassessment of the place and scope of the provisions on the free movement of persons is then offered through a critical examination of the interrelationship between the regulatory framework and case law concerning the free movement of persons, the status of Union citizenship, and developments in the distinct but related Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.


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