The EU's Economic Cooperation with North Korea: The Possibility as a Useful Tool to Complement Korea-US Cooperation

2009 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-149 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jong-Sue Lee

North Korea conducted 2nd nuclear test on May 25, 2009. It made a vicious circle and continued military tension on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea regime got a question on the effectiveness of the six party talks and ‘security-economy exchange model’. In addition, the North Korea probably disappointed about the North Korea issue has been excluded from the Obama administration's policy position. So the dialogue or relationship recovery with the United States and North Korea through six-party talks or bilateral talks will be difficult for the time being. This paper examines the EU policy on North Korea. Based on the results, analyzes the EU is likely to act as a balancer on the Korean Peninsula. Through the procedure of deepening and expanding the economic and political unification, the EU utilizes their cooperative policies towards North Korea as an ideal opportunity to realize their internal value and to confirm the commonness within the EU members. The acceleration of the EU's unification, however, began to focus on human rights, and this made their official relationship worse. Yet, the EU is continuously providing food as wells as humanitarian and technological support to North Korea regardless of the ongoing nuclear and human rights issues in North Korea. Also, the number of multinational corporations investing in North Korea for the purpose of preoccupying resources and key industries at an individual nation's level has been increasing. The European Union has unique structure which should follow the way of solving the problem of member states like subsidiary principle. It appears to conflict between normative power of the European Union and strategic interests on member states. This paper examines if the European Union is useful tool to complement Korea-US cooperation in the near future.

Author(s):  
Christian Klesse

The accession of ten new member states has opened up new political and discursive spaces for challenging homo-, bi-, and transphobia in the new member states and the European Union (EU) as a whole. There has been widely felt sense of hope that the accession will ultimately increase the possibilities of political action, result in democratisation, and better the political conditions for sexual minorities to fight discrimination and struggle for equal treatment before the law (ILGA Europe 2001, Vadstrup 2002, Pereira 2002, Neumann 2004, ILGA 2004, Stonewall 2004). Such sentiments were also expressed in the call-for-papers for the Conference ‘Europe without Homophobia. Queer-in(g) Communities’ that took place from May 24 to May 26, 2004 at Wroclaw in Poland, for which I wrote the first draft of this paper. Participants were asked to reflect upon ‘how we can contribute to making sexual minorities in the European Community visible, heard, safe, and equal before the law’ and to ‘investigate the practical ways (including legal actions, information campaigns, political participation, etc.) of achieving the bold vision suggested in the title: Europe without homophobia’ (Organizing Committee 2004). Human rights groups and lesbian and gay organisations both in the (prospective) new and the already existing member states sensed that access to funding by EU bodies and the ability to address political and/or legal institutions of the EU (and/or the Council of Europe) opened up ‘new space’ for political activism and enabled access to a new range of political discourses and strategies (cf. Stychin 2003). Already many years before accession, human rights organisations and lesbian and gay campaigning groups started to utilise the transformative potential of this prospective economic-political and socio-legal change for campaigns against human rights abuse and legal discrimination on the grounds of gender and sexuality in states applying for accession. ILGA Europe, for example, emphasised that accession should be made dependent on the applying states complying to the high human rights standard that the EU is supposed to stand for. Due to the uneven power structure between the institutions of the EU and the states applying for membership, the logic and rhetoric of ‘enlargement’ structured the negotiations about accession. The power imbalances at the heart of the process are further indicated by the fact that accession is frequently discussed in the scientific literature in the terminology of ‘Europeanization’ (cf. Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2005a). In this context, ‘Europeanization’ signifies ‘integration’ into the economic organisations and politico-legal institutions of the EU, a process that, according to Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, can be characterised as ‘a massive export of EU rules’ (2005b: 221). Because accession has been such a recent moment in history, research on the effects of the EU enlargement on the national polities of the new or prospective member states is still scarce. In particular, sexual politics has remained an under-researched topic (for an exception, see Stychin 2003). However, there is sufficient reason to speculate that accession will significantly affect the discourses and strategies of social movements struggling around sexuality and gender in the new member states. Even if it cannot be predicted at this stage, how political actors and social movements will respond and position themselves with regard to these newly emerging ‘political opportunity structures’ (Kriesi et al. 1995), the evolving institutional, economic, and discursive context will without any doubt impact on their politics.


Author(s):  
Artur Nowak-Far

AbstractAt present, the European rule of law enforcement framework under Article 7 TEU (RLF) is vulnerable to unguaranteed, discretionary influences of the Member States. This vulnerability arises from its procedural format which requires high thresholds in decision-making with the effect that this procedure is prone to be terminated by the EU Member States likely to be scrutinized under it, if only they collude. Yet, the Framework may prove effective to correct serious breaches against human rights (in the context of ineffective rule of law standards). The European Commission is bound to pursue the RLF effectiveness for the sake of achieving relative uniformity of application of EU law (at large), and making the European Union a credible actor and co-creator of international legal order. The RLF is an important tool for the maintenance of relative stability of human rights and the rule of law in the EU despite natural divergence propensity resulting from the procedural autonomy of the EU Member States. By achieving this stability, the EU achieves significant political weight in international dialogue concerning human rights and the rule of law and preserves a high level of its global credibility in this context. Thus, RLF increases the EU’s effectiveness in promoting the European model of their identification and enforcement.


2002 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-184
Author(s):  
Hannah R. Garry

From 1986 to the present, there has been a dramatic increase in the numbers of asylum applications within the borders of the European Union largely from Eastern European countries and former colonies in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. Reacting to the influxes of the 1980s, European States began to implement and coordinate policies to control entry of asylum seekers. Within this climate, the EU has moved towards harmonisation of asylum policy and procedure as necessary for its pursuit of an ‘area of freedom, security and justice’ without internal borders for the purpose of greater economic and political integration. In light of the current restrictive attitudes and practice towards asylum seekers in the individual Member States of the EU, the harmonisation of asylum policy through the institutions and law of the EU may prove to be problematic from a human rights perspective. This paper first traces the development of a common asylum policy within the EU through the Maastricht Treaty and the Amsterdam Treaty. Second, this paper analyses the implications of harmonisation after the Amsterdam Treaty with reference to the international obligations of the Member States under international human rights and refugee law. Third, this paper critiques the development of various current asylum policies and practice through intergovernmental development of ‘soft law’. Through this overview and analysis, it is argued that further steps towards harmonisation will continue to reflect European concerns with security, economic prosperity, and cultural homogeneity unless the moves towards supranationalism within the EU framework lead to a deliberate effort to make respect for human rights the core of asylum law and policy.


2021 ◽  
Vol 115 (4) ◽  
pp. 715-721

In July, the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), and other allies attributed a variety of malicious cyber activities, including the Microsoft Exchange hack, to China. This joint attribution builds on commitments made in June summits with NATO, the G7, the EU, and the United Kingdom, and is consistent with the Biden administration's multilateral approach to confronting cybersecurity threats and China more generally. Still, critics question whether the administration's efforts will succeed in altering the behavior of states that pose cybersecurity threats to the United States.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 85-92
Author(s):  
Gábor Kemény ◽  
Michal Vít

The aim of the paper is to introduce the legal misfits between the standards of human rights as stated by the European Union and the Council of Europe and practical day to day experience related to EU member states. For this purpose, the article focuses on political and legal assessment of the so-called pushbacks at the Greek-Turkish external border and introduces the influencing factors, such as the various interpretation of the legislation, differences in the organisational structure and values. Authors concluded that these factors are endangering the fulfilment of the fundamental rights and the efficiency of the border protection thus the security of the EU and its member states.


Author(s):  
Ramon Pacheco Pardo

Relations between Europe and North Korea date back to the founding of North Korea in 1948 when North Korea established relations with seven Central and Eastern European states. During the Cold War, several Western and Northern European states initiated diplomatic and trade relations with North Korea. However, North Korea remained anchored in the socialist bloc, including Central and Eastern Europe—even if its membership of the Non-Aligned Movement from 1975 suggested Pyongyang’s wish to have a degree of independence from the bloc. Official European Union (EU)–North Korea relations started in the post-Cold War years, just as the EU was starting to develop its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The EU began to provide aid to North Korea in 1995 and joined the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO)—through Euratom—in 1997. Between 1998 and 2001, the EU and North Korea launched political and human rights dialogues and established diplomatic relations. Since 2003, however, the EU has pursued a policy of “critical engagement” toward North Korea as a result of the Asian country’s development of its nuclear program. This has led to steadily deteriorating relations. In 2006, the EU started to impose sanctions on North Korea in relation to its nuclear and missile programs. Human rights and political dialogues were suspended in 2013 and 2015, respectively. In 2020, the EU imposed cyber sanctions on North Korea. One year later, it imposed more sanctions on North Korea in relation to alleged human rights abuses. As of 2021, the EU is prioritizing pressure over engagement in its relations with North Korea, and economic links have decreased dramatically from their peak in the early 2000s.


2020 ◽  
Vol 59 (3) ◽  
pp. 487-494
Author(s):  
David Lewis

This Resolution was adopted in October 2019 following a report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights. It has to be seen in the context of previous Council of Europe activity on this topic as well as the European Union (EU) Directive on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law. The content of the EU Directive was agreed earlier in 2019 and EU Member States are obliged to transpose it into national legislation by December 2021.


Author(s):  
Raja Noureddine

Ian Manners (2002) famously argued that the European Union (EU) is a ‘normative’ power. According to this description, ethical values are fundamental both to the legal basis, and to the day- to-day policies of the EU. This essay evaluates the claim that the EU is a Normative Power, focusing on the field of human rights. Certainly, the EU strongly promotes its human rights policies as being a force for good in the world. The EU’s has traditionally been supportive of international legal regimes, and its human rights values have conditioned its relations with other actors. Despite this, the EU’s policies have often failed to change the behaviour of other actors. The main cause of this gap between rhetoric and reality is the conflict between the traditional realist interests of member states, and the ideals of the EU. The EU must be more conscious of this clash, if its human rights policies are to be successful.


2011 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 545-556
Author(s):  
Justine N Stefanelli

On 14 September 2010 the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) delivered its judgment in Akzo Nobel.1 The judgment and its preceding opinion focused on the application of legal professional privilege to communications between a client and in-house legal counsel. The less-emphasized aspect of the case was the Court's decision to exclude all lawyers qualified outside of the European Union (EU) from the application of legal professional privilege.2 Because the application of legal professional privilege to lawyers from third States was not the focus of Akzo Nobel, the issue was lost in the extensive debate surrounding privilege and in-house legal counsel. The Court unfortunately missed an opportunity to reshape EU privilege law in acknowledgement of its negative consequences on the EU human rights framework and also on the EU's relationships with countries which do not apply a similar bright line rule. These implications will be discussed below with a particular emphasis on the EU's obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and its relationship with the United States (US).


Global Jurist ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Leo Paul Martinez ◽  
Pierpaolo Marano

AbstractEffective October 1, 2018, the Member States of the European Union had to bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Directive (EU) 2016/97 of the European Parliament and of the Council of January 20, 2016 on insurance distribution (IDD). The IDD arose out of a desire to give insurance customers equal protection regardless of the type of distributor from which they obtained insurance. Essentially, the IDD seeks to level the playing field of protections for insurance customers by simplifying, consolidating, and expanding customer protections when needed. The IDD has the stated goal of focusing on “the area of the disclosure of information” to customers. The directive is intentionally broad and applies “to persons whose activity consists of providing insurance or reinsurance distribution services to third parties.”Although it is much too early to predict the course of the IDD within the European Union, a comparison can be drawn with the Model Acts promulgated by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) in the United States to glean an inkling as to where the IDD might be headed. Parts of the Model Acts have been in place for a number of years and, while the legal regimes they cover are modestly different, there are nonetheless broad lessons that can be drawn in the comparison of the two. Whether the path of the IDD follows the arc of the Model Acts, or not, will perhaps be attributed to three instrumental aspects: 1.The IDD is unquestionably focused on customer protection. The NAIC is more nearly concerned with uniformity. It may be that the IDD’s focus will contribute to better traction among the EU Member States then Model Acts have experienced in the United States.2.Unlike the IDD, the NAIC Model Acts are not comprehensive with respect to customer protection.3.The NAIC Model Acts have seen inconsistent adoption by the states, a factor that has contributed to a lack of uniformity and constancy across any number of insurance products. While the IDD should not suffer from spotty adoption, the relative flexibility of the EU Member States in adopting more stringent rules may lead to a lack of uniformity and consistency similar to that of the Model Acts. Thus, the IDD may very well face the same headwinds faced by the Model Acts in the United States.Accurate predictions are always elusive when dealing with the implementation of regulation and legislation. Accordingly, we will watch with curiosity whether the IDD, which takes a much more global approach in customer protection, will see more success.


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