The Law and Certifying Practitioners

1929 ◽  
Vol 75 (310) ◽  
pp. 406-409
Author(s):  
The Rt. Hon

Recent decisions in the Law Courts leave the law relating to improper or negligent certification in a very unsatisfactory position; and that not only from the point of view of the medical practitioner. The effect of the decision in Harnett v. Fisher ([1927] Appeal Cases 573) is that a person of sound mind who has been improperly certified as insane through the negligence of the certifying physician, and has as a result of that negligence been deprived of his liberty for a period exceeding six years during which it has been impossible for him to take legal proceedings, is by his failure to do so—in other words, by the very gravity of the wrong that he has suffered—deprived of any remedy for that wrong against the person to whose negligence it is traceable.

2008 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Schafik Allam

AbstractIn viewing the documents relative to the Ptolemaic jurisdiction we come across an official with a title transcribed into Demotic, but which apparently corresponds to the Greek designation εισαγωευς. This official is mentioned in conjunction with judicial proceedings. His functions were to introduce cases before the judges and to take actions in concert with them; and his bailiff was empowered to enforce judicial decisions. Since the eisagogeus represented the central administration, we may postulate that he was regarded as a royal functionary acting as a liaison man with the law courts. My concern is to point out an official in the pre-Ptolemaic administration who had to play the same role. In the judicial machine of Pharaonic times many a scribe played an active part, not only in writing down the records. In reality he used to act in legal proceedings from start to finish. In grave situations he had to communicate directly with the highest office in the State (that of the vizier); and even at the great council (qnbt) held by the vizier, the scribe officiated sometimes as prosecutor. We come to the conclusion that it is likely that the position of the Hellenistic eisagogeus was no more than the continuation of a much older Pharaonic institution.


2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 264
Author(s):  
Hendra Mulyadi

Former TNI Commander Gen. Gatot Nurmantio to clean up the Indonesian National Army Institution from the Narcotics influence has issued instructions and orders to his ranks, efforts to overcome the problem of narcotics are not separated from the Principles of Military Interest. The principle of military interests means that in carrying out state defense and security, military interests are prioritized more than the interests of groups and individuals. It means that in the judicial process, military interests are always balanced with legal interests, in enforcing the law, military interests must not be ignored. Law enforcers within the TNI in carrying out legal proceedings against narcotics abusers should not only see their legal interests, military interests but also must be seriously considered. Military Judges who will decide on Narcotics cases should not only see the problem from the law. The dismissal of soldiers who are perpetrators of narcotics abusers is very reasonable because from a medical point of view, someone who has consumed drugs is not ready to use, they will experience brain tissue damage, nerve cells and memory loss so that their physical condition is not prime anymore and will not be able to carry out basic tasks to the fullest. This writing aims at 1. To find out how the implementation / application of the principle of military interest in dismissal is disrespectful to the soldiers involved in narcotics crime 2. To find out how the judges' legal considerations apply the principle of military interest in dismissal with disrespect to the involved soldiers criminal narcotics, military court I-03 / Padang in practice has applied the principle of military interest in the consideration of penalties especially in narcotics criminal cases in its legal area both as a user and as a narcotics dealer, but has not been followed by orders to convicts to carry out medical rehabilitation.


1934 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
pp. 149-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. Stuart Sutherland

The study of Law Merchant in England in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries which I venture to read to the Society to-day arose out of some work upon the business of eighteenth-century merchants. I approach the complex problem of the Law Merchant therefore not from the point of view of the law courts but as the merchant himself approached it, by way of the problems of commercial intercourse.


Legal Theory ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 101-128
Author(s):  
Hanoch Sheinman

Justice, you might think, is the first virtue of the law. After all, we call our judges justices, the administration of law the administration of justice, and the government's legal department the Justice Department. We should reject this Priority of Justice for the Law in favor of the more moderate Priority of Justice for the Courts, the view that justice is the first virtue of the law courts. Under its comparative conception, justice is distinguishable by its concern with the relative positions of subjects. I claim that legal duties divide into primary and secondary, that primary legal duties are not essentially comparative, and that this impugns the Priority of Comparative Justice for the Law. Still, the bipolar structure of litigation appears to suggest that comparative justice is the first virtue of the courts. I explain why that is not so. I then introduce a desert-based conception of justice I dub requitative justice. I argue that the Priority of Justice for the Law cannot draw succor from this conception of justice because primary legal duties are no more requitative than they are comparative. However, the special affinity between law courts and secondary legal duties suggests that requitative justice is the first virtue of the courts. Finally, I concede that the Priority of Justice for the Courts gives us reason to accept the Priority of Justice for the Law after all, if we accept the common Priority of Courts for the Law, the view that the courts are the first institution of the law. We should not do so, however.


1996 ◽  
Vol 30 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 154-160
Author(s):  
Knut Amelung

My lecture deals with three loosely connected topics, which are treated together in German textbooks.1. Acts authorized by law as mentioned in article 49, section 1, of the draft.2. Acts on the order of an authority, as mentioned in article 49, section 2, of the draft.3. Acts for the purposes of education, as mentioned in article 49, section 5, of the draft.Initially, a German scholar would be tempted to view the provision in article 49, section 1, as redundant. From a German point of view, it is evident that someone, who is authorized by law to act in a certain way, does not do so unlawfully. One of the first principles German students learn in their criminal law lectures, is that every act permitted by statute is in effect the justification of what is by definition a criminal offence. This is derived from a principle, which we call “unity of law”. This means that there may not be any contradictions in the law, and that an act permitted by it cannot also be forbidden by criminal code.


Author(s):  
Anne Power

This article provides a brief overview of emotionally focused couple therapy (EFT) along with some reservations about the method. The article considers questions and critiques which are often raised about the model and does so from the point of view of a practitioner new to the method, who has become convinced of the value of the approach whilst not wanting to jettison an object relations understanding. The segregation between different groups of attachment researchers and practitioners is noted. To provide variation I occasionally use the term "marital" but I do so loosely, referring to a couple bond rather than to a wedded pair. The systemic pattern between a pursuer and a withdrawer which is discussed here could refer to a same-sex or a heterosexual couple, despite the different gender alignments which operate in each case.


2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
Masdar Masdar

Cash waqf in Indonesia has been long enough implemented based on some rules enacted by government and other rules defined by The Waqf Board of Indonesia (BWI). However, the implementation of cash waqf has not reached the level of success. Therefore, this article studies the application of cash waqf law in Indonesia according to Friedman’s legal system theory. The legal system theory of Friedman firstly looks at the substance of the law, which is the rules or regulations; and secondly it examines the structure of the law, encompassing the law enforcement agencies, such as judge, prosecutor, police and legal counselors. And lastly the theory examines the element of legal culture, which is a response from Muslim society. The first two examinations indicate that there is nothing to be a problem. But from the last examination there is a problem regarding the trust from Muslim society. From the legal culture point of view, the implementation of cash waqf by the government, which is performed by BWI, needs attracting society’s credentials in order to improve and maximize the performance of cash waqf in Indonesia.


2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Fawzia Cassim ◽  
Nomulelo Queen Mabeka

Civil procedure enforces the rules and provisions of civil law.  The law of civil procedure involves the issuing, service and filing of documents to initiate court proceedings in the superior courts and lower courts. Indeed, notice of legal proceedings is given to every person to ensure compliance with the audi alteram partem maxim (“hear the other side”). There are various rules and legislation that regulate these court proceedings such as inter alia, the Superior Courts Act, 2013, Uniform Rules of Court, Constitution Seventeenth Amendment Act, 2012 and the Magistrates’ Courts Act of 1944. The rules of court are binding on a court by virtue of their nature.  The purpose of these rules is to facilitate inexpensive and efficient legislation. However, civil procedure does not only depend on statutory provisions and the rules of court.  Common law also plays a role. Superior Courts are said to exercise inherent jurisdiction in that its jurisdiction is derived from common law.  It is noteworthy that whilst our rules of court and statutes are largely based on the English law, Roman-Dutch law also has an impact on our procedural law. The question thus arises, how can our law of civil procedure transform to accommodate elements of Africanisation as we are part and parcel of the African continent/diaspora? In this regard, the article examines the origins of Western-based civil procedure, our formal court systems, the impact of the Constitution on traditional civil procedure, the use of dispute resolution mechanisms in Western legal systems and African culture, an overview of the Traditional Courts Bill of 2012 and the advent of the Traditional Courts Bill of 2017. The article also examines how the contentious Traditional Courts Bills of 2012 and 2017 will transform or complement the law of civil procedure and apply in practice once it is passed into law.


Author(s):  
Molly Shaffer Van Houweling

This chapter studies intellectual property (IP). A hallmark of the New Private Law (NPL) is attentiveness to and appreciation of legal concepts and categories, including the traditional categories of the common law. These categories can sometimes usefully be deployed outside of the traditional common law, to characterize, conceptualize, and critique other bodies of law. For scholars interested in IP, for example, common law categories can be used to describe patent, copyright, trademark, and other fields of IP as more or less “property-like” or “tort-like.” Thischapter investigates both the property- and tort-like features of IP to understand the circumstances under which one set of features tends to dominate and why. It surveys several doctrines within the law of copyright that demonstrate how courts move along the property/tort continuum depending on the nature of the copyrighted work at issue—including, in particular, how well the work’s protected contours are defined. This conceptual navigation is familiar, echoing how common law courts have moved along the property/tort continuum to address disputes over distinctive types of tangible resources.


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