scholarly journals Competition and Corporate Governance in Transition

2002 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-124 ◽  
Author(s):  
Saul Estrin
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Transition Economies ◽  
Initial Conditions ◽  
Institutional Development ◽  
Political Support ◽  
Company Performance ◽  
Central European ◽  
Institutional Frameworks ◽  
Cis Countries

This paper examines the elements of institutional development critical to the enhancement of company performance in transition economies. This includes initial conditions, forms of privatization, institutional frameworks and the competitiveness of markets. Comparing empirical evidence, the paper concludes that there is a clear distinction in effectiveness of policies followed and their impact between Central Europe and CIS countries. This divergence is attributed to fundamentally different political attitudes toward reform, the need of CIS governments to gain political support for reform and as a consequence of the desire of Central European countries to join European Union.

Concatenation of Circumstances or Historical Regularity?

2009 ◽  
pp. 75-84
Author(s):  
V. Popov
Keyword(s):  
Transition Economies ◽  
Government Expenditure ◽  
Previous History ◽  
Shock Therapy ◽  
Economic Liberalization ◽  
Institutional Capacity ◽  
Government Failure ◽  
Stage Of Development ◽  
Optimal Policies ◽  
Cis Countries

Why have many transition economies succeeded by pursuing policies which are so different from the radical economic liberalization (shock therapy) that is normally credited for the economic success of countries of Central Europe? First, optimal policies are context dependent, they are specific for each stage of development and what worked in Slovenia cannot be expected to work in Mongolia. Second, even for the countries with the same level of development reforms that are necessary to stimulate growth are different; they depend on the previous history and on the path chosen. The reduction of government expenditure as a share of GDP did not undermine significantly the institutional capacity of the state in China, but in Russia and other CIS countries it turned out to be ruinous. The art of the policymaker is to create markets without causing government failure, as happened in many CIS countries.

Book Reviews

2004 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 249-255
Author(s):  
Merdan Halilov ◽  
Zdenek Kudrna ◽  
Judit Kapás
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Foreign Trade ◽  
Transition Economies ◽  
Central European ◽  
European University

[Book reviews] Winiecki, J.: Transition Economies and Foreign Trade. London and New York: Routledge, 2002, 150 pp.; Olson, M.: Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorship. New York: Basic Books, 2000, 233 pp.; Krizsán, A. - Zentai, V. (eds): Reshaping Globalization - Multilateral Dialogues and New Initiatives. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2003, 327 pp.

THE EFFECT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CORPORATE CULTURE ON FIRM MARKET VALUE TO IMPROVE FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (6) ◽  
pp. 930-940
Author(s):  
Fathiyah Fathiyah ◽  
Mufidah Mufidah
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Performance ◽  
Corporate Culture ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Descriptive Analysis ◽  
Market Value ◽  
Company Performance ◽  
Financial Company

The purpose of this research is to analyze the effect of corporate governance and corporate culture  on firm market value to improve financial performance. Corporate governance  is measured by audit  committee,boards of directors, board meeting and nomination . Corporate culture is measured by Corporate culture promotion While financial  company performance is measured by return on assets.  This research was conducted on companies listed on the Indonesia Stock exchange on indexed LQ 45 for period of 2016-2018. The sample was selected for 25 companies. The method of analysis uses associate descriptive analysis with  path analysis. Based on the results of the study found that corporate governance and culture promotion indirectly effect on financial performance with firm market value as intervening variable.

Investments by Emerging-Market Multinationals in Other Emerging Markets

2018 ◽  
pp. 630-656
Author(s):  
Jing Li ◽  
Daniel Shapiro
Keyword(s):  
Sustainable Development ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Emerging Economies ◽  
Multinational Enterprises ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
Institutional Development ◽  
Spillover Effects ◽  
Investment Strategy ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Foreign Direct Investments

This chapter reviews the literature on foreign direct investments among emerging economies (E-E FDI), focusing on the motivations behind E-E FDI, country-specific advantages and firm-specific advantages associated with emerging-economy multinational enterprises (EMNEs), and spillover effects of E-E FDI on host-country economic and institutional development. We identify the following topics as posing important questions for future research: EMNEs’ ability to leverage home-government resources and diplomatic connections to promote investment in other emerging economies; nonmarket strategies of EMNEs in emerging economies; ownership and corporate governance affecting investment strategy and performance of EMNEs; E-E FDI contributions to sustainable development in host countries. Future studies should also consider potential heterogeneity among EMNEs by integrating insights from institutional theory, network theory, political science, corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, and sustainable-development research.

scholarly journals Clusters as institutional entrepreneurs: lessons from Russia

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Evgeniya Lupova-Henry ◽  
Sam Blili ◽  
Cinzia Dal Zotto
Keyword(s):  
Case Studies ◽  
Transition Economies ◽  
Change Agents ◽  
Institutional Entrepreneurship ◽  
Institutional Barriers ◽  
Barriers To Innovation ◽  
Institutional Entrepreneurs ◽  
Institutional Frameworks ◽  
Ability To Act ◽  
Individual Cluster

AbstractIn this article, we explore whether organized clusters can act as institutional entrepreneurs to create conditions favorable to innovation in their constituent members. We view self-aware and organized clusters as “context-embedded meta-organizations” which engage in deliberate decision- and strategy-making. As such, clusters are not only shaped by their environments, as “traditional” cluster approaches suggest but can also act upon these. Their ability to act as “change agents” is crucial in countries with high institutional barriers to innovation, such as most transition economies. Focusing on Russia, we conduct two cluster case studies to analyze the strategies these adopt to alter and shape their institutional environments. We find that clusters have a dual role as institutional entrepreneurs. First, these can act collectively to shape their environments due to the power they wield. Second, they can be mechanisms empowering their constituent actors, fostering their reflexivity and creativity, and allowing them to engage in institutional entrepreneurship. Moreover, both collective and individual cluster actors adopt “bricolage” approaches to institutional entrepreneurship to compensate for the lack of resources or institutional frameworks or avoid the pressures of ineffective institutions.

scholarly journals Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment, and Growth

2005 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 655-720 ◽  
Author(s):  
Randall Morck ◽  
Daniel Wolfenzon ◽  
Bernard Yeung
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Capital Investment ◽  
Corporate Control ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Institutional Development ◽  
The United States ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Control Structures ◽  
Resource Misallocation ◽  
Property Rights Protection

Outside the United States and the United Kingdom, large corporations usually have controlling owners, who are usually very wealthy families. Pyramidal control structures, cross shareholding, and super-voting rights let such families control corporations without making a commensurate capital investment. In many countries, a few such families end up controlling considerable proportions of their countries' economies. Three points emerge. First, at the firm level, these ownership structures, because they vest dominant control rights with families who often have little real capital invested, permit a range of agency problems and hence resource misallocation. If a few families control large swaths of an economy, such corporate governance problems can attain macroeconomic importance—affecting rates of innovation, economywide resource allocation, and economic growth. If political influence depends on what one controls, rather than what one owns, the controlling owners of pyramids have greatly amplified political influence relative to their actual wealth. This influence can distort public policy regarding property rights protection, capital markets, and other institutions. We denote this phenomenon economic entrenchment, and posit a relationship between the distribution of corporate control and institutional development that generates and preserves economic entrenchment as one possible equilibrium. The literature suggests key determinants of economic entrenchment, but has many gaps where further work exploring the political economy importance of the distribution of corporate control is needed.

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