scholarly journals Chisholm's Modal Paradox(es) and Counterpart Theory 50 Years On

2020 ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Murali Ramachandran
2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Harriet E. Baber

Abstract Modal counterpart theory identifies a thing’s possibly being F with its having a counterpart that is F at another possible world; temporal counterpart theory identifies a thing’s having been F or going to be F, with its having a counterpart that is F at another time. Benovsky, J. 2015. “Alethic Modalities, Temporal Modalities, and Representation.” Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 29: 18–34 in this journal endorses modal counterpart theory but holds that temporal counterpart theory is untenable because it does not license the ascription of the intuitively correct temporal properties to ordinary objects, and hence that we should understand ordinary objects, including persons, as transtemporal ‘worms’. I argue that the worm theory is problematic when it comes to accounting for what matters in survival and that temporal counterpart theory provides a plausible account of personal persistence.


2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 127-146 ◽  
Author(s):  
THEODORE SIDER

AbstractPersonal identity is not always symmetric: even if I will not be a later person, the later person may have been me. What makes this possible is that the relations that are criterial of personal identity—such as memory and anticipation—are asymmetric and ‘count in favor of personal identity from one side only’. Asymmetric personal identity can be accommodated by temporal counterpart theory but not by Lewisian overlapping aggregates of person stages. The question of uncertainty in cases of personal fission (and in Everettian quantum mechanics) is also discussed.


2014 ◽  
pp. 54-80
Author(s):  
Teresa Robertson
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Teresa Robertson
Keyword(s):  

Synthese ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 197 (11) ◽  
pp. 4691-4715
Author(s):  
Achille C. Varzi

Abstract David Lewis’s counterpart theory (CT) is often seen as involving a radical departure from the standard, Kripke-style semantics for modal logic (ML), suggesting that we are dealing with deeply divergent accounts of our modal talk. However, CT captures but one version of the relevant semantic intuition, and does so on the basis of metaphysical assumptions (all worlds are equally real, individuals are world-bound) that are ostensibly discretionary. Just as ML can be translated into a language that quantifies explicitly over worlds, CT may be formulated as a semantic theory in which world quantification is purely metalinguistic. And just as Kripke-style semantics is formally compatible with the doctrine of world-boundedness, a counterpart-based semantics may in principle allow for cases of trans-world identity. In fact, one may welcome a framework that is general enough to include both Lewis’s counterpart-based account and Kripke’s identity-based account as distinguished special cases. There are several ways of doing so. The purpose of this paper is to outline a fully general option and to illustrate its philosophical significance, showing how the large variety of intermediate relations that lie between Lewisian counterparthood and Kripkean identity yield a corresponding variety of modal theories that would otherwise remain uncharted.


Analysis ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 65 (3) ◽  
pp. 210-218 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Dorr
Keyword(s):  

Analysis ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 65 (4) ◽  
pp. 321-325 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Langford
Keyword(s):  

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