Effect of corporate governance on ceo pay - risk taking association: empirical evidence from australian financial institutions

2016 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 309-344
Author(s):  
Abdullahi D. Ahmed ◽  
Gilbert A. Ndayisaba
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Ceo Pay

scholarly journals Editorial: An empirical contribution to corporate governance issues

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 4-6
Author(s):  
Áron Perényi ◽  
Simone Terzani
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Business Management ◽  
Corporate Ownership ◽  
And Control ◽  
Empirical Contribution

The new issue of Corporate Ownership and Control journal is composed by 15 articles focussing on a variety of topics in the field. Five papers present empirical evidence from banks and financial institutions, three focus on firm finances, four on governance and responsibility and a further three on the role of technology in terms of contextualising various business management activities.

scholarly journals Corporate Governance of Banks and Financial Institutions: Economic Theory, Supervisory Practice, Evidence and Policy

2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-37
Author(s):  
Klaus J. Hopt
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Senior Managers ◽  
Good Corporate Governance ◽  
Bank Governance ◽  
Supervisory Practice

AbstractBanks are special, and so is the corporate governance of banks and other financial institutions. Empirical evidence, mostly gathered after the financial crisis, confirms this. Banks practicing good corporate governance in the traditional, shareholder-oriented style fared less well than banks having less shareholder-prone boards and less shareholder influence. The special governance of banks and other financial institutions is firmly embedded in bank supervisory law and regulation. Most recently there has been intense discussion on the purpose of (non-bank) corporations. For banks stakeholder governance and, more particularly, creditor or debtholder governance is more important than shareholder governance. The implications of this for research and reform are still uncertain. A key problem is the composition and qualification of the board. The legislative task is to enhance independent as well as qualified control. The proposal of giving creditors and even supervisors a special seat in the board is not convincing. Other important special issues of bank governance are for example the duties and liabilities of bank directors in particular as far as risk and compliance are concerned, but also the remuneration paid to bank directors and senior managers or key function holders. Claw-back provisions, either imposed by law or introduced by banks themselves, exist already in certain countries and are beneficial. Much depends on enforcement, an understudied topic.

scholarly journals Chinese CEO, Risk Taking and the Power of CEO: Empirical Evidence from Malaysian Family Firms

2021 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-84
Author(s):  
Swee-Sim Foong ◽  
Jiunn-Shyan Khong ◽  
Boon-Leong Lim
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Lower Risk ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Ceo Power ◽  
Structural Power ◽  
Expert Power

This paper examines the risk taking behaviour of Chinese CEO. Our analysis is based on a sample of 362 family firms in Malaysia over the 2009-2015 period using panel GMM methodology. Firstly, our results offer evidence that Chinese CEOs are risk taking. We then examine how CEO power, in the context of Finkelstein’s (1992) structural power, ownership power, expert power and prestige power, might drive risk taking of Chinese CEOs. The results are rather mixed where greater ownership power is likely to promote higher risk taking but greater expert power resulted in lower risk taking. We further show that corporate governance can mitigate risk taking of Chinese CEO in family firms. When the proportions of independent directors and foreign institutional shareholdings exceed the median thresholds of 40% and 5%, respectively, we find that CEO risk taking behaviour turns from positive to negative. Stronger evidence is found when we adjust the thresholds to the 75th percentile of 50% and 15%, respectively. The result is also robust with the use of leverage as a measure for CEO risk taking.

Banks’ capital regulation and risk: Does bank vary in size? Empirical evidence from Bangladesh

2017 ◽  
Vol 04 (02n03) ◽  
pp. 1750025 ◽  
Author(s):  
Changjun Zheng ◽  
Syed Moudud-Ul-Huq
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Credit Risk ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Commercial Banks ◽  
Think Tanks ◽  
Capital Regulation ◽  
Level Data ◽  
Risk Taking Behavior ◽  
The Stability

This paper primarily examines both causality effect of banks’ capital regulation and risk-taking behavior based on generalized methods of moment (GMM) for a dynamic unbalanced panel observation of 32 commercial banks in Bangladesh over the period 2000–2014. The empirical findings of this study suggest that capital regulation has a significant effect on risk-taking behavior, and excessive risks impede the growth of capital ratio as well as the stability. Moreover, from bank-level data, size does not uniformly affect the quantity of capital and risk. Large banks have poor capital ratio and higher inclination to risk than small size counterpart. Small size banks are well managed in capital ratio and risk-taking that glitter their stability through the periods. Besides these effects, corporate governance notably influenced banks to reduce credit risk and enhance stability. Finally, this paper provides some implications for the think tanks and stakeholders of the country.

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