The B-Deduction and the Refutation of Idealism

2019 ◽  
pp. 41-60
1919 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 77
Author(s):  
A. K. Rogers

1904 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 76
Author(s):  
Ralph Barton Perry ◽  
G. E. Moore

1991 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-67
Author(s):  
Michael Hymers

2003 ◽  
pp. 76-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Williams

2020 ◽  
pp. 65-122
Author(s):  
Karen Ng

This chapter explores Hegel’s speculative identity thesis, defending the importance of Schelling for Hegel’s appropriation of Kant’s purposiveness theme. It provides an interpretation of Hegel’s first published text, the Differenzschrift, and analyzes the relation between “subjective subject-objects” and “objective subject-objects” as an early presentation of Hegel’s philosophical method. In addition to defending the contribution of Schelling, this chapter provides an interpretation of Fichte’s contribution via his notion of the self-positing activity of the I. It then turns to a reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, demonstrating that the notion of “negativity” can be understood along the lines of speculative identity. The chapter argues that Hegel presents life as constitutive for self-consciousness by way of a three-dimensional argument: the employment of an analogy; a transcendental argument; and a refutation of idealism argument. It concludes by briefly outlining how the speculative identity thesis is carried forward in the Science of Logic.


2015 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 199-209
Author(s):  
Paul Clavier ◽  
Jacopo Domenicucci

Kant’s Refutation of Idealism has often been assessed either from a realistic or from a transcendental point of view. Each of them proves to be unsufficient. The realistic approach wouldn’t it enough the tenets of the Transcendental Esthetics, and the transcendental approach doesn’t allow us to go beyond our representations. We put forward a logical and structural analysis of the famous paragraph from the System of all principles and its rewriting in the Preface to the Second edition of the first Critique. Additional evidence from the Opus Postumum leads us to suggest that Kant more or less willingly endorses an equivocation on the phrase “existing outside me”, which wonderfully serves his double purpose of saving the transcendental deduction and facing the so-called “scandal of idealism.”


1971 ◽  
pp. 137-160
Author(s):  
A. J. Ayer

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document