scholarly journals The obligation of national Courts against whose decision there is no judicial remedy to refer questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union

2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (31) ◽  
pp. 24-36
Author(s):  
Valentin Paul Neamt

Abstract The present paper presents the obligation that courts in the member states of the European Union have to refer questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union, with a focus on courts against whose decision there is no judicial remedy under national law. The paper starts by presenting the applicable framework regarding the preliminary reference procedure, then focuses on analyzing the exceptions to national court’s duty under article 267 TFEU, with a focus on the direction in which the case law is heading based on the most recent judgments handed down by the Court of Justice of the European Union in 2015, finally presenting the author’s conclusions and observation on the subject.

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 19-36
Author(s):  
Graham Butler

The vast majority of cases that are submitted to the Court of Justice of the European Union (the Court) through the preliminary reference procedure that is contained in Article 267 TFEU come from lower instance national courts and tribunals in EU Member States. As a result, it is not always appellate courts, or higher instance national courts and tribunals, such as courts of final appeal, which make orders for reference. Judicial dialogue between national courts and the Court through this Article 267 TFEU procedure is notable for its particular quality of it being open to receiving orders for reference, for an interpretation of EU law from national courts and tribunals – of any instance – from first instance, to final instance. But can this judicial dialogue between lower instance national courts and tribunals and the Court be impeded by national courts’ more senior national Brethren, with appeals being allowed against orders for reference within national legal orders? The case law of the Court on such an issue has been progressive, in that it developed slowly over time, and the Court, by 2021, becoming increasingly assertive. As will be analysed in this article, the Court’s approach to the arising issue has clearly been an attempt to balance the interests of judicial dialogue on the one hand, and national rules on the other. Yet, with the Court’s broader case law tightening the understanding of who constitutes the European judiciary, and ensuring that all national courts and tribunals remain independent from executive interference in EU Member States, the article commends recent developments, but makes the further plea for an affirmative judgment of the Court to not permit, as a matter of EU law, appeals against orders for reference made by lower instance national courts and tribunals in EU Member States, in the name of preserving judicial dialogue through the preliminary reference procedure.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1663-1700 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clelia Lacchi

The Constitutional Courts of a number of Member States exert a constitutional review on the obligation of national courts of last instance to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).Pursuant to Article 267(3) TFEU, national courts of last instance, namely courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, are required to refer to the CJEU for a preliminary question related to the interpretation of the Treaties or the validity and interpretation of acts of European Union (EU) institutions. The CJEU specified the exceptions to this obligation inCILFIT. Indeed, national courts of last instance have a crucial role according to the devolution to national judges of the task of ensuring, in collaboration with the CJEU, the full application of EU law in all Member States and the judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law. With preliminary references as the keystone of the EU judicial system, the cooperation of national judges with the CJEU forms part of the EU constitutional structure in accordance with Article 19(1) TEU.


Author(s):  
Kreuschitz Viktor ◽  
Nehl Hanns Peter

This chapter assesses the enforcement of EU State aid rules. The Commission is not the only authority involved in the monitoring of State aid. As regards the supervision of Member States' compliance with their obligations under Articles 107 and 108 TFEU, the national courts also have an important role to play. The implementation of that system of control is a matter for both the Commission and the national courts, their respective roles being complementary but separate. Whilst assessment of the compatibility of aid measures with the common market falls within the exclusive competence of the Commission, subject to review by the Courts of the European Union, it is for national courts to ensure the safeguarding, until the final decision of the Commission, of the rights of individuals faced with a possible breach by State authorities of the prohibition laid down by Article 108(3) TFEU.


Author(s):  
Joni Heliskoski

Whatever terminology one might wish to employ to describe the form of integration constituted by the European Union and its Member States, one fundamental attribute of that arrangement has always been the division, as between the Union and its Member States, of competence to conclude international agreements with other subjects of international law. Today, the fact that treaty-making competence—as an external facet of the more general division of legal authority—is divided and, to some extent, shared between the Union and its Member States is reflected by some of the opening provisions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Notwithstanding the changes to the scope and nature of the powers conferred upon the Union, resulting from both changes to primary law and the evolution of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the basic characteristics of the conferment as an attribution of a limited kind has always been the same; there has always existed a polity endowed with a treaty-making authority divided between and, indeed, shared by, the Union and its Member States. In the early 1960s mixed agreements—that is, agreements to which the European Union


2020 ◽  
pp. 155-176
Author(s):  
Nigel Foster

This chapter examines the procedural law of the European Union (EU), focusing on Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). It explains that Article 267 is the reference procedure by which courts in member states can endorse questions concerning EU law to the Court of Justice (CJEU). Under this Article, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has the jurisdiction to provide preliminary rulings on the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies of the Union and on the interpretation of the Treaties. This ensures legal unity.


Author(s):  
Nigel Foster

This chapter examines the procedural law of the European Union (EU), focusing on Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). It explains that Article 267 is the reference procedure by which courts in member states can endorse questions concerning EU law to the European Court of Justice (CoJ). Under this Article, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has the jurisdiction to provide preliminary rulings on the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies of the Union and on the interpretation of the Treaties.


Author(s):  
Hartley Trevor C

This chapter discusses the ‘subject-matter scope’ of Brussels 2012, Lugano 2007, and the Hague Convention. ‘Subject-matter scope’ refers to the scope covered by a measure as regards its subject matter, that is to say the branches and areas of the law to which it applies. For the three legal instruments under consideration, the relevant provisions are contained in Article 1 of Brussels 2012 and Lugano, and Articles 1 and 2 of Hague. A review of case law shows that the distinction between a civil matter and public matter is far from straightforward. There is a significant grey area in which the Court of Justice of the European Union could legitimately go either way.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 1099-1130 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tamás Szabados

AbstractIn several golden share cases, the Court of Justice of the European Union (the “Court”) condemned Member States for reserving certain special rights in privatized companies for themselves. In spite of the Court's consistently strict approach in the golden share cases, the more recent golden share judgments demonstrate that the Court's practice is not free from uncertainties. In its case law, the Court seems to hesitate between the application of the freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital. Additionally, it is not entirely clear which measures are caught by provisions on the freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital.


Author(s):  
Susanne K. Schmidt

The European Court of Justice is one of the most important actors in the process of European integration. Political science still struggles to understand its significance, with recent scholarship emphasizing how closely rulings reflect member states’ preferences. In this book, I argue that the implications of the supremacy and direct effect of the EU law have still been overlooked. As it constitutionalizes an intergovernmental treaty, the European Union has a detailed set of policies inscribed into its constitution that are extensively shaped by the Court’s case law. If rulings have constitutional status, their impact is considerable, even if the Court only occasionally diverts from member states’ preferences. By focusing on the four freedoms of goods, services, persons, and capital, as well as citizenship rights, the book analyses how the Court’s development of case law has ascribed a broad meaning to these freedoms. The constitutional status of this case law constrains policymaking at the European and member-state levels. Different case studies show how major pieces of EU legislation cannot move beyond case law but have to codify its principles. Judicialization is important in the EU. It also directly constrains member-state policies. Court rulings oriented towards individual disputes are difficult to translate into general policies, and into administrative practices. Policy options are thereby withdrawn from majoritarian decision-making. As the Court cannot be overruled, short of a Treaty change, its case law casts a long shadow over policymaking in the European Union and its member states, undermining the legitimacy of this political order.


2013 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olga Łachacz ◽  
Rafał Mańko

Abstract The paper analyses and evaluates the linguistic policy of the Court of Justice of the European Union against the background of other multilingual courts and in the light of theories of legal interpretation. Multilingualism has a direct impact upon legal interpretation at the Court, displacing traditional approaches (intentionalism, textualism) with a hermeneutic paradigm. It also creates challenges to the acceptance of the Court’s case-law in the Member States, which seem to have been adequately tackled by the Court’s idiosyncratic translation policy.


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