scholarly journals EXISTENCE OF A PURE STRATEGY EQUILIBRIUM IN MARKOV GAMES WITH STRATEGIC COMPLEMENTARITIES FOR FINITE ACTIONS AND FINITE STATES

2017 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-214 ◽  
Author(s):  
Takahiro Watanabe ◽  
Hideaki Yamashita
Keyword(s):  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Markov Games ◽  
Pure Strategy Equilibrium ◽  
Strategic Complementarities ◽  
Strategy Equilibrium ◽  
Finite States

scholarly journals Bundling and Competition for Slots

2012 ◽  
Vol 102 (5) ◽  
pp. 1957-1985 ◽  
Author(s):  
Doh-Shin Jeon ◽  
Domenico Menicucci
Keyword(s):  
Marginal Cost ◽  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Digital Goods ◽  
Efficient Technology ◽  
Pure Strategy Equilibrium ◽  
Clear Cut ◽  
Mixed Strategy Equilibrium ◽  
Strategy Equilibrium

We consider competition between sellers selling multiple distinct products to a buyer having k slots. Under independent pricing, a pure strategy equilibrium often does not exist, and equilibrium in mixed strategy is never efficient. When bundling is allowed, each seller has an incentive to bundle his products, and an efficient “technology-renting” equilibrium always exists. Furthermore, in the case of digital goods or when sales below marginal cost are banned, all equilibria are efficient. Comparing the mixed-strategy equilibrium with the technology-renting equilibrium reveals that bundling often increases the buyer's surplus. Finally, we derive clear-cut policy implications.(JEL D43, D86, K21, L13, L14, L41, L82)

Costly Leader Games with a Probabilistically Non-Strategic Leader

2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (02) ◽  
pp. 1750008
Author(s):  
Brishti Guha
Keyword(s):  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Information Cost ◽  
Equilibrium Outcome ◽  
Pure Strategy Equilibrium ◽  
Strategy Equilibrium ◽  
Strategic Type ◽  
Simultaneous Move

I consider a two-person costly leader game — in which the follower endogenously chooses whether to buy information about the leader, and a follow-up action — with a twist. With a known probability, the leader is a nonstrategic type. A strategic type leader may choose to masquerade as a nonstrategic type, at a cost. I show that, if the follower’s cost of information is not too large, and the probability of the leader being nonstrategic is neither too large nor too small, this game has no pure strategy equilibrium. Moreover, the equilibrium of the simultaneous-move complete information game is inaccessible as follower information cost converges to zero. There is no equilibrium outcome in which leader advantage is destroyed: however, a mixed strategy equilibrium exists which does preserve leader advantage in the sense that payoffs and strategies converge to those of the sequential-move complete information equilibrium as information cost tends to zero. My results differ from some traditional results in costly leader games, and are due to the interaction of two forces, the “type uncertainty” and the “money down the drain” effects. To my knowledge this is the first paper to integrate behavioral types into costly leader games (other papers considering heterogeneity in type do not consider nonstrategic players).

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