scholarly journals How to investigate perceptual projection: a commentary on Pereira Jr., “The projective theory of consciousness: from neuroscience to philosophical psychology”

2018 ◽  
Vol 41 (spe) ◽  
pp. 233-242
Author(s):  
Max Velmans

Abstract: This commentary focuses on the scientific status of perceptual projection-a central feature of Pereira’s projective theory of consciousness. In his target article, he draws on my own earlier work to develop an explanatory framework for integrating first-person viewable conscious experience with the third-person viewable neural correlates and antecedent causes that form conscious experience into a bipolar structure that contains both a sense of self (created by interoceptive projective processes) and a sense of the world (created by exteroceptive projective processes). I stress that perceptual projection is a psychological effect (not an explanation for that effect) and list many of the ways it has been studied within experimental psychology, for example in studies of depth perception in vision and audition and experiences of depth arising from cues arranged on two-dimensional surfaces in stereoscopic pictures, 3D cinemas, holograms, and virtual realities. I then juxtapose Pereira’s explanatory model with two other models that have similar aims and background assumptions but different orientations, Trehub’s Retinoid model, which focuses largely on the neural functioning of the visual system, and Rudrauf et al’s Projective Consciousness Model, which draws largely on projective geometries to specify the requirements of organisms that need to navigate a three-dimensional world, and how these might be implemented in human information processing. Together, these models illustrate both converging and diverging approaches to understanding the role of projective processes in human consciousness.

2021 ◽  
pp. 40-79
Author(s):  
Hilary Kornblith

Knowledge may be examined from the third-person perspective, as psychologists and sociologists do, or it may be examined from the first-person perspective, as each of us does when we reflect on what we ought to believe. This chapter takes the third-person perspective. One obvious source of knowledge is perception, and some general features of how our perceptual systems are able to pick up information about the world around us are highlighted. The role of the study of visual illusions in this research is an important focus of the chapter. Our ability to draw out the consequences of things we know by way of inference is another important source of knowledge, and some general features of how inference achieves its successes are discussed. Structural similarities between the ways in which perception works and the ways in which inference works are highlighted.


1991 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 651-669 ◽  
Author(s):  
Max Velmans

AbstractInvestigations of the function of consciousness in human information processing have focused mainly on two questions: (1) Where does consciousness enter into the information processing sequence, and (2) how does conscious processing differ from preconscious and unconscious processing? Input analysis is thought to be initially “preconscious” and “pre-attentive” - fast, involuntary, and automatic. This is followed by “conscious,” “focal-attentive” analysis, which is relatively slow, voluntary, and flexible. It is thought that simple, familiar stimuli can be identified preconsciously, but conscious processing is needed to identify complex, novel stimuli. Conscious processing has also been thought to be necessary for choice, learning and memory, and the organization of complex, novel responses, particularly those requiring planning, reflection, or creativity.The present target article reviews evidence that consciousness performs none of these functions. Consciousness nearly alwaysresultsfrom focal-attentive processing (as a form of output) but does not itselfenter intothis or any other form of human information processing. This suggests that the term “conscious process” needs reexamination. Consciousnessappearsto be necessary in a variety of tasks because they require focal-attentive processing; if consciousness is absent, focal-attentive processing is absent. From afirst-person perspective, however, conscious statesarecausally effective. First-person accounts arecomplementaryto third-person accounts. Although they can be translated into third-person accounts, they cannot be reduced to them.


PEDIATRICS ◽  
1969 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 271-273
Author(s):  
H. Bartlett Vincent ◽  
Michael B. Rothenberg

We have presented a case of a child severely traumatized, both physically and emotionally. We feel that this and similarly difficult cases are well within the field of competent, comprehensive care that the pediatrician can provide. By means both of his proximity to the problems and in most cases by his familiarity with the psychological makeup of the patient, he is in the best position not only to initiate but to carry through prophylactic psychiatric care. The goals of minimizing both the trauma of hospitalization and long-term psychiatric sequelae can best be met by the pediatrician who can, in a non-threatening and in a non-pressuring manner, first listen to and then talk with the child and outline the thoughts and feelings that might occur in children similarly incapacitated. The child's ability to communicate can be facilitated by using a three-step process including the "third person technique" and the "option play" which have been outlined. Finally, it is our impression that the pediatrician often underestimates his ability to assume the role of primary physician, who is responsible for the total care of the child.


2002 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adamantios I. Gafos ◽  
Angela Ralli

This paper discusses data from the nominal paradigms of two dialectal varieties of East Lesvos, those of Thermi and Pamfila. It is shown that there is abundant evidence for the key role of the paradigm in the phonological realization of the [noun-clitic] clusters. We argue that the grammars of these dialectal varieties must crucially include constraints that require identity between related surface forms in the [noun-clitic] paradigm. This proposal has received considerable support by independent work, carried out mainly within Optimality Theory, in various languages. The Lesvian dialectal varieties, however, allow us to probe deeper into the precise statement of such intra-paradigmatic identity constraints. We show, first, that the identity constraints holding among various surface forms must have a limited domain of application, circumscribed by the forms of the paradigm and only those. Second, we show that intra-paradigmatic identity constraints do not require identity uniformly among all surface forms of the paradigm. Rather, distinct identity constraints hold between distinct forms. For instance, the identity constraint between the {+first person, +singular} and the {+third person, +singular} is different from that holding between the {+first person, +singular} and the {+first person, +plural}. We argue, specifically, that the network of such intra-paradigmatic identity constraints is projected on the basis of shared morphosyntactic features along the dimensions of Person and Number that enter into the construction of the paradigm.


2009 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elena T. Levy

An earlier analysis of an autistic adolescent's repeated retellings of a story (Levy & Fowler, 2004–2005) showed how a transition from disorganized linguistic behavior to organized narratives was scaffolded by adult speech. The present article is concerned with the role of kinesthetic enactment in this same transition. The goal of the analysis is to trace the emergence of narrative coherence relative to changes in speech-movement combinations. The analysis yields the following pattern of change: from utterances (1) elicited in the third-person and produced with diffuse body motion, then (2) reproduced while enacted, sometimes in the first-person, (3) elicited without enactment in the third-person, and (4) reproduced in the third-person without specific adult prompts and in the absence of full-body enactment. This pattern is interpreted as a process of increasing explicitation (Karmiloff-Smith, 1986a); relying at first on the grounding of speech-movement combinations in physical space, and later in linguistically created origos (Buhler, 1982). The findings support McNeill's (2005) view of language as a multimodal process that relies on two semiotic modes, the conventional lexicogrammatical categories of speech, and the imagistic and idiosyncratic properties of body motion.


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