scholarly journals Predatory Pricing: Single-Firm Dominance Exclusionary Abuse and Predatory Prices (Part 1)

Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 831-849
Author(s):  
Jan Louis Van Tonder

Important pronouncements of legal principle were recently made by the Competition Appeal Court and Constitutional Court on the determination of predatory pricing under section 8 of the Competition Act 89 of 1998. These pronouncements must now be seen in the context of the subsequent commencement of certain provisions of the Competition Amendment Act 18 of 2018, which affect predatory pricing cases under section 8 of the Act. In light of these developments, the main aim of this series of three articles is to evaluate the law relating to the economic concept of predatory pricing under the Competition Act. In this context, the main constituent elements of a predatory pricing case – namely, dominance, identifying an exclusionary abuse and predatory prices – are discussed in three parts. Part One critically evaluates the law on the determination of single-firm dominance under section 7 of the Competition Act. Part Two starts to focus on abuse analysis and discusses the basic forms of abuse, the meaning of abuse, tests that have been developed to identify exclusionary abuse, criticism of the traditional theory of predatory pricing, the main strategic economic theories of predatory pricing and non-pricing theories of predation. Part Three then specifically deals with the law of predatory prices under section 8(c) and 8(d)(iv) of the Competition Act. Pursuant to section 1(3) of the Competition Act, appropriate foreign and international law may be considered when interpreting or applying the Competition Act. This is complementary to section 1(2)(a), which directs that the Competition Act must be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with the Constitution and that gives effect to the purposes set out in section 2. In light hereof, where appropriate, the South African position is compared, mainly with the position in the European Union and the United States.

Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Louis Van Tonder

Important pronouncements of legal principle were recently made by the Competition Appeal Court and Constitutional Court on the determination of predatory pricing under section 8 of the Competition Act 89 of 1998. These pronouncements must now be seen in the context of the subsequent commencement of the Competition Amendment Act 18 of 2018. In light of these developments, this three-part series of articles evaluate the law relating to the economic concept of predatory pricing under the Competition Act. In this context, the crucial elements of dominance and abuse are also discussed. The first in this series of three articles critically evaluated the law on the determination of single-firm dominance under section 7 of the Competition Act. The second article discussed the basic forms of abuse, the meaning of abuse, tests that have been developed to identify exclusionary conduct, the criticism of the traditional theory of predatory pricing, the main strategic economic theories of predatory pricing and non-pricing theories of predation. This article focuses on the law of predatory prices under section 8(1)(c) and 8(1)(d)(iv) of the Competition Act. Pursuant to section 1(3) of the Competition Act, when interpreting or applying the Competition Act, appropriate foreign and international law may be considered. This is complementary to section 1(2)(a), which directs that the Competition Act must be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with the Constitution and which gives effect to the purposes set out in section 2. In light hereof and where appropriate, the South African position is mainly compared with the position in the European Union and the United States.


Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Louis van Tonder

Important pronouncements of legal principle were recently made by the Competition Appeal Court and Constitutional Court on the determination of predatory pricing under section 8 of the Competition Act 89 of 1998. These pronouncements must now be seen in the context of the subsequent commencement of certain provisions of the Competition Amendment Act 18 of 2018, which affect predatory pricing cases under section 8 of the Act. In light of these developments, the main aim of this series of three articles is to evaluate the law relating to the economic concept of predatory pricing under the Competition Act. In this context, the main constituent elements of a predatory pricing case – namely dominance, identifying an exclusionary abuse, and predatory prices – are discussed in three parts. Part 1 has critically evaluated the law on the determination of single-firm dominance under section 7 of the Competition Act. Part 2 starts to focus on the abuse analysis and discusses the basic forms of abuse, the meaning of abuse, tests that have been developed to identify exclusionary abuse, the criticism of the traditional theory of predatory pricing, the main strategic economic theories of predatory pricing and non-pricing theories of predation. Part 3 then specifically deals with the law of predatory prices under section 8(c) and (d)(iv) of the Competition Act. Pursuant to section 1(3) of the Competition Act, when interpreting or applying the Competition Act, appropriate foreign and international law may be considered. This is complementary to section 1(2)(a), which directs that the Competition Act must be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with the Constitution and gives effect to the purposes set out in section 2. In light hereof, where appropriate, the South African position is mainly compared with the position in the European Union and the United States.


2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 273-289
Author(s):  
Anmari Meerkotter

The Constitutional Court (CC) judgment of Lee v Minister of Correction Services 2013 2SA 144 (CC) is a recent contribution to transformative constitutional jurisprudence in the field of the law of delict. This matter turned on the issue of factual causation in the context of wrongful and negligent systemic omissions by the state. In this case note, I explore the law relating to this element of delictual liability with specific regard to the traditional test for factual causation – the conditio sine qua non (‘but-for’) test. In particular, I note the problems occasioned by formalistic adherence to this test in the context of systemic state omissions as evidenced by the SCA judgment in the same matter. I also consider the manner in which English courts have addressed this problem. Thereafter, I analyse the CC’s broader approach to the determination of factual causation as one based on common sense and justice. I argue that this approach endorses a break from a formalistic application of the test and constitutes a step towards an approach which resonates with the foundational constitutional values of freedom, dignity and equality. Furthermore, it presents an appropriate solution to the problems associated with factual causation where systemic omissions are concerned. I then consider the transformative impact of the Lee judgment. In particular, I argue that the broader enquiry favoured by the CC facilitates the realisation of constitutionally guaranteed state accountability, and amounts to an extension of the existing norm of accountability jurisprudence. Hence, I contend that the judgment presents a further effort by the Constitutional Court to effect wholesale the constitutionalisation of the law of delict, as well as a vindicatory tool to be used by litigants who have been adversely affected by systemic state omissions.


2018 ◽  
Vol 21 (5) ◽  
pp. 67-79
Author(s):  
Marta Makowska

For many years, the subject of aggressive marketing campaigns conducted by pharmaceutical companies has been raised in Poland. Drug ads are everywhere, on television, the radio, magazines and on the Internet. Therefore, it is extremely important is to ensure both their legal and ethical dimension. This article will present the differences between direct-to-consumer advertising of medicines in Poland and in the US. The dissimilarities result mainly from differences in legislation. In Poland, the law is much stricter than in the US. For example, in the United States companies are allowed to advertise prescription drugs directly to patients. In the whole of the European Union, and thus in Poland, it is strictly prohibited. The article will also present other regulations existing in Poland and in the United States and it will compare them. It will offer examples of violations of the law and ethics in the advertising of medicine in both countries. Lastly, it will briefly outline the negative consequences of unacceptable pharmaceutical marketing.


Author(s):  
Pál Sonnevend

AbstractModern constitutionalism is based on the paradigm that courts are inherently entitled and obliged to enforce the constitution of the respective polity. This responsibility of courts also applies in the context of the European Union to both the CJEU and national constitutional courts. The present chapter argues that in the face of constitutional crises the CJEU and the Hungarian Constitutional Court shy away from applying the law as it is to the full. The reasons behind this unwarranted judicial self-restraint are most different: the CJEU aims to avoid conflicts with national constitutional courts whereas the Hungarian Constitutional Court has been facing a legislative power also acting as constitution making power willing to amend the constitution to achieve specific legislative purposes or to undo previous constitutional court decisions. Yet both courts respond to expediencies that do not follow from the law they are called upon to apply. It is argued that rule of law backsliding requires these courts to abandon the unnecessary self-restraint and exploit the means already available.


2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 367-390 ◽  
Author(s):  
Armin Steinbach

The German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) has found that there are no constitutional objections against the Lisbon Treaty. At the same time, the FCC imposed limitations to future integration by identifying a number of state functions that are non-amenable to integration and which have to be retained at the national level. This article examines the scope and content of these core competencies. It also discusses to what extent the criteria used by the FCC for the determination of core competencies might reflect a European-wide standard for the determination of limits to the transfer of competencies to the European Union. The article concludes that the judgment clarifies the limitations of the transfer of competencies, even though the criteria used by the FCC cannot claim to produce the set of inalienable sovereign powers that were recognized as such throughout the Union.


1986 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sir Anthony Mason

The Australian National University, the Sir Robert Menzies Memorial Trust and the University of Virginia Law School have established an annual Menzies Lecture Series. The Lectures are held in honour of Sir Robert Menzies and mark his contribution to the law and public life. The Lectures are given in alternate years at the Law Schools of the University of Virginia and the Australian National University. The Lectures will be published in the “Federal Law Review”. The first Menzies Lecturer was The Honourable Sir Anthony Mason of the High Court of Australia who visited the University of Virginia in October 1985. The following article is based on Sir Anthony's lecture.


1990 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-128
Author(s):  
Joaquin Martin Canivell

Abstract The promulgation of the new Italian Law for the protection of competition and the market urges a comparison with the corresponding Spanish legislation, taking also account of its evolution.In 1963 a first competition law was introduced in Spain as a consequence of a request by the United States, whose intention was to increase its business activities in Spain. Another justification of the interest of Spain for introducing this law was the idea that it could be a step forward the European Common Market.This law was not very effective and, furthermore, its life has not been very easy, though it included the main legal definitions of the EEC Treaty, in particular provisions for cartels and for abuse of a dominant position. In addition, the Spanish law introduced a definition for «dominant position».In order to implement the law, two organisms have been created: the «Service for the Defence of Competition” and the Tribunal having the same name.Both the law and the administrative system organized on its basis became almost useless, because for the first two decades very few decisions had been taken and the only proposal by the Tribunal to the Government for inflicting a sanction was not approved. By consequence, the Tribunal made no other attempts to propose measures to the Government.The revival came after the introduction in Spain of the Constitution, which was promulgated in 1978 and which established, in art. 38, a free-enterprise system in the framework of a market economy to be protected by the public authorities.A judgement by July 1st, 1986, of the Constitutional Court, confirmed that competition is a component of the market economy which protects rather than restrict the freedom of enterprise.By the end of 1985 the Service for the Defence of Competition started a new life. The same happened with the activities of the Tribunal. The number of examinations increased and after 1988 the Tribunal tried again to inflict sanctions, and it was successful.A new law for the protection of the competition was approved by the Parliament on July 17th, 1989 and is in force in Spain since that time. It is founded on the EEC Treaty and it also benefits from the experience with the previous law.Cartels and abuse of dominant position are the main objects of the law which introduced, in addition, the case of «unfair competition».The Tribunal can injunct to the undertakings to suspend their action and to eliminate its consequences. Another innovation of the law was the attribution to the Tribunal of the power to inflict fees up to 150 million pesetas (about 1,7 billion Italian lire), to be increased until the 10 per cent of the turnover.As it was with the first law, two organs are committed to the safeguard of competition: the Service for the Defence of Competition and the Tribunal. The Service has the assignment to start preliminary investigations, to supervise the enforcement of the judgements of the Tribunal, to keep the register with the annotations of authorizations, prohibitions and concentrations and to make studies on the economic system.The Tribunal is an organ of the Ministry for Economy and Finances, but is functionally independent. Its eight members (economists and lawyers) and the president are appointed by the Government for six years and can be confirmed. The president is Secretary of State and the members have the rank of general directors. Decisions are taken by the Tribunal with a majority of six votes (including that of the president or of the vicepresident).Apart from its judiciary powers, the Tribunal can express opinions and give advices upon request by the Parliament, by the Government or by Ministers, as well as by local governments, by unions and by organizations of producers and consumers.The Tribunal has also the power to authorize agreements and other actions prohibited by the competition legislation, on the basis of these reasons: 1) productive improvements or better wholesalers’ organization, technical or technological progress; 2) partecipation by the consumers to the resulting benefits.No limitations to competition can be introduced in order to obtain such results. Competition cannot be eliminated from the market or from a relevant part of it.Such authorizations are not retroactive and can be renewed or revoked.On the subject of economic concentrations, the Tribunal can take action only on request by the Minister for Economy and Finances. The notification by undertakings is voluntary. The advice provided by the Tribunal to the Minister is not binding, since the power to decide on concentrations is entirely under the responsibility of the government.The rules of procedure adopted by the Tribunal and the Service are flexible and effective in order to guarantee the rights of the citizens. The judgements of the Tribunal can be taken to the Civil Courts. Also damage compensation is decided by the Civil Courts.At the moment, there are not yet cases on the basis of the new law and those pending follow the rules of the old law.Some authorizations, instead, have been decided already by the Tribunal whose advice has been requested twice on cases of concentration.New regulations for authorizations by category will be issued in the next future. Other rules for cases of individual authorization will also be provided.The number of cases submitted to the Tribunal increases and the number (as well as the amount) of fees goes up as the public opinion realizes how beneficial can be competition for the general welfare.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Jeffery Atik ◽  
Xavier Groussot

The U.S.-EU conflict over the application of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) to U.S.-based digital platform companies is marked by a startling legal development: the insertion of a constitutional court squarely into the heart of the dispute. The engagement of the EU’s top court - the Court of Justice (CJEU) - in the Schrems I and Schrems II cases - has significantly inflamed the dispute. The CJEU has now twice struck down GDPR accommodations reached between the United States and the European Union. In doing so, the Court has rebuked both U.S. and EU officials. By transfiguring provisions of the GDPR with constitutional (that is, treaty-based) and human rights values, the Court has placed out of reach any accommodation that does not involve significant reform of U.S. privacy and national security provisions. Heated trans-Atlantic disputes involving assertions of extraterritorial extensions of regulatory power is an inappropriate place for a constitutional court like the CJEU to throw its declarative weight around. 


Author(s):  
Kobolo J Selala

The Labour Appeal Court in Kylie v CCMA decided the vexed question as to whether or not the CCMA has jurisdiction to resolve a dispute of unfair dismissal involving a sex worker. Both the CCMA and the Labour Court had declined to assume jurisdiction to resolve the dispute on the basis that the employee’s contract of employment was invalid and therefore unenforceable in law. The Labour Appeal Court, on the other hand, overturned the Labour Court’s decision and held that the CCMA has jurisdiction to resolve the dispute, regardless of the fact that sex work is still illegal under the South African law. For this decision, the Labour Appeal Court relied on section 23(1) of the Constitution, which provides that everyone has the right to fair labour practices. According to the Labour Appeal Court the crucial question for determination by the court was if a person in the position of a sex worker enjoyed the full range of constitutional rights including the right to fair labour practices. In the court’s reasoning the word everyone in section 23(1) of the Constitution is a term of general import and conveys precisely what it means. In other words everyone, including a sex worker, has the right to fair labour practices as guaranteed in the Constitution. A critical analysis of the judgment is made in this case note. The correctness of the court’s judgment, particularly insofar as it relates to the approach to and the determination of the issue of jurisdiction, is questioned. It is argued that the Court lost focus on the main issue in the appeal, namely jurisdiction, and instead proceeded to place heavy emphasis on the employee’s constitutional rights. Relying on a handful of cases of the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court, the case note concludes that the approach adopted by the Labour Appeal Court in the determination of the appeal was incorrect - hence its decision. Given the critical importance of the matter, and the attendant implications of the judgment for labour litigation in South Africa, it is hoped that a similar case will soon come to the attention of a superior court and that a definitive pronouncement will be made.


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