scholarly journals Application of the Game Theory with Perfect Information to an agricultural company

2013 ◽  
Vol 59 (No. 1) ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Cabrera García ◽  
J.E. Imbert Tamayo ◽  
J. Carbonell-Olivares ◽  
Y. Pacheco Cabrera

This paper deals with the application of Game Theory with Perfect Information to an agricultural economics problem. The goal of this analysis is demonstrating the possibility of obtaining an equilibrium point, as proposed by Nash, in the case of an agricultural company that is considered together with its three sub-units in developing a game with perfect information. Production results in terms of several crops will be considered in this game, together with the necessary parameters to implement different linear programming problems. In the game with perfect information with the hierarchical structure established between the four considered players (a management center and three production units), a Nash equilibrium point is reached, since once the strategies of the rest of the players are known, if any of them would use a strategy different to the one proposed, their earnings would be less than the ones obtained by using the proposed strategies. When the four linear programming problems are solved, a particular case of equilibrium point is reached.

2012 ◽  
Vol 220-223 ◽  
pp. 202-205
Author(s):  
Liang Han ◽  
Xiang Mei Si

This thesis analyzes the benefit produced by the cooperation or non-cooperation of parts supplier and bus factory as well as users by use of the perfect-information static game model of the game theory in connection with the current situation of China's bus market supply chain. Conclusions are drawn from the analysis that good after-sales service not only brings benefits to users but also can efficiently promote the voluntary cooperation between a parts supplier and a bus factory, so that the individual benefit and the overall benefit are both increased, and a win-win situation is finally achieved.


Author(s):  
Kazuaki Kojima ◽  
◽  
Takaya Arita

The Nash demand game (NDG) has been at the center of attention when explaining moral norms of distributive justice on the basis of the game theory. This paper describes the demand-intensity game (D-I game), which adds an “intensity” dimension to NDG in order to discuss various scenarios for the evolution of norms concerning distributive justice, while keeping such simplicity that it can be analyzed by the concepts and tools of the game theory. We perform an ESS analysis and evolutionary simulations, followed by the analysis of replicator dynamics. It is shown that the three norms emerge: the one claiming an equal distribution (Egalitarianism), the one claiming the full amount (Libertarianism), and, as the special case of Libertarianism, the one claiming the full amount but conceding the resource in conflict (Wimpy libertarianism). The evolution of these norms strongly depends on the conflict cost parameter. Egalitarianism emerges with a larger conflict cost while Libertarianism with a smaller cost. Wimpy libertarianism emerges with a relatively larger conflict cost in libertarianism. The simulation results show that there are three types of evolutionary scenarios in general. We see in most of the trials the population straightforwardly converges to Libertarianism or Egalitarianism. It is also shown that, in some range of the conflict cost, the population nearly converges to Egalitarianism, which is followed by the convergence to Libertarianism. It is shown that this evolutionary transition depends on the quasi stability of Egalitarianism.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Gizem Temelcan ◽  
Hale Gonce Kocken ◽  
Inci Albayrak

Solving multiobjective linear programming (MOLP) problems and fully fuzzy multi-objective linear programming (FFMOLP) problems involves the trade-off process among several objectives. A new algorithm extended where FFMOLP problems are solved using a 2-player zero-sum game approach to deal with this case. Firstly, The FFMOLP problem is separated into a certain number of fully fuzzy linear programming (FFLP) problems and each is solved by applying any method. After forming a ratio matrix, a game theory approach is applied for finding the weights of objective functions and a weighted LP problem is constructed by these weights. Solving the weighted LP problem, a fuzzy compromise solution of the FFMOLP problem is found. Constructing different ratio matrices, it is also possible to obtain more than one compromise solution to be offered to the decision-maker(s). Some examples are given to show the applicability of the algorithm.


2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (02) ◽  
pp. 1750033 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julio B. Clempner

This paper suggests a game theory problem in which any feasible solution is based on the Lyapunov theory. The problem is analyzed in the static and dynamic cases. Some properties of Nash equilibria such as existence and stability are derived naturally from the Lyapunov theory. Remarkable is that every asymptotically stable equilibrium point (Nash equilibrium point) admits a Lyapunov-like function and if a Lyapunov-like function exists it converges to a Nash/Lyapunov equilibrium point. We define a Lyapunov-like function as an Lp-norm from the multiplayer objective function to the utopia minimum as a cost function. We propose multiple metrics to find the Nash/Lyapunov equilibrium and the strong Nash/Lyapunov equilibrium. Finding a Nash/Lyapunov equilibrium is reduced to the minimization problem of the Lyapunov-like function. We prove that the equilibrium point properties of Nash and Lyapunov meet in game theory. In order to validate the contributions of the paper, we present a numerical example.


2003 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 192-197
Author(s):  
Rolandas Janušaitis ◽  
Valerijus Keras ◽  
Jūratė Mockienė

Striving for rationality and long-term reliability is seen in different periods of building activities. Application of linear programming methods has enabled to formalise this striving and to elaborate the necessary mathematical models. But later theoretical and practical investigations have disclosed that not always, when optimising in respect of one criterion, it is possible to obtain solutions rational in other aspects, and this stimulated the application of multicriteria optimization methods. It is useful in this case to apply the ideas of the game theory, game problems solving methods already applied in other building design fields. When adapting methods of the game theory to popular needs for truss designing, a criteria set involving 11 alternatives has been selected. Attempts have been made to find rational truss variants by applying different methods (method of proximity to an ideal point, Wald's and Hurwitz's methods). It has been found when using the method of proximity to an ideal point for rational truss designing that a truss with a sloping brace network and pivoted knots supported by a column and composed of rectangular box shapes is more valuable than other trusses. According to Wald's and Hurvitz's methods, among popular spans of 24 m such a truss is the truss with a lowered bottom chord.


2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 76
Author(s):  
Kamran Shahanaghi ◽  
Maryam Keyvani Rad

<p>The relationships between the members of supply chain were modeled in many researches, such as cooperative and non-cooperative situation. In our paper, the main question is how much and for which price should each seller offer her product to maximize the profit. In the proposed methodology, Bi-level programming is used for modeling and then GAMS (general algebraic modeling system) language for solving the problem. In the presented model, the first level, called upper sub-problem and supposed as leader is trying to maximize each seller profits by obtaining the optimal offered quantity of individual seller. The objective of follower (buyer) is at second level. The lower sub-problem uses the results of the seller’s model and then maximizes its profit. These optimizations are obtained with regard to the some other constraints. Similar the other game theories problems, the Nash equilibrium point(s) is (are) the optimum decision of this seller-buyer supply chain. A numerical example is employed to illustrate the application of the proposed method.</p>


2012 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-6 ◽  
Author(s):  
M.Jayalakshmi M.Jayalakshmi ◽  
◽  
P.Pandian P.Pandian

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