Legitimation, State Repression, and the Sioux Massacre at Wounded Knee

2015 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vincent Roscigno ◽  
Julia Cantzler ◽  
Salvatore Restifo ◽  
Joshua Guetzkow

The Wounded Knee Massacre of 1890 and the Ghost Dance movement that preceded it offer a compelling sociological case for understanding legitimation, elite framing, and repression. Building on the social movements literature and theoretical insights on power, institutions, and inequality, we engage in multimethod, in-depth analyses of a rich body of archived correspondence from key institutional actors at the time. Doing so contributes to the literature by drawing attention to (1) the cultural foundations of inequality and repression; (2) super-ordinate framing by political elites and the state; and (3) key institutional conflicts and their consequences. We find that, within an ambiguous colonial context, officials of the Office of Indian Affairs and federal politicians shelved benign military observations and, instead, amplified ethnocentric and threat frames. Force was consequently portrayed as justifiable, which increased the likelihood of the massacre. We conclude by discussing the utility of our results for conceptions of culture, power, inequality, the state, and state violence.

2019 ◽  
pp. 46-73
Author(s):  
Amy Austin Holmes

This chapter analyzes the first wave of the revolution against Hosni Mubarak. Refuting arguments that focus on the role of the social media, or divisions among the elite, and the alleged neutrality of the Egyptian military, the chapter illustrates that it was a revolutionary coalition of the middle and lower classes that created a breaking point for the regime. Key features of this mass mobilization included the refusal of protesters to be cowed by state violence, the creation of “liberated zones” occupied by the people, “popular security” organizations that replaced the repressive security apparatus of the state, and strikes that crippled the economy in the final days of the Mubarak era. Key moments during the 18 days are described with ethnographic detail, including the unfiltered reactions of protesters to the deployment of soldiers on January 28. The revolutionary nature of the uprising is that people demanded more than just the ouster of Mubarak—they wanted to topple “the regime” by naming the names of a slew of Mubarak’s cronies to remove them from power.


Author(s):  
Mélanie Claude ◽  
Stéphanie Gaudet

Cet article pose un regard critique sur la catégorie de l’entrepreneur social présente dans le paysage socioéconomique québécois contemporain. L’objectif est de comprendre comment les processus de formalisation et d’informalisation de l’État participent à la construction de cette catégorie sociale. Pour ce faire, nous établissons quatre périodicités des dynamiques d’informalisation des services sociaux de l’État depuis les années 1960. Ces dynamiques ouvrent la voie à une ambiguïté grandissante du partage des responsabilités sociales. Ce mouvement d’informalisation cependant n’est ni unidirectionnel ni unidimensionnel. Nous expliquons qu’il s’agit de changements dans des dynamiques de partage de pouvoirs entre les sphères du marché et du communautaire que tente de réguler l’État. Ceux-ci bénéficient à certains acteurs institutionnels et ouvrent la voie à une nouvelle catégorie sociale elle-même empreinte d’ambiguïté : l’entrepreneur social.This article takes a critical look at the category of “social entrepreneur” present in the socioeconomic realm of contemporary Québec. Its objective is to understand how State processes of formalization and informalization contribute to the construction of such a social category. To that end, we describe four consecutive periods in the informalization of social services by the State since the 1960s. These four periods, as they unfold, contribute to an increasing ambiguity regarding how social responsibilities are to be shared. This process of informalization, however, is neither one-directional nor onedimensional. In our article, we observe that it reflects fluctuations in power between market and community that the State has been trying to regulate. These fluctuations benefit certain institutional actors and pave the way for a new, somewhat ambiguous, social category, that of the social entrepreneur.


Author(s):  
Amy L. Brandzel

This chapter examines the violent maintenance of citizenship through the police state, and the uses of hate crime legislation to both name and disallow any recognition of this violence. The intervention into how we understand citizenship to be violently organized functions at two interconnected levels, that is, at the structural level of state violence, and at the social level of identity categories. At the level of the state, hate crime legislation offers us important information on how the violence of citizenship is managed, controlled, and directed. At the structural level of the state, the chapter adds to left critiques of hate crime legislation by unpacking how these laws are used to create a dangerous discontinuum, in which hate crimes are marked as individualized errors, while police brutality is systemically assuaged. By examining the machinations of hate crime legislation at these two levels, it is argued that hate crime legislation works, simultaneously, to recognize and deny: (1) the violence of citizenship; and (2) the fear that the oppressed will seek revenge and retaliate for this experience by using violence themselves.


2016 ◽  
Vol 52 (8) ◽  
pp. 1080-1102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raju J Das

State repression is particularly likely when social movements target property relations that cause ordinary citizens to suffer. Whether these movements are violent, and whether the state is a liberal democracy is a contingent matter. This is illustrated by India’s ‘Maoist movement’ (which is also known as the Naxalite movement because it originated in an area called Naxalbari, located in India’s West Bengal State). Where necessary, sections of this movement use violent methods to fight for justice for aboriginal peoples and peasants. This strategy, which the author, incidentally, does not endorse, has been seen by the state as the greatest internal military threat to it. Such a perception invites state violence. What is often under-emphasized or ignored is that the movement is an economic, political and ideological threat, and not just a military threat, and it is so through its localized alternative developmental activities, and this is also a reason for the state’s violent response to it.


Author(s):  
Judah Schept

There can be no doubt that criminology has taken something of a visual turn, as evidenced by increasing numbers of articles, conference panels, edited volumes, monographs, and seminar series that support visual research within criminology and related fields (Brown, 2014; Carrabine, 2012; Brown & Carrabine, 2016; Lippens et al., 2013). This development has come with important calls for both direct, empirical engagement with images, as well as new methodological approaches that mobilize images for a “politically charged analysis” (Hayward, 2010, p. 3). While visual criminology, as it has come to be known, has taken up the importance of the image, the issue of representation, and the photograph, it has been slower to engage on the terrain of visuality, a concept that can sometimes slip into shorthand for the realm of the visual, but which means something more closely resembling an authorized view of society and history (Mirzoeff, 2011a). Visuality is the production, representation, and naturalization of state power that at once fabricates order and, in doing so, organizes the available vocabularies for describing and challenging it. Visuality is a mechanism by which the quotidian violence underwriting authority is made illegible and unseeable. a process that relies on knowledge production for legitimacy and consent. It is here, at the intersections of visuality’s naturalization of the everyday violence of law and its naturalization of an authorized constellation of ideas and terms from which to draw meaning about the world, that the role of criminology must be considered. As a science of crime and punishment, criminology is both subordinate to the terms and ideologies of the state and continually reproduces and reifies those terms by providing the gloss of scientific objectivity. Criminology is largely managerial and reformist, a discipline dependent on the state as much for grant monies and evaluation projects as for the very normative terms of study—crime, law, punishment—that underwrite its very existence and relevance. Yet, the relationship between criminology and visuality is not one of wholehearted subservience and hegemony. Even as the discipline should be understood as an important intellectual prosthetic in the state’s fabrication of social order through technologies of illumination, capture, and mapping, visuality is never complete and criminology is not uniform. Indeed, criminology has an established if uneven lineage of radical interventions into the common sense of state violence. The question remains open as to the role criminology might play in enacting counter-visuality, an intellectual and political project aimed at inscribing in the social body the capacities to render such violence legible.


2021 ◽  
pp. 002200272110130
Author(s):  
Howard Liu ◽  
Christopher M. Sullivan

Among security institutions, police occupy a unique position. In addition to specializing in the repression of dissent, police monitor society and enforce order. Yet within research studying state repression, how police institutions are used and deployed to control domestic threats remain under-explored, particularly as it relates to the dual functionality just described. In this study, we develop and test an explanation of police repression accounting for the bifurcation of Mann’s two modalities of state power: infrastructural power and despotic power. Infrastructural power allocates police resources to surveil dissidents and preemptively limit dissent’s emergence or escalation. Police deploy despotic power through repressive responses to political threats. Empirically, we employ unique data to investigate police repression and the modalities of power in Guatemala. To analyze how shifting the balance between infrastructural and despotic power affects police repression, we isolate damage occurring from an earthquake that exogenously reshaped the landscape of infrastructural power. Results affirm the role of infrastructural power in regulating the despotic power of the state. Where local infrastructure was most affected by the earthquake, the security apparatus lost the capacity to surveil nascent movements and predict their activity, thereby providing opportunity for dissidents to mobilize and forcing police to (over-)react rather than shutdown resistance preemptively. However, the intensity of state violence recedes as the state recovers from the infrastructural damage and regains its control of local district.


Author(s):  
A. FREIXO ◽  
V. ARMELE

The Brazilian Anti-Terrorism Bill (no. 13.260/2016) was drafted and approved in the context of the street demonstrations to have occurred from 2013 to 2015 and the state violence to have erupted in their wake, linked to the major sporting events held over the period. An examination of the process by which this legislation was implemented prompts a debate over its constitution as a legal mechanism able to justify extraordinary measures within a formal democratic regime. It is based on this premise that an exploratory and explanatory analysis is provided of the social, political, and historical phenomena raised by the question debated in the article. Such an approach thus seeks to demonstrate how legal uncertainty – transmitted through the use of vague expressions – allows the state power to endow the Brazilian State with the capacity to act freely and to selectively frame social and political demonstrations as acts of terrorism.


2002 ◽  
Vol 96 (1) ◽  
pp. 193-194
Author(s):  
Peter G. Stillman

Sciabarra's book attempts to conjoin dialectics with libertarianism to produce total freedom. He is led to this seemingly odd conjunction by a concatenation of concerns. He sees dialectics as the logic or method most attentive to contexts and libertarianism as a radical political ideology of freedom. He sees the opportunity to free dialectics of its totalitarian (including Marxist) overtones and libertarianism of its apparent irrelevance, which is the more galling now that once-popular Marxism has failed as radical social theory. He wishes to combine his own academic appreciation of the dialectical elements of Marx's method with his long-standing love of libertarian ideas. Primarily, he hopes to expand libertarian thought from a narrow concentration on economic self-interest and the state as repressive to a broader concern with the cultural, social, and historical preconditions of freedom, and he sees dialectics, with its emphasis on contexts, dynamism, and relations, as a method that can be appropriated by libertarians to realize these broader concerns and to propound a comprehensive and radical social theory. No longer need libertarian thought be seen as atomic individualism struggling for freedom against state violence; building on dialectical thinking shorn of its Marxist content, libertarians can embrace whole individuals living in rich social environments that can carry out, without violence, the social powers that the state has illegitimately appropriated.


Author(s):  
Alexander Verkhovsky

This chapter examines changes in the Russian nationalist movement from Russia’s annexation of Crimea until the State Duma elections in September 2016. Since 2014, the nationalist movement has been split over which side to support in the war in Ukraine. Then, with the subsequent increase in state repression of ultra-rightists, the movement lapsed into total decline. The chapter traces activities in various sectors of Russian nationalism, discussing the separate trajectories of the pro-Kremlin and oppositional nationalists, as well as the latter group’s further subdivision into groups that support or oppose the ‘Novorossiia programme’. Attention is paid to the complex relationship and interaction between the various groups of nationalists, as well as to their interaction with the powers-that-be and with the liberal opposition.


2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 4-32
Author(s):  
Le Hoang Anh Thu

This paper explores the charitable work of Buddhist women who work as petty traders in Hồ Chí Minh City. By focusing on the social interaction between givers and recipients, it examines the traders’ class identity, their perception of social stratification, and their relationship with the state. Charitable work reveals the petty traders’ negotiations with the state and with other social groups to define their moral and social status in Vietnam’s society. These negotiations contribute to their self-identification as a moral social class and to their perception of trade as ethical labor.


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