scholarly journals The White Working Class as Trump’s Electorate Base

2021 ◽  
Vol 65 (11) ◽  
pp. 5-14
Author(s):  
O. Bogaevskaya ◽  
V. Zhuravleva

In 2020, the white working class made almost half of all the votes for Donald Trump – about 37 million out of 73.5 million votes that he got. 67% of white Americans with less than four years degree cast their votes for Trump. 100 days after he lost the reelection, 29% of Republicans believed that Trump will come back to the White House before the month of August 2021. Who are they, these Trumps supporters and believers? How did Trump change their role in political life, and what will be their future after him? During the last 45 years, the white working class of America has transformed from the world’s most affluent and secure working class, the linchpin of the New Deal coalition, the protagonist of the American dream into one of the most vulnerable, disintegrated and declining in its number and power element of the American electorate. Trump used their anger and despair in his way to power, bringing them back to politics. Today both the Democratic and Republican Parties are fighting again for the white working class. Historically, this group was the base of the Democratic Party. But for the last two decades, the Party has become much more liberal in its values and focused more on different groups of minorities. These trends made whites without college degree to shift to the Republican Party, regardless its “party of white riches” image. The current shift occurred in the years of Obama presidency – for highly conservative, less educated, mostly South whites this President came as a challenge to their traditional views of America. By the end of the Obama era, the Republican Party almost filled the gap with the Democratic Party in white working class support. Trump became the high pick of this shift. Meanwhile, the Democrats got the trend and came back fighting for its past electorate who suddenly became the focus of a political game and interparty transformations, which makes it highly possible to change the face of the American party system as we know today. Acknowledgements. The article was prepared within the project “Post-Crisis World Order: Challenges and Technologies, Competition and Cooperation” supported by the grant from Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation program for research projects in priority areas of scientific and technological development (Agreement № 075-15-2020-783).

2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (105) ◽  
pp. 78-86
Author(s):  
EKATERINA A. NIKONOVA

The article deals with the analysis of the balance of opinion in the newspaper, which is originally realized through editorial and op-ed genres. We analyzed 20 articles from “The Wall Street Journal” and “The New York Times” in the genres of editorial and op-ed about events in Afghanistan in August 2021, which were interpreted differently in mass media due to the role of the White House. The findings prove that in the context of new digital reality the op-ed has lost its original function of conveying alternative positions to the ones stated in the editorial; at the same time newspapers tend to advocate the positions shared by the political parties they have historically developed close relations with: “The Wall Street Journal” - with the Republican Party, “The New York Times” - the Democratic Party.


Author(s):  
Justin Gest

What are white working-class partisan trends? United States One of the most staggering trends in American politics is the utter collapse of white working-class support for the Democratic Party over the last 50 years. The trend is as extraordinary for its steadiness as it is...


Author(s):  
Lee Drutman

This chapter examines the paradox of partisanship. In 1950, the American Political Science Association put out a major report arguing for a “more responsible two-party system.” The two parties—the Democratic Party and the Republican Party—were then largely indistinguishable coalitions of parochial local parties, and the political scientists argued that too little, rather than too much polarization, was the problem. This sets up a paradox: Some party division is necessary, but too much can be deadly. Various traditions in American political thought have tried to resolve this paradox. Antipartisans have urged consensus above all. Responsible partisans have urged competition above all. Meanwhile, bipartisans have urged compromise above all. Consensus is impossible. However, both compromise and competition are essential to democracy. Only the neglected multiparty tradition can solve the paradox with the right balance of competition and compromise.


2003 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. 91-108
Author(s):  
Robert P. Steed ◽  
Laurence W. Moreland

Paralleling developments in other southern states over the past three to four decades, South Carolina’s political system has undergone dramatic change. One of the more significant components of this change has been the partisan realignment from a one-party system dominated by the Democrats to a competitive two-party system in which Republicans have come to hold the upper hand. This increased electoral competitiveness has been accompanied by an increased organizational effort by both parties in the state. An examination of local party activists in 2001 points to a continuation of this pattern over the past ten years. In comparison with data from the 1991 Southern Grassroots Party Activists Survey, the 2001 data show the following: (1) the Republican Party has sustained its electoral and organizational gains of recent years; (2) the parties continue to attract activists who differ across party lines on a number of important demographic and socioeconomic variables; (3) there has been a continued sorting of political orientations and cues marked by sharply different inter-party ideological and issue positions; (4) the Democratic Party has become more ideologically homogeneous and more in line with the national party than previously; and (5) since 1991 perceptions of factionalism have declined in both parties, but still remain higher among Democrats than among Republicans.


1993 ◽  
Vol 14 ◽  
pp. 197-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles D. Hadley

To whom does the South belong politically, now that an all-southern ticket has reclaimed the White House for the Democratic party? Review of 1992 voting returns for national, statewide, and legislative races in the South, contrasted with those from earlier presidential years, lead to only one conclusion: the South continues to move toward the Republican party. The Clinton-Gore ticket ran behind its percentage of the national vote in most southern states, as well as behind all Democratic candidates in statewide races, and would have won without any southern electoral votes; whereas Bush-Quayle ran ahead of their percentage of the national vote in every southern state except Clinton’s Arkansas, while Republicans gained seats in southern legislatures and congressional delegations. It is suggested that southern electoral college votes won by Democratic presidential candidates in 1976 and 1992 hinged upon Democratic vote-getters in races for statewide offices in each state carried except the presidential candidates’ home states.


Author(s):  
Jeffery A. Jenkins ◽  
Charles Stewart

This chapter examines the speakership elections of 1849 and 1855–1856, the most chaotic instances of officer selection in the history of the House of Representatives. It considers how the Second Party System weakened and eventually collapsed as the slavery issue overwhelmed the interregional partisanship that had been in place for two decades. It also discusses the emergence of new political parties, such as the Free-Soil Party, the American Party, and the Republican Party, that created new avenues for coalitional organization. In particular, it looks at the rise of the Republican Party as the primary opposition party to the Democrats. Finally, it describes how the rising popularity of the new parties in congressional elections affected politicians in both the Whig Party and the Democratic Party.


Author(s):  
Emily J. Charnock

This book explores the origins of political action committees (PACs) in the mid-twentieth century and their impact on the American party system. It argues that PACs were envisaged, from the outset, as tools for effecting ideological change in the two main parties, thus helping to foster the partisan polarization we see today. It shows how the very first PAC, created by the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) in 1943, explicitly set out to liberalize the Democratic Party by channeling campaign resources to liberal Democrats while trying to defeat conservative Southern Democrats. This organizational model and strategy of “dynamic partisanship” subsequently diffused through the interest group world—imitated first by other labor and liberal allies in the 1940s and 1950s, then adopted and inverted by business and conservative groups in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Previously committed to the “conservative coalition” of Southern Democrats and northern Republicans, the latter groups came to embrace a more partisan approach and created new PACs to help refashion the Republican Party into a conservative counterweight. The book locates this PAC mobilization in the larger story of interest group electioneering, which went from a rare and highly controversial practice at the beginning of the twentieth century to a ubiquitous phenomenon today. It also offers a fuller picture of PACs as not only financial vehicles but electoral innovators that pioneered strategies and tactics that have come to pervade modern US campaigns and helped transform the American party system.


2007 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 405-432
Author(s):  
M. Cathleen Kaveny

It is a great honor for me to have been asked to contribute to this issue of the Journal of Law and Religion focusing on the work of my colleague and friend, Robert E. Rodes, Jr. In June 2006, Professor Rodes celebrated his fiftieth anniversary as a member of the faculty of Notre Dame Law School. His long career has marked him as a founding father of interdisciplinary scholarship at the intersection of faith, law, and morality—the very sort of scholarship which this journal is dedicated to fostering and preserving.The topics that Professor Rodes has considered over the years are wide-ranging; for example, he has written insightfully on both sexual ethics and economic justice. The methods that he has used are diverse; he has deftly deployed the tools of historiography as well as logic. Moreover, the normative stances that he has taken defy location on the normal liberal/conservative spectrum as it plays itself out in American political life. He has argued in favor of a legal system that would encourage a more traditional sexual morality, while emphasizing the need to compassionately accommodate those whose lives do not conform to its strictures. He has also maintained the importance of assessing social and economic structures from the perspective of the most marginalized members of the society, without succumbing to romantic illusions that technology, progress, or the dynamism of history will eliminate class stratification and its ensuing divisions of humanity into the “haves” and the “have nots.” His writings at the intersection of law and religion reflect neither the Democratic Party nor the Republican Party at prayer—and neither party at a town hall meeting, for that matter.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 67-74
Author(s):  
Xiaowei Gui

Owing to its features of economic nationalism, trade protectionism, anti-establishment and white nationalism, Trump’s “America First” policy brought him to the White House but also divided the USA as a nation. The policy was essentially a response to the American populist movement created by the economic and cultural anxiety of the white working class. However, rather than fix the problem, Trump’s philosophy of governance may make the situation even worse and could provide China with a significant opportunity to strengthen itself in an era of great change.


2021 ◽  
Vol 65 (10) ◽  
pp. 103-111
Author(s):  
V. Klimov

The article analyses the issue of the NATO missile defense development and the evolution of views in the Russian political, military and expert circles. In 2009, the U. S. President Baraсk Obama declared a start of the NATO missile defense system construction with a goal to be able to intercept a limited nuclear strike from Iran. Russia is in doubt about the stated purpose of the European missile defense and considers it to be a threat to its own strategic nuclear forces. The European missile defense construction has been experiencing technical obstacles and political difficulties: the cancellation of deployment of interceptor SM‑3 IIB and delays in establishing operational capability of the Aegis Ashore land-based missile defense system in Poland. The current architecture of the NATO missile defense, which allows only to intercept a limited number of incoming warheads, has no significant impact on Russian retaliatory strike capability. Nevertheless, the missile defense in Europe remains an irritating factor in relations between Russia and the USA. Apparently, Biden’s arrival in the White House creates an opportunity for parties to address the issue during negotiations on the New START follow-on Treaty. The research addresses the history of Russia–USA–NATO cooperation on theatre missile defense and the reasons for the failure of the joint missile defense in Europe. The author justifies the reanimation of the Joint Data Exchange Center project and outlines the idea of its transformation to the Multilateral Data Exchange Center. Acknowledgments. The article was prepared within the project “Post-crisis world order: challenges and technologies, competition and cooperation” supported by the grant from Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation program for research projects in priority areas of scientific and technological development (Agreement № 075-15-2020-783).


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