Competition for FDI with vintage investment and agglomeration advantages: A revisit
Abstract We analyze the taxation regimes that may emerge in a two-period dynamic tax competition game where a country that attracts investments during the initial period has agglomeration advantages during the later period. When competing countries choose taxation regimes simultaneously, mixed taxation may arise in an equilibrium where one country adopts a non-preferential and the other adopts a preferential taxation regime. Equilibrium tax revenues of competing countries decrease with the increase in agglomeration effects. Whether a country with a non-preferential or a preferential taxation regime obtains a higher tax revenue depends critically on the extent of agglomeration effects. Moreover, whether a country with a non-preferential or a preferential regime attracts investments during the initial period and in turn will have agglomeration advantages during the later period also depends on the extent of agglomeration effects. When competing countries choose taxation regimes sequentially, a mixed taxation regime arises, and the first mover chooses a non-preferential taxation regime when the agglomeration effect is not very large. On the other hand, when the agglomeration effect is very large, a mixed taxation regime arises where the first mover chooses a preferential and the second mover chooses a non-preferential regime. We provide the complete characterization and proof of the uniqueness of the equilibrium in mixed strategies.JEL classification: F21, H21, H25, H87