scholarly journals Speed Is Associated With, But Does Not Cause, Polarization in the Moral Evaluation of Real-World Images

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ma Chunyu ◽  
Noha Mohsen Zommara ◽  
Kajornvut Ounjai ◽  
Xi Ju ◽  
Johan Lauwereyns
Keyword(s):  
Real World ◽  
Causal Link ◽  
Moral Evaluation ◽  
Visual Images ◽  
Perceptual Decision Making ◽  
Continuous Scale ◽  
Trial Basis ◽  
Speed Accuracy ◽  
Accuracy Tradeoff ◽  
Fast Responses

Abstract In human perceptual decision-making, the speed-accuracy tradeoff establishes a causal link between urgency and reduced accuracy. Less is known about how urgency affects the moral evaluation of visual images. Here, we asked participants to give ratings for a diverse set of real-world images on a continuous scale from -10 (“very immoral”) to +10 (“very moral”). We used a cueing procedure to inform the participants on a trial-by-trial basis whether they could make a Self-Paced (SP) evaluation or whether they had to perform a Time-Limited (TL) evaluation within 2 seconds. In the SP condition, fast responses were associated with more extreme evaluations. Compared to the SP condition, the responses in the TL condition were much faster, indicating that our urgency manipulation was successful. However, comparing the SP versus TL conditions, we found no significant differences in the moral evaluation of the real-world images. The data indicated that, while speed is associated with polarization, urgency does not cause participants to make more extreme evaluations. Instead, the correlation between speed and polarization likely reflects the ease of processing. Images that are obviously moral or immoral are categorized faster and given more extreme evaluations than images for which the moral interpretation is uncertain.

scholarly journals Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation Does Not Influence the Speed–Accuracy Tradeoff in Perceptual Decision-making: Evidence from Three Independent Studies

2016 ◽  
Vol 28 (9) ◽  
pp. 1283-1294 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gilles de Hollander ◽  
Ludovica Labruna ◽  
Roberta Sellaro ◽  
Anne Trutti ◽  
Lorenza S. Colzato ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Direct Current ◽  
Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation ◽  
Response Threshold ◽  
Perceptual Decision Making ◽  
Perceptual Decision ◽  
Direct Current Stimulation ◽  
Speed Accuracy ◽  
Accuracy Tradeoff

In perceptual decision-making tasks, people balance the speed and accuracy with which they make their decisions by modulating a response threshold. Neuroimaging studies suggest that this speed–accuracy tradeoff is implemented in a corticobasal ganglia network that includes an important contribution from the pre-SMA. To test this hypothesis, we used anodal transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) to modulate neural activity in pre-SMA while participants performed a simple perceptual decision-making task. Participants viewed a pattern of moving dots and judged the direction of the global motion. In separate trials, they were cued to either respond quickly or accurately. We used the diffusion decision model to estimate the response threshold parameter, comparing conditions in which participants received sham or anodal tDCS. In three independent experiments, we failed to observe an influence of tDCS on the response threshold. Additional, exploratory analyses showed no influence of tDCS on the duration of nondecision processes or on the efficiency of information processing. Taken together, these findings provide a cautionary note, either concerning the causal role of pre-SMA in decision-making or on the utility of tDCS for modifying response caution in decision-making tasks.

Neuroticism and Speed-Accuracy Tradeoff in Self-Paced Speeded Mental Addition and Comparison

2010 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 130-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hagen C. Flehmig ◽  
Michael B. Steinborn ◽  
Karl Westhoff ◽  
Robert Langner
Keyword(s):  
Reaction Time ◽  
Response Speed ◽  
Time Variability ◽  
Reaction Time Variability ◽  
Comparison Task ◽  
Processing Efficiency ◽  
Mental Addition ◽  
Speed Accuracy ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Accuracy Tradeoff

Previous research suggests a relationship between neuroticism (N) and the speed-accuracy tradeoff in speeded performance: High-N individuals were observed performing less efficiently than low-N individuals and compensatorily overemphasizing response speed at the expense of accuracy. This study examined N-related performance differences in the serial mental addition and comparison task (SMACT) in 99 individuals, comparing several performance measures (i.e., response speed, accuracy, and variability), retest reliability, and practice effects. N was negatively correlated with mean reaction time but positively correlated with error percentage, indicating that high-N individuals tended to be faster but less accurate in their performance than low-N individuals. The strengthening of the relationship after practice demonstrated the reliability of the findings. There was, however, no relationship between N and distractibility (assessed via measures of reaction time variability). Our main findings are in line with the processing efficiency theory, extending the relationship between N and working style to sustained self-paced speeded mental addition.

Speed/accuracy tradeoff in directed forgetting

1997 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffry S. Kellogg ◽  
Xiangen Hu ◽  
William Marks
Keyword(s):  
Directed Forgetting ◽  
Speed Accuracy ◽  
Accuracy Tradeoff

The nature of metacognitive inefficiency in perceptual decision making

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Medha Shekhar ◽  
Dobromir Rahnev
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Mechanistic Model ◽  
Perceptual Decision Making ◽  
Large Dataset ◽  
Substantial Body ◽  
Confidence Levels ◽  
Continuous Scale ◽  
Competing Models ◽  
Metacognitive Ability ◽  
Confidence Ratings

Humans have the metacognitive ability to judge the accuracy of their own decisions via confidence ratings. A substantial body of research has demonstrated that human metacognition is fallible but it remains unclear how metacognitive inefficiency should be incorporated into a mechanistic model of confidence generation. Here we show that, contrary to what is typically assumed, metacognitive inefficiency depends on the level of confidence. We found that, across five different datasets and four different measures of metacognition, metacognitive ability decreased with higher confidence ratings. To understand the nature of this effect, we collected a large dataset of 20 subjects completing 2,800 trials each and providing confidence ratings on a continuous scale. The results demonstrated a robustly nonlinear zROC curve with downward curvature, despite a decades-old assumption of linearity. This pattern of results was reproduced by a new mechanistic model of confidence generation, which assumes the existence of lognormally-distributed metacognitive noise. The model outperformed competing models either lacking metacognitive noise altogether or featuring Gaussian metacognitive noise. Further, the model could generate a measure of metacognitive ability which was independent of confidence levels. These findings establish an empirically-validated model of confidence generation, have significant implications about measures of metacognitive ability, and begin to reveal the underlying nature of metacognitive inefficiency.

scholarly journals Can binocular rivalry reveal neural correlates of consciousness?

2014 ◽  
Vol 369 (1641) ◽  
pp. 20130211 ◽  
Author(s):  
Randolph Blake ◽  
Jan Brascamp ◽  
David J. Heeger
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Binocular Rivalry ◽  
Neural Activity ◽  
Neural Correlates ◽  
Causal Link ◽  
Neural Dynamics ◽  
Perceptual Decision Making ◽  
Neural Correlate ◽  
Neural Correlates Of Consciousness ◽  
Neural Correlate Of Consciousness

This essay critically examines the extent to which binocular rivalry can provide important clues about the neural correlates of conscious visual perception. Our ideas are presented within the framework of four questions about the use of rivalry for this purpose: (i) what constitutes an adequate comparison condition for gauging rivalry's impact on awareness, (ii) how can one distinguish abolished awareness from inattention, (iii) when one obtains unequivocal evidence for a causal link between a fluctuating measure of neural activity and fluctuating perceptual states during rivalry, will it generalize to other stimulus conditions and perceptual phenomena and (iv) does such evidence necessarily indicate that this neural activity constitutes a neural correlate of consciousness? While arriving at sceptical answers to these four questions, the essay nonetheless offers some ideas about how a more nuanced utilization of binocular rivalry may still provide fundamental insights about neural dynamics, and glimpses of at least some of the ingredients comprising neural correlates of consciousness, including those involved in perceptual decision-making.

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