scholarly journals Can Status Inequality Organize Cooperation in Multi-leader Systems? An Evolutionary Theory

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hsuan-Wei Lee ◽  
Yen-Ping Chang ◽  
Yen-Sheng Chiang
Keyword(s):  
Real World ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Task Groups ◽  
Cooperative Interactions ◽  
Evolutionary Function ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Status Inequality ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Multiple Leaders

Abstract Status hierarchies often emerge in small collective task groups. In these groups, clearly defined hierarchies facilitate and stabilize structured cooperative interactions among group members, supporting their evolutionary function in the real world. What the existing research in this field has failed to consider, however, is that cooperation matters in these hierarchies with clear status inequality, as well as in other more realistic, multiple-leader groups with less clear hierarchies. Multi-leadership is ubiquitous but, by definition, flattens status inequality and may, in turn, jeopardize its capacity to sustain cooperation. Leveraging the relationship between multi-leadership and cooperation, our evolutionary game model reveals that hierarchies, in general, promote cooperation in groups with multiple leaders, but these hierarchies only do that up to a point, after which multi-leadership backfires. Accordingly, the model provides not only a theoretical account for how multi-leadership coexists with cooperation but also the conditions under which the coexistence would break.

Evolutionary game analysis of information sharing by institutional investors

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Hua Li ◽  
Qingqing Lou ◽  
Qiubai Sun ◽  
Bowen Li
Keyword(s):  
Information Sharing ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Information Exchange ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Relationship Network ◽  
The Relationship

In order to solve the conflict of interests of institutional investors, this paper uses evolutionary game model. From the point of view of information sharing, this paper discusses four different situations. Only when the sum of risk and cost is less than the penalty of free riding, the evolution of institutional investors will eventually incline to the stable state of information sharing. That is, the phenomenon of hugging. The research shows that the institutional investors are not independent of each other, but the relationship network of institutional investors for the purpose of information exchange. The content of this paper enriches the research on information sharing of institutional investors.

scholarly journals An Incentive Mechanism for Reporting Phishing E-Mails Based on the Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Mengli Wang ◽  
Lipeng Song
Keyword(s):  
Real World ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Stable Strategy ◽  
Evolution Process ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Important Link ◽  
E Mail

The human is considered as the important link in the phishing attack, and the e-mail security provider encourages users to report suspicious e-mails. However, evidence suggests that reporting is scarce. Therefore, we study how to motivate users to report phishing e-mails in this paper. To solve the problem, a tripartite evolutionary game model among e-mail security providers, e-mail users, and attackers is constructed. We obtain the desired evolutionary stable strategy through solving the replicator dynamics equations. Moreover, the evolution process to the desired evolutionary stable strategy is derived, which can guide the e-mail security provider to make a reasonable incentive mechanism. Lastly, we experiment with a large real-world e-mail network. The experiment results show that our model is effective and practical.

scholarly journals Kinship as a frequency dependent strategy

2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 150632 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ting Ji ◽  
Xiu-Deng Zheng ◽  
Qiao-Qiao He ◽  
Jia-Jia Wu ◽  
Ruth Mace ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Real World ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Southwestern China ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Group Level ◽  
Costs And Benefits ◽  
Frequency Dependent ◽  
Frequency Dependent Selection ◽  
The Past ◽  
Cultural Extinction

Humans divide themselves up into separate cultures, which is a unique and ubiquitous characteristic of our species. Kinship norms are one of the defining features of such societies. Here we show how norms of marital residence can evolve as a frequency-dependent strategy, using real-world cases from southwestern China and an evolutionary game model. The process of kinship change has occurred in the past and is also occurring now in southwestern China. Our data and models show how transitions between residence types can occur both as response to changing costs and benefits of co-residence with kin, and also due to the initial frequency of the strategies adopted by others in the population: patrilocal societies can become matrilocal, and neolocal societies can become duolocal. This illustrates how frequency-dependent selection plays a role both in the maintenance of group-level cultural diversity and in cultural extinction.

scholarly journals Research on Promotion of Consumers’ Application of After Service in Online Shopping Based on Evolutionary Game Theory-- Introduction of Smart Contract

2021 ◽  
Vol 233 ◽  
pp. 01074
Author(s):  
Hongzhen Lei ◽  
Di Lu ◽  
HongHong Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Online Shopping ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Smart Contract ◽  
Service Guarantee ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Relationship

In order to research how to promote online shopping consumers’ application of after service, build an evolutionary game model of both consumers and e-stores. This paper introduces the variables of supervision and punishment, tries to introduce the smart contract as a powerful service guarantee, and analyzes the influence relationship of variables between the two players and their strategic choices. This paper analyzes the ESS of the system when the relationship among smart contract, revenue, supervision and punishment meets 8 different conditions. Finally, giving suggestions to optimize the after service in online shopping according to the results.

Study of Evolutionary Game Model between Supply Chain Enterprises Growth

2013 ◽  
Vol 422 ◽  
pp. 327-335
Author(s):  
Yu Lai ◽  
Yong Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Core Competence ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Collaborative Management ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Negotiation Model ◽  
Core Ability ◽  
Collaborative Competition ◽  
The Relationship

Collaborative competition between manufacturers and monopoly supplier is a game relationship, which is very complicated. It involves many factors, both collaborative management relations, and there is competition between non-cooperatives. The enterprise core ability in the relationship is the research variables of the analysis. Meanwhile, it is necessary to establish a negotiation model, but because the quantization of core competence has a certain degree of difficulty, to quantify and measure the bargaining power is very difficult. Quantification of core competence and bargaining power are to be further analyzed and researched.

A Fitting Solution

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kaori Kashimura ◽  
Takafumi Kawasaki Jr. ◽  
Nozomi Ikeya ◽  
Dave Randall
Keyword(s):  
Organizational Change ◽  
Power Plant ◽  
Augmented Reality ◽  
Real World ◽  
Work Practices ◽  
Plant Construction ◽  
Tightly Coupled ◽  
Complex Scenario ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Way

This chapter provides an ethnography of a complex scenario involving the construction of a power plant and, in so doing, tries to show the importance of a practice-based approach to the problem of technical and organizational change. The chapter reports on fieldwork conducted in a highly complex and tightly coupled environment: power plant construction. The ethnography describes work practices on three different sites and describes and analyses their interlocking dependencies, showing the difficulties encountered at each location and the way in which the delays that result cascade through the different sites. It goes on to describe some technological solutions that are associated with augmented reality and that are being designed in response to the insights gained from the fieldwork. The chapter also reflects more generally on the relationship between fieldwork and design in real-world contexts.

scholarly journals A Study of Taxi Service Mode Choice Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Zhu Bai ◽  
Mingxia Huang ◽  
Shuai Bian ◽  
Huandong Wu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Mode Choice ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Stable States ◽  
Taxi Service ◽  
Service Mode ◽  
The Impact

The emergence of online car-hailing service provides an innovative approach to vehicle booking but has negatively influenced the taxi industry in China. This paper modeled taxi service mode choice based on evolutionary game theory (EGT). The modes included the dispatching and online car-hailing modes. We constructed an EGT framework, including determining the strategies and the payoff matrix. We introduced different behaviors, including taxi company management, driver operation, and passenger choice. This allowed us to model the impact of these behaviors on the evolving process of service mode choice. The results show that adjustments in taxi company, driver, and passenger behaviors impact the evolutionary path and convergence speed of our evolutionary game model. However, it also reveals that, regardless of adjustments, the stable states in the game model remain unchanged. The conclusion provides a basis for studying taxi system operation and management.

OP48 Nursing Requirements In Long-Term Care: A Health Technology Assessment

2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (S1) ◽  
pp. 11-12
Author(s):  
Paula Corabian ◽  
Charles Yan ◽  
Susan Armijo-Olivo ◽  
Bing Guo
Keyword(s):  
Nursing Care ◽  
Nursing Staff ◽  
Real World ◽  
Research Evidence ◽  
Long Term Care ◽  
Staff Time ◽  
Term Care ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
The Relationship

IntroductionThe objectives of this study were to systematically review published research on the relationship between nursing staff coverage, care hours, and quality of care (QoC) in long-term care (LTC) facilities; and to conduct a real world evidence (RWE) analysis using Alberta real world data (RWD) to inform policy makers on whether any amendments could be made to current regulations.MethodsA systematic review (SR) of research evidence published between January 2000 and May 2018 on the relationship between nursing staff coverage, care hours, and QoC in LTC facilities was conducted. Panel data regressions using available RWD from Alberta, Canada, were performed to assess associations between nursing care hours and LTC outcomes. Outcomes of interest included quality indicators related to resident outcomes, hospital admissions, emergency room visits and family satisfaction. Nursing care hours considered in SR and RWE analysis included those provided by registered nurses (RNs) and licensed practical nurses (LPNs).ResultsThe SR found inconsistent and poor quality evidence relevant to the questions of interest, indicating a great uncertainty about the association between nursing staff time and type of coverage and QoC. Although some positive indications were suggested, major weaknesses of reviewed studies limited interpretation of SR results. RWE analysis found that impact of care hours on LTC outcomes was heterogeneous, dependent on outcome measurements. There was evidence that total staff, RN, and LPN hours had positive effects on some resident outcomes and magnitude of effect differed for different nursing staff.ConclusionsNo definitive conclusion could be drawn on whether changing nursing staff time or nursing staff coverage models would affect residents’ outcomes based on the research evidence gathered in the SR. RWE analysis helped to fill a gap in the available published literature and allowed policy makers to better understand the impact of revising current regulations based on actual outcomes.

scholarly journals Cooperation and competition between pair and multi-player social games in spatial populations

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Attila Szolnoki ◽  
Xiaojie Chen
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Pair Interaction ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Point Interactions ◽  
Social Games ◽  
The Public ◽  
Specific Parameter ◽  
Group Members

AbstractThe conflict between individual and collective interests is in the heart of every social dilemmas established by evolutionary game theory. We cannot avoid these conflicts but sometimes we may choose which interaction framework to use as a battlefield. For instance some people like to be part of a larger group while other persons prefer to interact in a more personalized, individual way. Both attitudes can be formulated via appropriately chosen traditional games. In particular, the prisoner’s dilemma game is based on pair interaction while the public goods game represents multi-point interactions of group members. To reveal the possible advantage of a certain attitude we extend these models by allowing players not simply to change their strategies but also let them to vary their attitudes for a higher individual income. We show that both attitudes could be the winner at a specific parameter value. Interestingly, however, the subtle interplay between different states may result in a counterintuitive evolutionary outcome where the increase of the multiplication factor of public goods game drives the population to a fully defector state. We point out that the accompanying pattern formation can only be understood via the multipoint or multi-player interactions of different microscopic states where the vicinity of a particular state may influence the relation of two other competitors.

scholarly journals Research on Cooperative Innovation Behavior of Industrial Cluster Based on Subject Adaptability

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaohui Jia ◽  
Minghui Jiang ◽  
Lei Shi
Keyword(s):  
Steady State ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Industrial Cluster ◽  
Industrial Clusters ◽  
Government Support ◽  
Correlated Equilibrium ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Cooperative Innovation ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Impact

From the perspective of the interactive cooperation among subjects, this paper portrays the process of cooperative innovation in industrial cluster, in order to capture the correlated equilibrium relationship among them. Through the utilization of two key tools, evolutionary stable strategy and replicator dynamics equations, this paper considers the cost and gains of cooperative innovation and the amount of government support as well as other factors to build and analyze a classic evolutionary game model. On this basis, the subject’s own adaptability is introduced, which is regarded as the system noise in the stochastic evolutionary game model so as to analyze the impact of adaptability on the game strategy selection. The results show that, in the first place, without considering subjects’ adaptability, their cooperation in industrial clusters depends on the cost and gains of innovative cooperation, the amount of government support, and some conditions that can promote cooperation, namely, game steady state. In the second place after the introduction of subjects’ adaptability, it will affect both game theory selection process and time, which means that the process becomes more complex, presents the nonlinear characteristics, and helps them to make faster decisions in their favor, but the final steady state remains unchanged.

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