Strategy Distinctiveness and Hedge Fund Performance

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lu Zheng ◽  
Ashley Wang
2004 ◽  
Vol 2004 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
David A. Hsieh

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dimitrios Stafylas ◽  
Keith P. Anderson ◽  
Muhammad Moshfique Uddin

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sergiy Gorovyy ◽  
Patrick J. Kelly ◽  
Olga Kuzmina

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lingling Zheng ◽  
Xuemin (Sterling) Yan

Affiliation with a financial conglomerate may provide hedge funds with superior information about the conglomerate’s lending, investment banking, and brokerage clients; such affiliation can also lead to potential conflicts with the other units of the conglomerate and exacerbate the conflict between hedge fund companies and hedge fund investors. We find that affiliated funds significantly underperform unaffiliated funds. A difference-in-difference analysis confirms the negative relation between financial industry affiliation and hedge fund performance. Affiliated funds pursue asset-gathering strategies, overweight their conducted initial public offerings/seasoned equity offerings clients’ stocks, are more likely to commit legal and regulatory violations, and tend to exhibit a greater number of internal conflicts. Our results are consistent with conflict of interest exerting a negative impact on the performance of affiliated hedge funds. However, it is possible that lack of skill also contributes to the underperformance of affiliated funds. This paper was accepted by Karl Diether, finance.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document