Rewarding Audit Committee Members: Does it Influence Diligence and Financial Reporting Quality?

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine Jubb ◽  
Rita (Yalu) Lin
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality

Did the 1999 NYSE and NASDAQ Listing Standard Changes on Audit Committee Composition Benefit Investors?

2017 ◽  
Vol 92 (6) ◽  
pp. 187-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seil Kim ◽  
April Klein
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Research Question ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Difference In Differences ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Independent Audit

ABSTRACT In December 1999, the SEC instituted a new listing standard for NYSE and NASDAQ firms. Listed firms were now required to maintain fully independent audit committees with at least three members. In July 2002, the U.S. Congress legislated these standards through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Our research question is whether all investors benefited from the 1999 new rule. Using both an event study and a difference-in-differences methodology, we find no evidence of higher market value or better financial reporting quality resulting from this rule.

scholarly journals An Investigation on the Audit Committees Effectiveness: The Case for GLCs in Malaysia

2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 287 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nurul Nazlia Jamil ◽  
Sherliza Puat Nelson
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Financial Expertise ◽  
Monitoring Mechanism ◽  
The Impact

Financial reporting quality has been under scrutiny especially after the collapse of major companies. The main objective of this study is to investigate the audit committee’s effectiveness on the financial reporting quality among the Malaysian GLCs following the transformation program. In particular, the study examined the impact of audit committee characteristics (independence, size, frequency of meeting and financial expertise) on earnings management in periods prior to and following the transformation program (2003-2009). As of 31 December 2010, there were 33 public-listed companies categorized as Government-Linked Companies (GLC Transformation Policy, 2010) and there were 20 firms that have complete data that resulted in the total number of firm-year observations to 120 for six years (years 2003-2009).  Results show that the magnitude of earnings management as proxy of financial reporting quality is influenced by the audit committee independence. Agency theory was applied to explain audit committee, as a monitoring mechanism as well as reducing agency costs via gaining competitive advantage in knowledge, skills, and expertise towards financial reporting quality. The study is important as it provides additional knowledge about the impact of audit committees effectiveness on reducing the earnings management, and assist practitioners, policymakers and regulators such as Malaysian Institute of Accountants, Securities Commission and government to determine ways to enhance audit committees effectiveness and improve the financial reporting of GLCs, as well as improving the quality of the accounting profession.     

Influence of internal audit reporting line and implementing internal audit recommendations on financial reporting quality

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abdulaziz Alzeban
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Empirical Work ◽  
Internal Audit ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Positive Influence ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Annual Reports ◽  
Content Type

Purpose This study aims to explore the influence of internal audit (IA) reporting lines and the implementation of IA recommendations (IMPLEMENT) on financial reporting quality (FRQ). Design/methodology/approach Data were obtained from the annual reports of 201 UK listed companies, and also from survey questionnaires completed by the chief audit executives working within those companies. Two measures are used as proxies of FRQ: abnormal accruals and accrual quality. Findings Findings indicate that when IA reports directly to the audit committee (AC), there is a significant positive influence upon FRQ. Conversely, when IA reports to the chief executive officer (CEO) or chief financial officer (CFO), there is a negative impact on FRQ. It is further shown by the results that lower income-increasing accruals are evident when there is greater IMPLEMENT, thereby showing an accompanying positive influence on FRQ. Moreover, the results indicate that greater adoption of such recommendations is also associated with internal reporting lines, i.e. when IA reports directly to the AC, FRQ results improved. Originality/value These findings contribute to the literature in the field of IA reporting, by introducing new insights regarding reporting lines and IMPLEMENT, and the influence of these on FRQ, and by establishing those insights through empirical work undertaken in the UK where little research on this issue has been reported.

Audit committee ownership and audit report lag: evidence from Australia

2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 96-125
Author(s):  
Md. Borhan Uddin Bhuiyan ◽  
Mabel D’Costa
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Audit Report ◽  
Content Type ◽  
External Auditors ◽  
Using Data

Purpose This paper aims to examine whether audit committee ownership affects audit report lag. Independent audit committees are responsible for overseeing the financial reporting process, to ensure that financial statements are both credible and released to external stakeholders in a timely manner. To date, however, the extent to which audit committee ownership strengthens or compromises member independence, and hence, influences audit report lag, has remained unexplored. Design/methodology/approach This paper hypothesizes that audit committee ownership is associated with audit report lag. Further, the author hypothesize that both the financial reporting quality and the going concern opinions of a firm mediate the effect of audit committee ownership on audit report lag. Findings Using data from Australian listed companies, the author find that audit committee ownership increases audit report lag. The author further document that financial reporting quality and modified audit opinions rendered by external auditors mediate this positive relationship. The results are robust to endogeneity concerns emanating from firms’ deliberate decisions to grant shares to the audit committee members. Originality/value The study contributes to both the audit report timeliness and the corporate governance literatures, by documenting an adverse effect of audit committee ownership.

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