Universal Basic Income: A Theoretical Review, and an Exploration of a Possible Solution Based on Creation of New Wealth

Images of free time are used today to give the impression that alienation from work is being alleviated. As a result, exploitation of the workers who are constantly occupied with “self-realization” becomes even more effective. Free time becomes a fetish — a means of productively engaging people’s energy through various scenarios in which they are (supposedly) enjoying their leisure time pursuits. Is it even possible to undo the fetishization of free time? And if so, how else might we conceptualize it? In seeking an answer to these questions the author continues the discussion of akrasia launched by Michail Maiatsky in his article “Liberation from Work, Unconditional Income and Foolish Will” (Logos, 2015, 25[3]) in which Maiatsky expressed a well-founded fear that a contemporary “post-Nietzschean” person might respond to the “gift of unconditional freedom” with an irrational desire to test the boundaries of that boon and end up as Dostoyevsky said “living by his own foolish will.” A hypothesis to address that fear argues that the intentions behind such an “akratic rebellion” are inherently rooted in the fetishistic logic that dominates both current perceptions of free time and also the debate about providing a basic income. The akratic reaction is a form of phantasmatic acting out of the painful suspicion that efforts to reach liberation could turn into another form of bondage. The roots of this bind can be found in the historically embedded form of economic organization, which is based on a sense of dire emergency. We owe this understanding of the “economic dispositive” to the work of Giorgio Agamben, but it is already discernible in Xenophon. We can find an indication of its dominant position in modern economic thinking in Nikolay Sieber’s (1844–1888) criticism of the postulates of the “subjective school” of economics. Because the economy acquires a sacred aspect within this dispositive, akrasia may be compared with a sacrilegious trespass of its boundaries. However, Agamben proposes that challenging any form of the solemn ceremonies of capitalism’s priesthood in a way that is not merely imaginary must necessarily be a kind of profanation.

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