scholarly journals Endogena korupcija kao ravnoteza sekvencijalne igre

2003 ◽  
Vol 44 (156) ◽  
pp. 21-43
Author(s):  
Milic Milovanovic
Keyword(s):  
Working Conditions ◽  
Perfect Information ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Backward Induction ◽  
Power Struggle ◽  
Extensive Form ◽  
Sequential Game ◽  
Privatized Firms ◽  
Motivational Structure ◽  
Insider Privatization

In this paper power struggle over the control of an insider privatized firm is modeled as a sequential game with perfect information. The endogenous corruption is a consequence of an insider privatization plan, where employees obtain majority of shares. In the post privatization game three players are dominant: managers, employees, and outside owners. Managers are by far the strongest player, with their key position in privatized firms despite their minority ownership stake. Since managers control working conditions of employees-cum-owners, they exercise an unparalleled power. Motivational structure is given for each player. Their ranked lists of goals and fears are necessary in order to specify parameters for the model. The game is modeled in an extensive form, and backward induction suggests a coalition of insiders (managers and employees) against the interests of outsiders. Under stated conditions, the equilibrium strategy results in an endogenous corruption.

Interpreting Knowledge in the Backward Induction Problem

Episteme ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 248-261 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ken Binmore
Keyword(s):  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Perfect Information ◽  
Backward Induction ◽  
Finite Games ◽  
Common Knowledge Of Rationality

AbstractRobert Aumann argues that common knowledge of rationality implies backward induction in finite games of perfect information. I have argued that it does not. A literature now exists in which various formal arguments are offered in support of both positions. This paper argues that Aumann's claim can be justified if knowledge is suitably reinterpreted.

scholarly journals Supply Chain Analysis of Cross Border Importing E-Commerce Considering with Bonded Warehouse and Direct Mailing

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (7) ◽  
pp. 1909
Author(s):  
Yaqing Xu ◽  
Hong Gui ◽  
Jiang Zhang ◽  
Yihua Wei
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Equilibrium Solution ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Backward Induction ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Cross Border ◽  
Chain Analysis ◽  
Single Piece ◽  
Direct Mailing ◽  
Supply Chain Analysis

In this paper, we consider a cross-border supply chain system that has an import e-commerce company and an overseas supplier. We first considered a pure bonded warehouse mode in which the e-commerce company makes bulk purchase from an overseas supplier to a bonded warehouse and will deliver goods to customers from the bonded warehouse when customers order online. We constructed a Stackelberg model to obtain the equilibrium solution by using backward induction, and then properties of equilibrium strategy and equilibrium profit is discussed. We then studied the combined bonded warehouse and direct mailing mode in which the e-commerce company will purchase a single piece and mail to the customer directly if the bonded warehouse is out of stock. Analytical results demonstrate that the combined bonded warehouse and direct mailing mode may increase the profit of suppliers and decrease the profit of e-commerce companies.

scholarly journals Owner-Intruder contests with information asymmetry

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jay Bisen ◽  
Faheem Farooq ◽  
Manaeil Hasan ◽  
Akhil Patel ◽  
Jan Rychtar ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Extensive Form ◽  
Sequential Game

We consider kleptoparasitic interactions between two individuals - the Owner and the Intruder - and  model the situation as a sequential game in an extensive form.  The Owner is in possession of a resource when another individual,  the Intruder, comes along and may try to steal it. If the Intruder makes such a stealing attempt,  the Owner has to decide whether to defend the resource; if the Owner defends, the Intruder can withdraw or continue with the stealing attempt. The individuals may  value the resource differently and  we distinguish three information cases: (a) both individuals know resource values to both of them, (b) individuals know only their own valuation, (c) individuals do not know the value at all. We solve the game in all three cases. We identify scenarios when it is  beneficial for the individuals to know as much information as possible. We also identify several scenarios where knowing less seems better as well as show that an individual may not benefit from their opponent knowing less.  Finally, we  consider the same kind of interactions but without the option for the Intruder to withdraw. We find that, surprisingly, the Intruder typically fares better in that case.

DYNAMIC GAMES WITH COALITIONAL STRUCTURES

2006 ◽  
Vol 08 (02) ◽  
pp. 295-307 ◽  
Author(s):  
LEON PETROSJAN ◽  
SVETLANA MAMKINA
Keyword(s):  
Random Process ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Perfect Information ◽  
Backward Induction ◽  
Multistage Games

The paper explores the properties of multistage games with perfect information, in which (unlike the classic Kuhnian definition) the conditional coalition partition at any vertex is determined by a chance move and remains unchanged until the random process repeats at the next vertex. A new value for such a game is proposed in terms of a PMS-vector. It is computed by backward induction using conditional partition and transition in the vertices. An illustrative example is provided.

scholarly journals BELIEF REVISION IN GAMES OF PERFECT INFORMATION

2004 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thorsten Clausing
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Perfect Information ◽  
Backward Induction ◽  
Common Belief ◽  
Belief Condition ◽  
Perfect Information Games ◽  
Use Of Knowledge ◽  
Information Games

A syntactic formalism for the modeling of belief revision in perfect information games is presented that allows to define the rationality of a player's choice of moves relative to the beliefs he holds as his respective decision nodes have been reached. In this setting, true common belief in the structure of the game and rationality held before the start of the game does not imply that backward induction will be played. To derive backward induction, a “forward belief” condition is formulated in terms of revised rather than initial beliefs. Alternative notions of rationality as well as the use of knowledge instead of belief are also studied within this framework.

Privatizing Rural China: Insider Privatization, Innovative Contracts and the Performance of Township Enterprises

2003 ◽  
Vol 176 ◽  
pp. 981-1005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hongbin Li ◽  
Scott Rozelle
Keyword(s):  
Local Government ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Rural China ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Book Value ◽  
The World ◽  
Privatized Firms ◽  
Privatization Process ◽  
Insider Privatization

This article examines the privatization of China's township enterprises. According to our survey of 670 firms in 15 randomly selected counties in Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces, more than half of the firms owned by local government were completely privatized by 1999. The privatization process is striking for two reasons. First, local governments almost always sold firms to insiders, while in the rest of the world privatization largely involves outsiders. Secondly, unlike the predictions of some academics and policy makers, many privatized firms have experienced an increase in performance. Drawing on firm-level survey data and extensive interviews with government leaders and managers, we found that leaders devised a way to elicit information from the buyer at the time of the sale about the firm's future profitability that enabled them to execute privatization successfully. Our analysis shows that the performance of firms with new owners that paid a price for the firm that exceeded the book value of its assets is on par with the performance of private firms after privatization since they also received strong incentives.

scholarly journals Contractual incompleteness in an extensive-form game under perfect information using Stackelberg model

2014 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Anton Abdulbasah Kamil
Keyword(s):  
General Class ◽  
Perfect Information ◽  
Financial Contracts ◽  
Extensive Form ◽  
Extensive Form Games ◽  
Form Game ◽  
Strategic Default ◽  
Contractual Incompleteness ◽  
Extensive Form Game ◽  
Stackelberg Model

The paper presents the explanation of contractual commitments which are renegotiation-proof, based on “strategic default”. Under this, financial contracts must provide incentives of their own so that the parties would honor the agreement. We investigates the reach of this type of commitment within the general class of extensive form games. The result is that a renegotiation-proof contract exists which commits against every deviation from the equilibrium which would induce a revenue acceleration. AMS Subj. Classification: 91A40, 91A20 .

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