Rules, Sanctions and Enforcement Under Section 301: At Odds with the WTO?

1996 ◽  
Vol 90 (4) ◽  
pp. 675-689 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Lynne Puckett ◽  
William L. Reynolds

Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 permits the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to investigate and impose sanctions on countries whose trade practices are found to be unfair to U.S. interests. It reaches beyond the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), to give the United States unilateral power to penalize countries that threaten American interests. Section 301 can be used to enforce United States rights under multilateral and bilateral trade agreements, as well as to remedy unreasonable, unjustifiable or discriminatory foreign trade practices that restrict or burden U.S. trade. It contains both mandatory and discretionary provisions and specific timetables for action by the USTR.

2021 ◽  
Vol 65 (11) ◽  
pp. 31-39
Author(s):  
Z. Podoba ◽  
V. Gorshkov

The paper addresses current issues in Japan-U.S. foreign trade following the signing of the Japan-U.S. Trade Agreement and the Japan-U.S. Agreement on Digital Trade in October 2019. By providing an overview of Japan-U.S. trade relations, analyzing current trends in bilateral foreign trade and outlining basic terms of new bilateral agreements, the authors conclude that “path-dependency” in Japan-U.S. contemporary foreign trade persists and trade relations between the two countries are to a greater extent influenced by the U.S. trade policy which aims to assure a broader access of American companies to Japanese markets – the situation that was typical for bilateral trade relations since the 1980s. “Path-dependency” in Japan-U.S. trade relations, conventionally categorized by the existence of numerous trade contradictions, is pronounced in the unchanged goals, strategy and tactics of foreign trade negotiations. The United States maintains its “attacking” role and dominates in the bilateral trade negotiations, while Japan, despite its enhancing influence in the multilateral trading system and regional trade agreements, is forced to “self-defend” and make concessions to a more dominant partner in order to maintain its automobile exports to the United States at the expense of its national interests in other industries, particularly in the agricultural sector. Thus, new trade agreements are unlikely to cause significant structural changes in Japan-U.S. bilateral trade in the shortterm as the problem of persistent trade deficits remains. In order to break the vicious circle of “path-dependency” Japan is to actively cooperate with the economies of the European Union which have large amounts of trade deficits with the U.S., can serve as a mediator in the U.S. – China trade conflicts, as well with other Asian countries via mega-FTAs which possess potential risks to the United States. Further development of foreign trade cooperation will depend on the initiatives of new governments in both countries.


2017 ◽  
Vol 111 ◽  
pp. 92-95
Author(s):  
Kathleen Claussen

These remarks are derived from a forthcoming work considering the future of international trade law. Compared with most features of the international legal system, the regional and bilateral trade law system is in the early stages of its evolution. For example, the United States is a party to fourteen free trade agreements currently in force, all but two of which have entered into force since 2000. The recent proliferation of agreements, particularly bilateral and regional agreements, is not unique to the United States. The European Union recently concluded trade agreement negotiations with Canada, Singapore, and Vietnam to add to its twenty-seven agreements in force and is negotiating approximately ten additional bilateral or multilateral agreements. In the Asia-Pacific Region, the number of regional and bilateral free trade agreements has grown exponentially since the conclusion of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Free Trade Area of 1992. At that time, the region counted five such agreements in force. Today, the number totals 140 with another seventy-nine under negotiation or awaiting entry into force. The People's Republic of China is negotiating half a dozen bilateral trade agreements at present to top off the sixteen already in effect. India likewise is engaged in at least ten trade agreement negotiations. The World Trade Organization (WTO) reports 267 agreements of this sort in force among its members as of July 1, 2016.


At the present stage of development of international economic relations special attention is paid to the study of the relations between the countries that are the world leaders in terms of GDP and foreign trade – the USA and China. This is due to the fact that in recent years the US have introduced a number of measures to counteract the growth of Chinese exports, which has led to backlash from China. The subject of the study is the foreign trade relations of the USA and China. The goal is to analyze the influence of protectionist measures applied by the US and China on the development of their foreign economic relations. The following objectives are set: to determine the level of economic interdependence of the USA and the PRC, to investigate their impact on mutual trade flows and to analyze the dynamics of bilateral trade of countries under restrictive measures. The following methods are: comparative analysis, systematization and generalization, construction of regression models. The results of the analysis revealed that the US and PRC current accounts show reverse dynamics: the United States demonstrates stable deficit, while China has had surplus for many years. Moreover, the structures of the current accounts do differ a lot as well: the US is totally services-oriented country, whereas China is a major exporter of goods. It can be observed that both countries have experienced a recession of foreign economic activity since 2018, as far as their current account balances decreased substantially, which is likely to be the consequence of tariff barriers imposed by the US and PRC. Furthermore, due to trade confrontation, bilateral trade between these countries declines significantly as well, so that now China and the United States are forced to look for new export markets. The results of the regression models allow concluding that import from China is indeed having a negative impact on US exports, which has led to the US restrictions on imports from China. However, the introduction of mutual restrictions did not lead to an improvement of the US foreign trade.


Significance The hearing was part of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) Robert Lighthizer’s investigation of China under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, initiated in August. The US delegation to the WTO submitted in September a request for China to delay implementation of its Cybersecurity Law, citing its anticipated impact on cross-border technology transfers. Both of these developments reflect increasing technology trade tensions between the world’s two largest economies. Impacts US allies are likely to face pressure from Washington over procurement of Chinese ICT in government facilities. The US government is likely to use power over contracts, regulation and informal pressure to shape tech companies’ behaviour. Espionage fears will drive harsher US and European scrutiny of Chinese investment in their domestic tech sectors.


2007 ◽  
Vol 49 (5) ◽  
pp. 647-672
Author(s):  
Chris Nyland ◽  
Elizabeth Ann Maharaj ◽  
Anne O'Rourke

When the Australian and Chinese governments announced their intention to negotiate a bilateral trade agreement this news generated apprehension among employee bodies. This was because many workers believe China's competitiveness is underpinned by its government's refusal to allow China's workers to realize basic labour rights and because Australian labour and the wider community has been unable to participate in the debate surrounding the proposed agreement. The latter concern is the focus of this article. We accept organized labour has a right to `sit at the table' when trade policy is being determined and that the union movement needs to forge effective alliances if it is to achieve this goal. To assist this process we draw on submissions generated by the United States—Australia (AUSFTA) and Australia—China (ACFTA) trade agreements to argue that Australian unions and civil society groupings can influence the outcome of bilateral trade negotiations and in so doing offer suggestions regarding the issues likely to be most conducive to alliance building.


2006 ◽  
Vol 96 (3) ◽  
pp. 896-914 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nuno Limão

Most countries are members of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). The effect of these agreements has attracted much interest and raised the question of whether PTAs promote or slow multilateral trade liberalization, i.e., whether they are a “building block” or “stumbling block” to multilateral liberalization. Despite this long-standing concern with PTAs and the lack of theoretical consensus, there is no systematic evidence on whether they are actually a stumbling block to multilateral liberalization. We use detailed data on U.S. multilateral tariffs to provide the first systematic evidence that the direct effect of PTAs was to generate a stumbling block to its MTL. We also provide evidence of reciprocity in multilateral tariff reductions.


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