scholarly journals Dividends, Share Repurchases, and Tax Clienteles: Evidence from the 2003 Reductions in Shareholder Taxes

2011 ◽  
Vol 86 (3) ◽  
pp. 887-914 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer L. Blouin ◽  
Jana S. Raedy ◽  
Douglas A. Shackelford

ABSTRACT: This study jointly evaluates firm-level changes in investor composition and shareholder distributions following a 2003 reduction in the dividend and capital gains tax rates for individuals. We find that directors and officers, but not other individual investors, rebalanced their portfolios to maximize after-tax returns in light of the new tax rules. We also find that firms adjusted their distribution policy (specifically, dividends versus share repurchases) in a manner consistent with the altered tax incentives for individual investors. To our knowledge, this is the first study to employ simultaneous equations to estimate both shareholder and managerial responses to the 2003 rate reductions. We find that the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimates are substantially stronger than OLS estimates, consistent with our expectation that investor and manager responses are simultaneously determined. Failure to estimate systems of equations may account for some of the weak and conflicting results from prior studies of the 2003 rate reductions.

Author(s):  
Igor Semenenko ◽  
Junwook Yoo ◽  
Parporn Akathaporn

Growing tax competition among national governments in the presence of capital mobility distorts equilibrium in the international corporate tax market. This paper is related to the literature that examines impact of international tax policies on corporate accounting statements. Employing international firm-level data, this study revisits the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis and documents that tax exemptions lowering effective tax rates relative to statutory rates increase pre-tax returns. This finding directly contradicts the implicit tax hypothesis documented by Wilkie (1992), who provided empirical evidence on inverse relationship between pre-tax return and tax subsidy. We also find evidences that relative importance of permanent versus timing component depends on the geography and that decline in corporate tax rates reduces impact of tax subsidies on profitability. Our findings suggest that tax subsidies play a different role than in 1968-1985, which was examined by Wilkie (1992). These results are consistent with the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis and income shifting explanation


2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 131-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
François Gourio ◽  
Jianjun Miao

To study the long-run effect of dividend taxation on aggregate capital accumulation, we build a dynamic general equilibrium model in which there is a continuum of firms subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks. We find that a dividend tax cut raises aggregate productivity by reducing the frictions in the reallocation of capital across firms. Our baseline model simulations show that when both dividend and capital gains tax rates are cut from 25 and 20 percent, respectively, to the same 15 percent level permanently, the aggregate long-run capital stock increases by about 4 percent. (JEL D21, E22, E62, G32, G35, H25, H32)


Author(s):  
John R. Aulerich ◽  
James Molloy

<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: x-small;">A reduction in the long-term capital gains tax rate provides investors with new strategies to minimize taxes and protect investment gains.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>One such opportunity exists when an investor decides to sell a profitable stock with a holding period of less than one-year, resulting in short-term ordinary taxes.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>The investor would find it more beneficial to sell the stock after one-year lapses, resulting in lower long-term capital gain taxes, although the longer holding period exposes the investor to the uncertainty of stock price movement.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>A strategy to extend the holding period without excess risk would be to use the protective put option strategy, sometimes referred to as &ldquo;investment insurance&rdquo;.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>The strategy involves the purchase of a put option to protect against the possible decline in the stock price, to take advantage of the lower long-term capital gains tax rate, and to preserve the upside potential of the stock.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Pursuant to IRS Publication 550, the IRS does not allow the use of a protective put to extend the holding period on the same security considered for sale.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Since the IRS does not allow a direct protective put hedge, this study will explore an alternative strategy involving the purchase of a put on a highly correlated investment to extend the holding period to recognize lower capital gains tax rates.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>The paper presents example situations when an investor benefits from utilizing the correlated protective put option strategy.</span></p>


2020 ◽  
pp. 0000-0000 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michelle Hanlon ◽  
Rodrigo Verdi ◽  
Benjamin P. Yost

We hypothesize that prior evidence of target shareholder capital gains tax liabilities affecting acquisition features is driven by the tax liabilities of the target firm CEO. To test this, we estimate CEOs' capital gains tax liabilities for a large sample of acquisitions and examine the effects of such liabilities on acquisition outcomes. Results indicate that the previously documented positive relations between shareholder-level capital gains tax rates and 1) the likelihood of a nontaxable acquisition (Ayers, Lefanowicz, and Robinson 2004) and 2) acquisition premiums (Ayers, Lefanowicz, and Robinson 2003) are largely driven by CEO tax effects. We also find evidence consistent with 1) CEOs' tax incentives leading to potential agency conflicts under certain conditions and 2) acquisition structure or premium being adjusted in response to CEOs' taxes depending on the alternatives available to the acquirer. Our study contributes to our understanding of what and whose taxes affect acquisition structure and value.


2016 ◽  
Vol 106 (10) ◽  
pp. 3224-3237 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jules H. van Binsbergen ◽  
Ralph S. J. Koijen

Schulz (2016) replicates the findings of van Binsbergen, Brandt, and Koijen (2012)—henceforth, BBK—and agrees that the average pretax returns on short-term dividend strips are higher than those of the index, but argues that the after-tax returns are not. He thus provides a possible economic interpretation of the results in BBK: taxes. Schulz (2016) estimates the differential tax rates of dividends versus capital gains from ex-dividend day returns. We show that these estimated tax rates are suspect and imprecisely measured, peaking at over 100 percent in some periods. The results in BBK are robust to using tax rates from the literature (Sialm 2009). The arguments in Schulz (2016) thus crucially depend on implausibly large tax esti mates. We further discuss two other financial market imperfections discussed in the literature and show that they are also unlikely to explain the results in BBK. (JEL G11, G12, G35)


2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 170-202 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anca D. Cristea ◽  
Daniel X. Nguyen

Using a firm-level dataset of Danish exports between 1999–2006, we find robust evidence for profit shifting by multinational corporations. Our triple difference estimations exploit the response of export unit values to acquisitions of foreign affiliates and to changes in statutory corporate tax rates. This identification strategy corrects for a downward bias resulting from firms adjusting arm's length prices to obscure transfer price manipulations. We find that Danish multinationals reduce the unit values of their exports to low tax countries between 5.7 to 9.1 percent. This difference corresponds to a tax revenue loss of 3.24 percent of Danish multinationals' tax returns. (JEL D21, D22, F14, F23, H25, H32)


1990 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 411-425
Author(s):  
YOLANDA K. HENDERSON

2009 ◽  
Vol 99 (4) ◽  
pp. 1356-1383 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clemens Sialm

The tax burden on equity securities has varied substantially over time and remains a source of continuing policy debate. This paper investigates whether investors were compensated for the tax burden of equity securities over the period between 1913 and 2006. Taxes on equity securities vary over time due to changes in dividend and capital gains tax rates and due to changes in corporate payout policies. Equity taxes also vary across firms due to persistent differences in propensities to pay dividends. The results indicate an economically plausible and statistically significant tax capitalization over time and cross-sectionally. (JEL G10, G12, H22, H24, N21, N22)


2013 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 1241-1269 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcus Jacob ◽  
Martin Jacob

AbstractWe compile a comprehensive international dividend and capital gains tax data set to study tax-based explanations of corporate payout for a panel of 6,035 firms from 25 countries for the period 1990–2008. We find robust evidence that the tax penalty on dividends versus capital gains corresponds closely with firms’ propensity to pay dividends and repurchase shares, and with the amount of dividends and shares repurchased. Our coefficient estimates suggest a smaller tax effect than reported in recent single-country, single-event studies. Instead, our results correspond more closely with historic long-term estimates of the elasticity of dividends.


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