Assessing the Accuracy of Forward-Looking Information in Debt Contract Negotiations: Management Forecast Accuracy and Private Loans

2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-102
Author(s):  
Peter R. Demerjian ◽  
John B. Donovan ◽  
Jared Jennings
Keyword(s):  
Forecast Accuracy ◽  
Debt Contracts ◽  
Earnings Volatility ◽  
Contract Negotiations ◽  
External Auditors ◽  
Future Performance ◽  
Management Forecast ◽  
Debt Contract ◽  
Future Value ◽  
Forward Looking

ABSTRACT We examine a possible mechanism by which the lender can evaluate the borrower's ability to produce accurate forward-looking information. Forward-looking information is important to lenders to project the borrower's future performance and the loan's expected payoff. However, unlike historical financial statements, forward-looking information cannot be verified by lenders or external auditors. We contend that the borrower's past forecast accuracy provides a measure that allows the lender to assess the borrower's ability to produce accurate forward-looking information, allowing the lender to gain greater confidence in the borrower's projections of future value. Consistent with this argument, we find that the borrower's past forecast accuracy is negatively associated with the loan's initial interest spread. We also find that this relation is concentrated among non-relationship loans and borrowers with greater earnings volatility. Finally, we find that debt contracts to borrowers with more accurate managerial forecasts exhibit less interest rate mispricing. JEL Classifications: G30; M40; M41.

Information Technology Capability, Management Forecast Accuracy, and Analyst Forecast Revisions

2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 49-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Feiqi Huang ◽  
He Li ◽  
Tawei Wang
Keyword(s):  
Forecast Accuracy ◽  
Analyst Forecast ◽  
Management Forecasts ◽  
Forecast Revisions ◽  
It Capability ◽  
Management Forecast ◽  
Prior Literature ◽  
Technology Capability ◽  
Information Technology Capability ◽  
The Relationship

SYNOPSISPrior literature has firmly established the relationship between IT capability and firm performance. In this paper, we extend the research in this field and investigate (1) whether IT capability contributes to management forecast accuracy, and (2) whether IT capability improves the informativeness of management forecasts and enhances the extent to which analysts incorporate management forecasts in their revisions. Using firms listed on InformationWeek 500 as our high IT capability group, we empirically demonstrate that firms with high IT capability are able to increase management forecast accuracy, and that analysts incorporate more information from management forecasts in their revisions if the firm has high IT capability.

Are CEOs and CFOs Rewarded for Disclosure Quality?

2014 ◽  
Vol 90 (3) ◽  
pp. 1013-1047 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kai Wai Hui ◽  
Steven R. Matsunaga
Keyword(s):  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Forecast Accuracy ◽  
High Growth ◽  
Effective Communication ◽  
Disclosure Quality ◽  
Management Forecast ◽  
Growth Firms ◽  
Financial Disclosures ◽  
Cfo Compensation

ABSTRACT This study provides evidence regarding the importance that boards of directors place on effective communication with the investor community by examining whether CEO and CFO compensation are related to the quality of the firm's financial disclosures. Using an index derived from analyst forecast characteristics and management forecast accuracy to measure disclosure quality, we find changes in the annual bonus for both the CEO and CFO to be positively associated with changes in disclosure quality. We also find that the relation is stronger for high-growth firms, firms that have stronger governance structures, and for executives with lower equity incentives. Overall, our findings provide insight into the importance that boards place on effective communication with investors as a responsibility of the CEO and CFO and, therefore, provide them with contractual incentives to address the moral hazard problem associated with voluntary disclosures. JEL Classifications: M41.

The Effects of Debt Contracting on Voluntary Accounting Method Changes

2003 ◽  
Vol 78 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne Beatty ◽  
Joseph Weber
Keyword(s):  
Interest Rate ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Bank Debt ◽  
Accounting Choice ◽  
Debt Contracts ◽  
Debt Contracting ◽  
Dividend Payment ◽  
Debt Contract ◽  
Performance Pricing ◽  
The Interest Rate

This study examines whether the provisions of a firm's bank debt contracts affect its accounting choices. Starting with a sample of firms who have bank debt and who also voluntarily changed accounting methods, we investigate whether the likelihood that the change in accounting method increased (rather than decreased) the borrower's income depends on (1) whether the change in accounting method affects the bank debt contract calculations, (2) the expected costs of violating the bank debt covenants, (3) whether performance pricing provisions affect the interest rate on the loan, and (4) whether the bank debt contract contains accounting-based dividend restrictions. After controlling for other motives for changing accounting methods, we find that borrowers whose bank debt contracts allow accounting method changes to affect contact calculations are more likely to make income-increasing rather than income-decreasing changes. This increase in likelihood of an income-increasing change is attenuated when expected costs of technical violation are lower because there is a single lender, and occurs for borrowers whose debt contacts have performance pricing and dividend restrictions. These results suggest that incentives to lower interest rates through performance pricing or to retain dividend payment flexibility influence borrowers' accounting method choices, thereby addressing the fundamental questions posed by Fields et al. (2001) of whether, under what circumstances, and how accounting choice matters.

scholarly journals The Reciprocal Relationship Between Earnings Management, Disclosure Quality and Board Independence: UK Evidence

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (5) ◽  
pp. 63
Author(s):  
Nooraisah Katmon ◽  
Omar Al-Farooque
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Forecast Accuracy ◽  
Reciprocal Relationship ◽  
Least Square ◽  
Analyst Forecast ◽  
Board Independence ◽  
Disclosure Quality ◽  
Simultaneity Bias ◽  
Forward Looking

We empirically examine the reciprocal relationships between disclosure quality, board independence and earnings management. Disclosure quality is measured using the IR Magazine Award, the number of forward looking information in the annual report as well as the analyst forecast accuracy. We estimate earnings management using modified Jones Model, while board independence is measured using the percentage of independent directors in the board. We remedied the simultaneity bias in our study using a simultaneous system of equation, which was estimated using two-stage least square regression (2SLS). Match-paired samples comprised of the winners and non-winners of the IR Magazine Award during the years from 2005-2008 were employed in our study. Our finding reported that there is a negative reciprocal relationship between disclosure quality and earnings management. We notice that these findings are robust across all disclosure quality measurement that we utilised in our 2 Stage Least Square (2SLS) regression. Only one way (negative) causality between board independence and earnings management is demonstrated (in the board independence equation). In regards to disclosure quality and board independence, we found mixed findings. In this instance, our result demonstrated that there is no reciprocal relationship between disclosure quality and board independence (measured using IRAWARD). Nonetheless, we reported a positive reciprocal relationship between board independence and disclosure quality when forward looking information is utilized as to represent disclosure quality and a negative relationship between these variables when analyst forecast accuracy is employed. Our finding suggests that future research should take into account the potential simultaneity bias when examining the relationship between disclosure quality, earnings management and board independence.

scholarly journals The Effect of Ex Ante Management Forecast Accuracy on the Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift

2012 ◽  
Vol 87 (5) ◽  
pp. 1791-1818 ◽  
Author(s):  
Li Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Announcements ◽  
Forecast Accuracy ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Management Forecasts ◽  
Composite Measure ◽  
Earnings Announcement ◽  
Post Earnings Announcement Drift ◽  
Management Forecast ◽  
Ex Ante

ABSTRACT I examine the effect of ex ante management forecast accuracy on the post-earnings-announcement drift when management forecasts about next quarter's earnings are bundled with current quarter's earnings announcements. I build a composite measure of ex ante management forecast accuracy that takes into account forecast ability, forecast difficulty, and forecast environment. The results show that the bundled forecasts with higher ex ante accuracy mitigate investors' under-reaction to current earnings and reduce the magnitude of the post-earnings-announcement drift. Data Availability: The data used in this paper are available from the sources listed in the text.

Management Forecast Accuracy and CEO Turnover

2012 ◽  
Vol 87 (6) ◽  
pp. 2095-2122 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sam (Sunghan) Lee ◽  
Steven R. Matsunaga ◽  
Chul W. Park
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Forecast Accuracy ◽  
Ceo Turnover ◽  
Forecast Errors ◽  
Positive Relation ◽  
Managerial Ability ◽  
Management Forecast ◽  
Future Events ◽  
The Absolute

ABSTRACT We investigate whether management forecast accuracy provides a signal regarding CEOs' ability to anticipate and respond to future events by examining the relation between management forecast errors and CEO turnover. We find that the probability of CEO turnover is positively related to the magnitude of absolute forecast errors when firm performance is poor and that this positive relation holds for both positive and negative forecast errors. In addition, we find that the positive relation between CEO turnover and the absolute forecast errors is concentrated in the sample of less entrenched CEOs. Our findings indicate that boards of directors use management forecast accuracy as a signal of CEOs' managerial ability and that managers bear a cost for issuing inaccurate forecasts.

scholarly journals Pound of Flesh? Debt Contract Strictness and Family Firms

2017 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 259-282 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Hillier ◽  
Beatriz Martínez ◽  
Pankaj C. Patel ◽  
Julio Pindado ◽  
Ignacio Requejo
Keyword(s):  
Firm Value ◽  
Lower Risk ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Lower Cost ◽  
Cost Of Debt ◽  
Agency Conflicts ◽  
Publicly Traded ◽  
Debt Contracts ◽  
Value Maximization ◽  
Debt Contract

While past work finds support for both higher and lower cost of debt among family firms, whether lower shareholder–creditor agency conflicts in family firms translate into greater ex-ante contracting efficiency (i.e., lower debt contract strictness) remains unexplored. Drawing on a shareholder–creditor agency framework and costly contracting theory, creditors, expecting firm value maximization rather than shareholder value maximization from family firms, may offer less strict debt contracts to increase contracting efficiency. We find in a sample of 716 publicly traded U.S. firms (2001–2010) that family firms have less strict debt contracts, which are even less strict when family firms have higher asset tangibility. Although increases in R&D investments could lead to more pronounced shareholder–creditor agency conflicts, given family firms' preferences for lower risk and growth, debt contract strictness among family firms is not positively associated with higher R&D intensity.

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