The Fall and Revival of Coercive Diplomacy: Security Partnerships and Sino-American Security Relations, 1972–2009

Author(s):  
Thomas J. Christensen

This chapter examines how, in the post-Cold War era, the United States' alignment with Taiwan and alliance with Japan again have figured prominently among issues affecting U.S.-China security relations. While they are far from being allies, the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC) are not enemies either, but rather major economic partners who have also cooperated to some degree in addressing an increasing range of international problems. But there are still security tensions between the two sides over issues such as relations across the Taiwan Strait, and both nations practice coercive diplomacy toward the other, sometimes tacitly, sometimes less so. The chapter considers how the legacies of these Cold War alliances—particularly the U.S.–Taiwan relationship and the U.S.–Japan security treaty—have affected U.S.–China relations since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

2020 ◽  
Vol 01 (01) ◽  
pp. 2050001
Author(s):  
KHANH VAN NGUYEN

In this article, the political–security relations between the United States and Pakistan in the Post-Cold War era are analyzed. The allied relationship between the two countries during the Cold War was abruptly disrupted following the conclusion of the Cold War in 1991 and the United States imposed a series of sanctions against Pakistan following the nuclear issue in 1990. However, the September 11 attacks of 2001 and the global anti-terrorism war launched by the G. W. Bush government resumed the relationship. Again, Pakistan became one of the principal allies of the United States and bilateral political–security relations were promoted unprecedentedly thanks to their collaboration against terrorism. The war against terrorism, however, has also produced many contradictions, which brought the relationship between the two countries into disputes and crises. This article discusses the U.S.–Pakistan relations in the Post-Cold War Era with special attention to the political–security aspects. Attempts will be made to clarify the nature, impacts and tendencies of the relationship. The U.S.–Pakistan relationship is a typical example of the international relationship between a superpower and a middle power, and it is also typical of the U.S.’s changing alliance relations.


Author(s):  
Thomas J. Christensen

In brute-force struggles for survival, such as the two world wars, disorganization and divisions within an enemy alliance are to one's own advantage. However, most international security politics involve coercive diplomacy and negotiations short of all-out war. This book demonstrates that when states are engaged in coercive diplomacy—combining threats and assurances to influence the behavior of real or potential adversaries—divisions, rivalries, and lack of coordination within the opposing camp often make it more difficult to prevent the onset of regional conflicts, to prevent existing conflicts from escalating, and to negotiate the end to those conflicts promptly. Focusing on relations between the Communist and anti-Communist alliances in Asia during the Cold War, the book explores how internal divisions and lack of cohesion in the two alliances complicated and undercut coercive diplomacy by sending confusing signals about strength, resolve, and intent. In the case of the Communist camp, internal mistrust and rivalries catalyzed the movement's aggressiveness in ways that we would not have expected from a more cohesive movement under Moscow's clear control. Reviewing newly available archival material, the book examines the instability in relations across the Asian Cold War divide, and sheds new light on the Korean and Vietnam wars. While recognizing clear differences between the Cold War and post-Cold War environments, the book investigates how efforts to adjust burden-sharing roles among the United States and its Asian security partners have complicated U.S. security relations with the People's Republic of China since the collapse of the Soviet Union.


Author(s):  
Matthew Kroenig

Otto von Bismarck famously said that “God has special providence for fools, drunks, and the United States of America.” Divine providence may not have hurt, but it was America’s domestic political institutions that transformed a smattering of British colonies in North America into, first, an independent nation and, then, a global superpower with a network of allies and partners spanning six continents. The United States faced off against the Soviet Union for a half century during the Cold War. But Washington possessed the better institutions, and the stress of the competition caused Moscow’s political system to collapse altogether. In the post–Cold War period that followed, Washington deepened and expanded the Pax Americana, and spread unprecedented levels of global peace, prosperity, and freedom. For the first time since Ancient Rome, a single superpower so overawed any potential competitors that great power rivalry itself came to a temporary halt.


2008 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 118-138 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pavel Podvig

The Soviet strategic modernization program of the 1970s was one of the most consequential developments of the Cold War. Deployment of new intercontinental ballistic missiles and the dramatic increase in the number of strategic warheads in the Soviet arsenal created a sense of vulnerability in the United States that was, to a large degree, responsible for the U.S. military buildup of the late 1970s and early 1980s and the escalation of Cold War tensions during that period. U.S. assessments concluded that the Soviet Union was seeking to achieve a capability to fight and win a nuclear war. Estimates of missile accuracy and silo hardness provided by the U.S. intelligence community led many in the United States to conclude that the Soviet Union was building a strategic missile force capable of destroying most U.S. missiles in a counterforce strike and of surviving a subsequent nuclear exchange. Soviet archival documents that have recently become available demonstrate that this conclusion was wrong. The U.S. estimates substantially overestimated the accuracy of the Soviet Union's missiles and the degree of silo reinforcement. As the data demonstrate, the Soviet missile force did not have the capability to launch a successful first strike. Moreover, the data strongly suggest that the Soviet Union never attempted to acquire a first-strike capability, concentrating instead on strategies based on retaliation.


2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 4-63
Author(s):  
Inger L. Stole

In the mid-1930s, the notion that the U.S. government would collaborate with the country’s private industries to project official policies and shape public opinion abroad as well as at home would have been controversial and considered a violation of the nation’s democratic values. Yet, by the early 1950s, institutions and practices were in place to make this a regular activity. Much of this ideological work was done surreptitiously, in conjunction with commercial media, and there was little public or news media discussion demanding exposure and accountability for it. What had once been unthinkable had become unquestionable. This monograph chronicles the development of U.S. “information services” in the immediate postwar years. It chronicles the synergetic relationship between government interests, represented by the U.S. State Department, and major American corporations, represented by groups like the Committee for Economic Development and the Advertising Council in portraying the rapidly escalating Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union in a manner that would secure economic world dominance for American interests in the postwar era.


2016 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 7-44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson

Did the United States promise the Soviet Union during the 1990 negotiations on German reunification that NATO would not expand into Eastern Europe? Since the end of the Cold War, an array of Soviet/Russian policymakers have charged that NATO expansion violates a U.S. pledge advanced in 1990; in contrast, Western scholars and political leaders dispute that the United States made any such commitment. Recently declassified U.S. government documents provide evidence supporting the Soviet/Russian position. Although no non-expansion pledge was ever codified, U.S. policymakers presented their Soviet counterparts with implicit and informal assurances in 1990 strongly suggesting that NATO would not expand in post–Cold War Europe if the Soviet Union consented to German reunification. The documents also show, however, that the United States used the reunification negotiations to exploit Soviet weaknesses by depicting a mutually acceptable post–Cold War security environment, while actually seeking a system dominated by the United States and opening the door to NATO's eastward expansion. The results of this analysis carry implications for international relations theory, diplomatic history, and current U.S.-Russian relations.


2003 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 293-334
Author(s):  
Jianwei Wang

Ever since the end of the Cold War, the United States—from the government to the public, from the White House to Congress, from policymakers to pundits, from China specialists to people who know little about China—has engaged itself in the seemingly endless debate on China. Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, people debated whether China was still important to the United States and whether the Sino-U.S. special relationship was worth preserving. Since the early 1990s, with China's remarkable economic “soft landing” and the consequent robust and sustained economic growth, Americans seemed to have reached a consensus that China still matters to the United States for better or worse. U.S.-China relations were often referred to as one of the most important bilateral relations to the United States. But important in what way? Much debate ensued with a series of frictions between the two countries that climaxed in the dispatch of two U.S. aircraft carriers to the South China Sea during the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996, the U.S.-led NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, and the midair collision between the two air forces in 2001. The U.S. media tirelessly asked the question: “China: friend or foe?” The pattern for U.S. China policy since the end of the Cold War is that whenever the relationship appeared to be stabilizing and a consensus was shaping, new crises emerged and destroyed the hard-won progress, triggering another round of debate on China as if people never learned anything from the previous debate; the old and familiar discourse started all over again.


2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 150-174 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niklas Jensen-Eriksen

This article shows how the United States and the Soviet Union competed technologically in northern Europe during the final decades of the Cold War. The article highlights the U.S. government's ability to enlist neutral countries, and even vulnerable neutral states like Finland, into Western technology embargoes against the Soviet Union. Yet, the Finnish case also demonstrates that determined small countries and their companies were not simply helpless actors and could protect their political and commercial interests. Finland exported high-technology goods such as electronics and telecommunications equipment to the Soviet Union, even though Finland itself was dependent on technology flows from the United States. In fact, the Finns managed to get the best of both worlds: their country was an important player in East-West trade, but at the same time it was able to modernize its economy and strengthen trading links with the U.S.-led Western alliance.


2005 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-65
Author(s):  
Anatoli Ilyashov

As revealed by documents in the National Archives in Washington, u.c., the United States routinely and knowingly sent reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Union during the fifties and sixties. The u-2 shootdown of the pilot Francis Gary Powers in 1960 was a manifestation of this dangerous pattern during the Cold War era. The author, the first Fulbright Lecturer to the formerly « closed-to-foreigners » military-industrial city of Nizhny Novgorod, or Gorki, suggests a direct correlation between this pattern of earlier reconnaissance flights and the shoot down of the KAL 007 airliner in 1983. It thus contains implications for current foreign policy in the bold new post-Cold War era, in which the means for surveillance have become more militarily sophisticated and technologically advanced.


Author(s):  
G.M. Kakenova ◽  
Z.А. Kakenova

The article discusses approaches to the study of the theoretical foundations of the U.S. foreign policy. For decades, the United States has been one of the most important actors in international relations. The post-Cold War period is one of the most important periods in the U.S. foreign policy. At this time, scholars also debate the new role of the United States in the structure of international relations. Singling out the United States as the only center of power, American researchers supported the idea of a “unipolar” world. The ideas of American scholars and researchers dominated the words of American political leaders of the time: the United States is a world leader, and its mission is to establish a new international political and economic order based on liberal democratic values. The ideas of spreading democratic values and the theory of a democratic peace have had a significant impact on the formation and development of the U.S. foreign policy after the Cold War. The article examines the content and essence of these theories, their basic principles, and the reflection of these theories in the foreign policy of the United States.


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