scholarly journals Wittgenstein on Scepticism. An Interpretation of Wittgenstein's On Certainty

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Agata Orłowicz
Keyword(s):  
On Certainty ◽  
The World ◽  
Hinge Propositions ◽  
New Interpretation

<p>The thesis puts forward a new interpretation of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and contrasts it with the standard reading of the book, also known in literature as the Framework Reading. The Framework Reading sees hinge propositions, that is our most basic and indubitable beliefs, as framing our practice of talking about the world, and, therefore, external to this practice. As such, they are seen as not truth-apt, purely regulative in character and our relation to them as non-epistemic. According to the interpretation put forward in this thesis, we should instead see hinges as uncontroversially correct moves in our practice of talking about the world, and, therefore, we should see them as obviously true and playing both a regulative and a descriptive role.</p>

scholarly journals Wittgenstein on Scepticism. An Interpretation of Wittgenstein's On Certainty

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Agata Orłowicz
Keyword(s):  
On Certainty ◽  
The World ◽  
Hinge Propositions ◽  
New Interpretation

<p>The thesis puts forward a new interpretation of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and contrasts it with the standard reading of the book, also known in literature as the Framework Reading. The Framework Reading sees hinge propositions, that is our most basic and indubitable beliefs, as framing our practice of talking about the world, and, therefore, external to this practice. As such, they are seen as not truth-apt, purely regulative in character and our relation to them as non-epistemic. According to the interpretation put forward in this thesis, we should instead see hinges as uncontroversially correct moves in our practice of talking about the world, and, therefore, we should see them as obviously true and playing both a regulative and a descriptive role.</p>

Nous, Motion, and Teleology in Anaxagoras

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rhodes Pinto
Keyword(s):  
Living Things ◽  
The World ◽  
New Interpretation

This paper advances a new interpretation of the manner in which Anaxagoras regards nous as producing motion and, in so doing, explains Anaxagoras’ emphasis on nous’s purity and offers a major reassessment of the explanatory value of nous. Based on a fresh examination of the evidence, I argue that Anaxagoras holds that considerable difference between things is itself productive of motion. On account of nous’s purity there is always a difference between nous and the mixture (comprising everything else) such as to produce motion, with the specific sort of motion being determined by nous’s intent (based on its judgement) or affect. Taking into account what nous brings about, including the cosmic vortex that orders the world and the preservation of living things (by being present in them as their soul), Anaxagoras can be recognized as having offered the framework for a wide-reaching teleology with his conception of nous.

Pleasure, Judgment and the Function of the Painter-Scribe Analogy

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Emily Fletcher
Keyword(s):  
The World ◽  
New Interpretation ◽  
Independent Assessment

Abstract This paper puts forward a new interpretation of the argument at Philebus 36c–40d that pleasures can be false. Protarchus raises an objection at 37e–38a, and in response Socrates presents the elaborate painter-scribe analogy (38e–40c). Most previous interpretations do not explain how the analogy answers Protarchus’ objection. On my account, Protarchus’ objection relies on the plausible intuition that pleasure is simply not in the business of assessing the world, and so it cannot be charged with doing so incorrectly. Socrates responds by demonstrating that pleasure can be mistaken about the world, despite not making an independent assessment of it. The painter-scribe analogy demonstrates how pleasure comes to be mistaken about the world by reproducing the mistake of a judgment. Socrates persuades Protarchus that pleasure can be mistaken in part by preserving his intuition that pleasure itself is not the source of the mistake.

The ‘wild hunt’ in the long story by V. Korotkevich. A new interpretation of the medieval legend

2021 ◽  
pp. 154-167
Author(s):  
A. V. Khokhlova
Keyword(s):  
Eastern European ◽  
Fixed Set ◽  
The World ◽  
Western European ◽  
New Interpretation ◽  
Late Modern

The article considers a transformation of the Western European motif of the ‘wild hunt’ in V. Korotkevich’s story King Stakh’s Wild Hunt. The author gives an overview of folklore motifs typical of the ‘wild hunt’ phenomenon in the Western and Eastern European traditions. With origins in folklore, the ‘wild hunt’ motifs find their way into works of many writers in the late modern to contemporary period: the ‘wild hunt’ is localised on the edge of the mythological space and retains a fixed set of meanings. Most commonly, the ‘wild hunt’ features at the intersection of two domains. The first one is a complex of motifs inherited from the ancient myths and legends of the Germanic ‘Wütendes Heer.’ The second consists of the attributes of actual hunting. Taking a cue from The Hound of the Baskervilles — an obvious inspiration behind the story — and making use of the motifs traditionally associated with the legend, Korotkevich deconstructs the medieval myth, reducing it to an adventurous technique, only to reinstate it with new and unique meanings. The ‘wild hunt’ becomes a symbol of the ignorance, fear and despondency that have the world in their grip.

scholarly journals Thinking in colors

2021 ◽  
pp. 12-38
Author(s):  
Nikolai Aleksandrovich Kormin
Keyword(s):  
Cultural Identity ◽  
Color Harmony ◽  
Color Determination ◽  
The World ◽  
New Interpretation ◽  
The Aesthetic ◽  
First Time ◽  
Philosophy Of Arithmetic

This article reveals the philosophical grounds of the aesthetics of color, analyzes the correlation between the structures of philosophical and artistic comprehension of coloristics. Interaction of philosophy and art as the forms of cultural identity manifests in the sphere of intellectual understanding of the perception of color and its semantics in painting. In the hidden logic of contemplation of color, can be traced the outlines of the problematic of transcendental and intelligible in art conditions for the aesthetic approach towards chromatic space. Color creates the visual beauty, thus it is apparent why the aesthetic knowledge seeks to clarify to which extent we can assess the experience of color &ndash; the result of coloration of light. The art itself creates the so-called color ontology of the world. First the first time, the beauty of color and its perception are analyzed in the context of correlation between art and transcendental traditions of philosophizing &nbsp;(Descartes, Kant, early Husserl &ndash;&nbsp; his work &ldquo;The Philosophy of Arithmetic&rdquo;) that allows matching the key to a new interpretation of the tradition of color. Determination of its meaning requires comparing history and structure of the philosophical and artistic metaphor of color. It is demonstrated that the phenomenon of color is of crucial significance for the aesthetics, as it implies not only comprehension of the problem of correlation between nature and art, but also cognition of the beauty of color, its universal value for all forms of art, profound structures of perception of coloristic phenomena, picturesque unveiling of the color harmony of the painting.

Common Knowledge

2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 309-325
Author(s):  
John Greco
Keyword(s):  
Recent Literature ◽  
Common Knowledge ◽  
On Certainty ◽  
Transmission Of Knowledge ◽  
Advantages And Disadvantages ◽  
Hinge Propositions ◽  
Distinctive Role

A promising idea in the recent literature is that the concept of knowledge serves to govern the flow of actionable information within a community of information sharers. In this connection, several authors have argued that knowledge is the “norm of assertion,” while others have explored the distinctive role of testimony in the transmission of knowledge. This paper investigates the role of “common knowledge” in such a community, and compares it to Wittgenstein’s notion of “hinge propositions” in On Certainty. Wittgenstein’s thinking is evaluated in this context, and an account of common knowledge along Wittgensteinian lines is considered. I do not here endorse the account of common knowledge that results. Rather, I consider some of the advantages and disadvantages of what looks to be a promising approach.

Mastery: learning to act and perceive

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ezequiel A. Di Paolo ◽  
Thomas Buhrmann ◽  
Xabier E. Barandiaran
Keyword(s):  
Dynamical Systems ◽  
Mastery Learning ◽  
Ongoing Process ◽  
Action And Perception ◽  
The World ◽  
Progressive Growth ◽  
New Challenges ◽  
Sensorimotor Contingencies ◽  
New Interpretation ◽  
Sensorimotor Skills

If action and perception depend on the mastery of the laws of sensorimotor contingencies, then any theory of cognition that starts from this premise will not be complete unless it offers an explanation of how such mastery is achieved and of what exactly constitutes it. This chapter takes inspiration from Piaget’s theory of equilibration to develop an account of mastery as the progressive growth and refinement of an agent’s sensorimotor repertoire, involving processes of assimilation and accommodation. A new interpretation is provided of these Piagetian concepts in dynamical systems terms. The resulting theory holds that mastery of sensorimotor skills is both world-involving and nonrepresentational. Mastery does not consist in the accumulation of knowledge about the sensorimotor regularities that the agent is able to enact; rather, it is the ongoing process of equilibration by which the agent continuously adapts to new challenges presented to her by the world.

Melissus And His Opponents: The Argument of DK 30 B 8

Phronesis ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 263-288 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Makin
Keyword(s):  
Prima Facie ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
The Other ◽  
Good Argument ◽  
Orthodox Interpretation ◽  
Realist Position ◽  
The World ◽  
New Interpretation ◽  
The One

AbstractIn this paper I offer a new interpretation of Melissus' argument at DK 30 B8.In this passage Melissus uses an Eleatic argument against change to challenge an opponent who appeals to the authority of perception in order to support the view that there are a plurality of items in the world. I identify an orthodox type of approach to this passage, but argue that it cannot give a charitable interpretation of Melissus' strategy. In order to assess Melissus' overall argument we have to identify the opponent at whom it is aimed. The orthodox interpretation of the argument faces a dilemma: Melissus' argument is either a poor argument against a plausible opponent or a good argument against an implausible opponent.My interpretation turns on identifying a new target for Melissus' argument. I explain the position I call Bluff Realism (contrasting it with two other views: the Pig Headed and the Fully Engaged). These are positions concerning the dialectical relation between perception on the one hand, and arguments to counter-perceptual conclusions on the other. I argue that Bluff Realism represents a serious threat from an Eleatic point of view, and is prima facie an attractive position in its own right.I then give a charitable interpretation of Melissus' argument in DK 30 B8, showing how he produces a strong and incisive argument against the Bluff Realist position I have identified. Melissus emerges as an innovative and astute philosopher.

Political Conflict and Spiritual Battle

2016 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 85-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos Gustavo Sarmet Moreira Smiderle ◽  
Wania Amelia Belchior Mesquita
Keyword(s):  
Political Conflict ◽  
Territorial Disputes ◽  
The World ◽  
New Interpretation

A new interpretation of Evangelical actors’ increasing participation in Brazilian political and electoral contests is that elements of Pentecostalism predispose a believer to see the world as the site of an eternal struggle between God and Satan. The belief in demons that have territorial jurisdictions, known as territorial spirits, is one aspect of this theology. The cognitive universe of this belief induces the Evangelical voter to make electoral decisions on the basis of religious premises. It teaches the voter to conceive, without much reflection, the spiritual battle and the electoral game as territorial disputes.Uma nova interpretação para a crescente participação de atores evangélicos nas disputas político-eleitorais do Brasil é que elementos pentecostais predispõem a fazer a leitura do mundo como sendo resultado da disputa desde sempre travada entre Deus e o Diabo. Importante aspecto desta teologia é a crença em demônios dotados de jurisdição territorial, referidos como espíritos territoriais. O universo cognitivo onde prospera esta crença torna o eleitor evangélico propenso a tomar decisões eleitorais a partir de premissas religiosas. Embora nem sempre de modo reflexivo, tal crença leva o fiel a conceber batalha espiritual e jogo eleitoral como disputas por territórios.

scholarly journals Dobradiças, Vertigem Epistémica e Moralidade

2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (53) ◽  
pp. 125-140
Author(s):  
Nuno Venturinha ◽  
Keyword(s):  
On Certainty ◽  
The Third ◽  
Inexact Knowledge ◽  
Hinge Epistemology ◽  
Hinge Propositions ◽  
Rational Evaluation

This paper explores central themes of Duncan Pritchard’s epistemology intimately related to the Wittgensteinian idea of a “hinge epistemology”. The first section calls attention to the eminently empirical character of our “hinges”. The second section focuses on Pritchard’s notion of “arational hinge commitments”, more specifically his distinction between the pair “über hinge commitments”/“über hinge propositions” and the pair “personal hinge commitments”/“personal hinge propositions”. The third section brings to the discussion Timothy Williamson’s view of “inexact knowledge” and examines another pair of notions introduced by Pritchard, namely “antiskeptical hinge commitments”/“antiskeptical hinge propositions”. I conclude with a reevaluation of the diagnosis made by Pritchard that, confronted with a sceptical scenario, our “epistemic angst” can be surpassed if we follow Wittgenstein’s teaching in On Certainty about the “structure of rational evaluation”, but that an “epistemic vertigo” can never be ultimately dispelled. My argument is that in a moral scenario there is no room for vertigo.

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