scholarly journals The Problem of ESEE Knowledge

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Turri

Traditionally it has been thought that the moral valence of a proposition is, strictly speaking, irrelevant to whether someone knows that the proposition is true, and thus irrelevant to the truth-value of a knowledge ascription. On this view, it’s no easier to know, for example, that a bad thing will happen than that a good thing will happen (other things being equal). But a series of very surprising recent experiments suggest that this is actually not how we view knowledge. On the contrary, people are much more willing to ascribe knowledge of a bad outcome. This is known as the epistemic side-effect effect (ESEE), and is a specific instance of a widely documented phenomenon, the side-effect effect (a.k.a. “the Knobe effect”), which is the most famous finding in experimental philosophy. In this paper, I report a new series of five experiments on ESEE, and in the process accomplish three things. First, I confirm earlier findings on the effect. Second, I show that the effect is virtually unlimited. Third, I introduce a new technique for detecting the effect, which potentially enhances its theoretical significance. In particular, my findings make it more likely that the effect genuinely reflects the way we think about and ascribe knowledge, rather than being the result of a performance error.

Episteme ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Carsten Bergenholtz ◽  
Jacob Busch ◽  
Sara Kier Praëm

Abstract Studies in experimental philosophy claim to document intuition variation. Some studies focus on demographic group-variation; Colaço et al., for example, claim that age generates intuition variation regarding knowledge attribution in a fake-barn scenario. Other studies claim to show intuition variation when comparing the intuition of philosophers to that of non-philosophers. The main focus has been on documenting intuition variation rather than uncovering what underlying factor(s) may prompt such a phenomenon. We explore a number of suggested explanatory hypotheses put forth by Colaço et al., as well as an attempt to test Sosa's claim that intuition variance is a result of people ‘filling in the details’ of a thought experiment differently from one another. We show (i) that people respond consistently across conditions aimed at ‘filling in the details’ of thought experiments, (ii) that risk attitude does not seem relevant to knowledge ascription, (iii) that people's knowledge ascriptions do not vary due to views about defeasibility of knowledge. Yet, (iv) we find no grounds to reject that a large proportion of people appear to adhere to so-called subjectivism about knowledge, which may explain why they generally have intuitions about the fake-barn scenario that vary from those of philosophers.


2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 14-28
Author(s):  
Pendaran S. Roberts ◽  
Joshua Knobe ◽  
Pendaran Roberts ◽  
Joshua Knobe

This conversation piece contains an interview with Joshua Knobe. It provides a useful introduction to what experimental philosophy is and the interdisciplinary collaborations it encourages. Pendaran Roberts and Joshua Knobe collaboratively developed this conversation piece via email. Joshua Knobe is a renowned experimental philosopher, who works on a range of philosophical issues, including philosophy of mind, action and ethics. He is a professor in the Program in Cognitive Science and the Department of Philosophy at Yale University. He is most known for what is now called the ‘Knobe effect’.


Synthese ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 197 (12) ◽  
pp. 5457-5490
Author(s):  
Katarzyna Paprzycka-Hausman

AbstractThe Knobe effect (Analysis 63(3):190–194, 2003a) consists in our tendency to attribute intentionality to bringing about a side effect when it is morally bad but not when it is morally good. Beebe and Buckwalter (Mind Lang 25:474–498, 2010) have demonstrated that there is an epistemic side-effect effect (ESEE): people are more inclined to attribute knowledge when the side effect is bad in Knobe-type cases. ESEE is quite robust. In this paper, I present a new explanation of ESEE. I argue that when people attribute knowledge in morally negative cases, they express a consequence-knowledge claim (knowledge that a possible consequence of an action is that harm will occur) rather than a predictive claim (knowledge that harm will actually occur). I use the omissions account (Paprzycka in Mind Lang 30(5):550–571, 2015) to explain why the consequence-knowledge claim is particularly salient in morally negative cases. Unlike the doxastic heuristic account (Alfano et al. in Monist 95(2):264–289, 2012), the omissions account can explain the persistence of ESEE in the so-called slight-chance of harm conditions. I present the results of empirical studies that test the predictions of the account. I show that ESEE occurs in Butler-type scenarios. Some of the studies involve close replications of Nadelhoffer’s (Analysis 64(3):277–284, 2004) study.


2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 229-247
Author(s):  
Moshe Cohen-Eliya ◽  
Iddo Porat

Abstract Some constitutional accounts, in particular in the U.S., emphasize government attitudes to harming rights. Up till now, such accounts have primarily concentrated on intention to harm rights and on government acts of illicit intentions. However, such accounts have neglected a large scope of government attitudes that indicate indifference to harming rights rather than intention. In our article we use insights from experimental philosophy to develop an account of the role of indifference in constitutional law. We propose that the results of the Knobe Effect experiment show that the correlation between intent and indifference can be explained by the idea that indifference shows a lack of respect for the value or for the person harmed. Indifference, therefore, manifests a similar wrongness in terms of moral attitude as intent. The implications in terms of constitutional law are substantial. In principle, government actions manifesting indifference toward harming rights should be reviewed on the same lines as government actions based on intention to harm rights.


2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 179-203 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robin Scaife ◽  
Jonathan Webber

Certain recent experiments are often taken to show that people are far more likely to classify a foreseen side-effect of an action as intentional when that side-effect has some negative normative valence. While there is some disagreement over the details, there is broad consensus among experimental philosophers that this is the finding. We challenge this consensus by presenting an alternative interpretation of the experiments, according to which they show that a side-effect is classified as intentional only if the agent considered its relative importance when deciding on the action. We present two new experiments whose results can be explained by our hypothesis but not by any version of the consensus view. In the course of doing so, we develop a methodological critique of the previous literature on this topic and draw from it lessons for future experimental philosophy research.


Episteme ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 219-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
James R. Beebe ◽  
Joseph Shea

AbstractWe report experimental results showing that participants are more likely to attribute knowledge in familiar Gettier cases when the would-be knowers are performing actions that are negative in some way (e.g. harmful, blameworthy, norm-violating) than when they are performing positive or neutral actions. Our experiments bring together important elements from the Gettier case literature in epistemology and the Knobe effect literature in experimental philosophy and reveal new insights into folk patterns of knowledge attribution.


2014 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 215-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
Verena Utikal ◽  
Urs Fischbacher

A series of studies in experimental philosophy have revealed that people blame others for foreseen negative side effects but do not praise them for foreseen positive ones. In order to challenge this idea, also called the Knobe effect, we develop a laboratory experiment using monetary incentives. In a game-theoretic framework we formalize the two vignettes in a neutral way, which means that we abstain from the use of any specific language terms and can easily control and vary the economic parameters of the situation. We confirm the Knobe effect in one situation and present situations in which the effect vanishes or even reverses. Our results are in line with a theoretical approach where the assessment of intention is not based on the action itself but on the underlying motive – as modelled in Levine (1998).


2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florian Cova

The ‘Knobe effect’ is the name given to the empirical finding that judgments about whether an action is intentional or not seems to depend on the moral valence of this action. To account for this phenomenon, Scaife and Webber have recently advanced the ‘Consideration Hypothesis’, according to which people’s ascriptions of intentionality are driven by whether they think the agent took the outcome in consideration when taking his decision. In this paper, I examine Scaife and Webber’s hypothesis and conclude that it is supported neither by the existing literature nor by their own experiments, whose results I did not replicate, and that the ‘Consideration Hypothesis’ is not the best available account of the ‘Knobe Effect’.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (8) ◽  
Author(s):  
Emily Ann Harris ◽  
Rafael Garza Castillon ◽  
Priya Bhakta

Abstract Hepatic artery infusion pump chemotherapy (HAIPC) for colorectal liver metastasis (CRLM) is a new technique in the treatment of CRLM, whose side effects are not well studied. Case Report: This paper aims to understand the side effect profile of HAIPC as it relates to recurrent pleural effusions. This is a case report of a 48-year-old male with CRLM being treated with HAIPC, who presents with recurrent pleural effusions found to be benign/transudative after right-side video-assisted thoracoscopic surgery. Discussion: This study suggests that HAIPC causes recurrent sympathetic pleural effusions as a side effect of the perihepatic inflammation of the localized chemotherapy treatment. Furthermore, we question if sympathetic pleural effusions are a prelude to hepatic toxicity from HAIPC. Lastly, this paper aims to guide the differential diagnosis of pleural effusions in the cancer patient being treated with HAIPC.


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