What's new in the "new" US course towards the DPRK?

Author(s):  
Alexander Zhebin

The article analyzes the prospects for US-North Korean and inter-Korean relations, taking into account the completed policy review of the new US administration towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), as well as the results of the President of the Republic of Korea Moon Jae-in’s trip to Washington in May 2021 and his talks with US President Joe Biden. It is concluded that the “new" course proposed by the United States in relation to the DPRK will not lead to a solution to the nuclear problem of the Korean Peninsula and will interfere with the normalization of inter-Korean relations. During his visit to the US President Moon failed to obtain the US consent on ROK more “independent policy” toward North Korea. In spite of lavish investments into US economy and other concessions, Seoul was forced to promise to coordinate his approaches to the DPRK with US and Japan and support US position on Taiwan straits and South China Sea. The author argues that in the current conditions, the introduction of a regime of arms limitation and arms control in Korea should be a necessary stage on the way to complete denuclearization of the peninsula. The transition to a such method of the settlement of the nuclear problem could lead to the resumption of the negotiation process, mutual concessions, including reductions in the level of military-political confrontation, partial or large-scale lifting of economic sanctions in exchange for North Korea's restrictions of its nuclear weapon and missile systems.

2000 ◽  
Vol 9 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 85-105
Author(s):  
Steven Hugh Lee

AbstractSince December 1997, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Republic of Korea (ROK), and the United States have met in a series of talks aimed at promoting peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in the region. According to a November 1998 U.S. Department of Defense report, the discussions have created a “diplomatic venue for reducing tensions and ultimately replacing the Armistice Agreement with a permanent peace settlement.”1 Amidst the tragic human suffering which has occurred in North Korea, there have been some encouraging developments on the peninsula. The 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea placed international controls on North Korea’s atomic energy program and cautiously anticipated the normalization of U.S.-DPRK relations. Since assuming power in early 1998, South Korean President Kim Dae Jung has vigorously pursued a policy of engagement with P’yo¨ngyang, known as the “sunshine policy.” Over the past decade, North Korea has also reoriented its foreign policy. In the early 1990s, the regime’s social and economic crisis led to a rethinking of its autarkic economic system. By early 1994, the state had created new free trade zones and relatively open foreign investment laws.2 By complying with the Agreed Framework, the DPRK has also shown a willingness to work with the international community on sensitive issues affecting its internal sovereignty and ability to project power beyond its borders.


2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tomonori Ishida

AbstractIn January 1983, Japan finalized an economic assistance agreement with the Republic of Korea (ROK), pledging to extend $4 billion in economic aid to the country concerned. Prior to the finalization of the agreement, both countries held rounds of negotiation on the aid package conditions, and this led to them entering into a period of growing political friction. Despite this, a political consensus was eventually hammered out in 1983 over their disagreement, and this had a far-reaching effect in stabilizing the political relationship between the countries. Substantial academic research has been carried out on this topic, but the reasons behind Japan’s commitment to rounds of political negotiation with the ROK have yet to be positively analyzed and convincingly substantiated. In light of this fact, the main aim of this article is to analyze the motivational forces that brought Japan to the negotiating table with the ROK. More specifically, it focuses on analyzing the effects of the formalization process of the US-Japan agreement that served to induce Japan to address the ROK-aid negotiation issue conscientiously. The analysis reveals clearly that the major factor that spurred Japan to revisit its ROK’s aid package conditions was Japan’s concern over its security burden-sharing scheme with the United States. It is likely that in July 1981, in his summit meeting with President Ronald Reagan, Prime Minister Suzuki Zenkō pledged to initiate official talks with the ROK in response to the ROK’s request for an extended economic aid package. In tracing the course of US-Japan political negotiations from the period between 1977 and the formalization of the ROK’s aid agreement, this analysis reveals that the United States and Japan were of one mind concerning the need for the agreement as one of the critical means of resolving a myriad of their security concerns. It is also shown, however, that the countries arrived at their shared view from different perspectives, which were politically beneficial to their own interests. On the one hand, the United States expected Japan to assume greater responsibilities in security burden sharing, in line with its global economic status. On the other hand, partly because of the political limitations of shouldering a regional security role, Japan’s primary concern was to minimize its share of security burdens as far as possible and in such a way as not to disrupt its harmonious relationship with the United States. On top of this, insofar as the United States was concerned, it seemed to be unwise to request that Japan overshare the bilateral security defense expenditure, which might be detrimental to its political stability at home and at the same time might affect the credibility of their security alliance. In sum, the article shows that the consensus on aid for the ROK was beneficial to both Japan and the United States in terms of resolving their differences in the political operation of their security alliance scheme, including burden-sharing responsibilities. This was the real reason for Japan’s commitment to revisit its economic aid package with the ROK.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (02) ◽  
pp. 68-79
Author(s):  
Sung Chull KIM

While the nuclear negotiations between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the United States reached a stalemate in 2019, North Korea has advanced its missile capability and strengthened its alignment with China. In 2020 and beyond, the security of the Korean peninsula will depend on China’s influence on the DPRK–US game amid the US–China rivalry; the modality of Kim Jong-un’s actions, i.e. whether they are provocations or restraints; and the sanctions’ effect on North Korea’s foreign currency reserves.


Vojno delo ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Dejan Vuletić ◽  
Miloš Milenković ◽  
Anđelija Đukić

Modern society is critically dependent on information as a strategic resource and information and communications technology, which carries out its transmission, processing and exchange. Information and communications technology has created a new environment, cyberspace, in which tensions, disagreements and incidents are becoming more frequent. In recent years, the mentioned area has increasingly appeared as a domain of conflict between the leading world and regional powers. The paper gives a brief description of the concept of operations in several domains and elements of the new concept of joint warfare of the US Armed Forces. The importance of cyberspace for the US has been pointed out with a review of organizational changes and the adoption of certain strategic and doctrinal documents. The paper presents certain events and activities in cyberspace, in recent years, between the United States on the one hand, and Iran and North Korea on the other. The United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) was created in 2009. USCYBERCOM was elevated to the status of a full and independent unified command in May 2018. It indicates the importance of cyberspace for the Pentagon. In many ways, the separation of USCYBERCOM from Strategic Commands, which oversees strategic rejection, is a symbol of the change in the US attitude in cyberspace from "defensive" to "persistent engagement." The United States is still the strongest force in cyberspace and shows ambition to carry out cyber operations at all levels of command. It is unlikely that Iran will provoke the United States into a large-scale military conflict and wage a direct war in cyberspace. Iran has rapidly improved its ability to operate in cyberspace, and it is estimated that this trend will continue. The imbalance can prevent Iran from a direct military conflict with the United States and its allies. Greater action is expected with an asymmetric arsenal such as e.g. cyber attacks. Iranian and North Korean operations are similar in target selection, planning and exploitation of attacks. Both countries undertake different variants of phishing attacks in an attempt to deceive their victims into downloading malicious software by presenting it as a legitimate link or file. Whereas Iran usually had a motive only to cause disruption to the functioning of financial institutions, North Korean motive was both financial and political retaliation. Certain discovered incidents indicate that North Korea devotes much more time to conducting invasive surveillance before carrying out attacks. Numerous examples show that some activities have been prepared over the years and with the support of certain state bodies. Regardless of the fact that an investigation has been launched against certain groups, most often sponsored by states, it is unlikely that this will deter countries such as North Korea and Iran from giving up further activities and will pose an increasing threat to the US security.


2021 ◽  
Vol 66 (1) ◽  
pp. 226-244
Author(s):  
Valerii T. Yungblud ◽  
◽  
Denis A. Sadakov ◽  

The article describes the formation of a military and political alliance of the United States and the Republic of Korea in 1954. The article aims at defining the motives and priorities of the parties in the American-Korean negotiations held from June to November 1954 and at determining which factors influenced the negotiation outcome. On the whole, the significance of conflict elements in the US-South Korea relations increased in 1953–1954. While the Americans’ goal was to stabilize the situation on the peninsula and create a strong security system in northeast Asia, the priority of the Koreans and their leader Syngman Rhee, the President of the South Korea, was to restore the country’s unity. These priorities were not in line after the failure of the Korean talks at the 1954 Geneva Conference. Being totally dependent on the Americans in the military and economic spheres, Rhee was forced to comply with the armistice and cooperate in the implementation of the US initiatives regarding reunification of the country, which had very little chance of success. In exchange, he expected the US-Korea Mutual Defense Treaty to come into force and demanded the implementation of economic and military aid programs. Although the USA made concessions regarding all the points, they managed to create sufficient counterbalance to restrain Syngman Rhee: they established control over the South Korean military forces; assigned broad authority to the Coordinator of aid programs; had considerable armed forces on the territory of Korea. The Republic of Korea was included in the US regional security system on the terms of the Americans.


2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 353-360
Author(s):  
Kholofelo Kugler

The dispute relates to anti-dumping measures imposed by the United States (US) on oil country tubular goods (OCTG) imported from the Republic of Korea (Korea). Korea challenged the ‘laws, regulations, administrative procedures and other measures’ through which the US maintains a ‘viability test’ in anti-dumping investigations, administrative reviews, and other aspects of anti-dumping proceedings ‘as such’ and ‘as applied’ in the underlying investigation in this dispute. Korea also challenged certain aspects of the final anti-dumping measure that was applied by the US on imports of Korean OCTG subsequent to a final determination of dumping by the US Department of Commerce (USDOC) in the underlying investigation. Moreover, Korea challenged certain conduct of the USDOC during the course of the investigation at issue. Finally, Korea challenged the USDOC's remand determination of 22 February 2016 that was issued while the current dispute was pending before the panel. This determination was taken by the USDOC subsequent to a review conducted by the US Court of International Trade (USCIT) on the final determination challenged by Korea in this dispute. The USCIT found aspects of the final determination to be inconsistent with US law and remanded that final determination to the USDOC to cure the relevant inconsistencies.


2020 ◽  
pp. 658-667
Author(s):  
Olha Kravchenko

The article describes and analyses the policy of the Trump administration towards Ukraine. Traditionally, the election of a new US President has some impact on the Washington’s position on Ukrainian issues, and the end of the presidential tenure serves as a reason to take stock of the results. Donald Trump’s presidency has not been marked by profound changes in the US foreign policy towards Ukraine, as it was inertially in line, for the most part, with the previous years. The American political establishment primarily views Ukraine through the prism of the security paradigm as a bulwark of deterring its global opponents, particularly Russia. Thus, the article deals with the challenges and prospects of the modern US policy towards Ukraine. The priorities of the US foreign policy towards Ukraine traditionally consist of the issues enshrined in the 2008 U.S.-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership. The article focuses on defence, security, and energy cooperation. In this regard, the United States remains the major guarantor of the territorial integrity and independence of Ukraine. In deterring the Russian aggression, the Trump administration generally follows the approach of the imposition of economic sanctions, launched during the presidency of Barack Obama. It is important to stress that the United States focuses not only on the problem of the armed conflict in Donbas but also on the attempted illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia. At the same time, the focus on security issues has its negative repercussions, as it leads to certain limitations in bilateral relations, as evidenced by the lack of large-scale joint projects and weak trade and economic cooperation that impacts Ukraine’s position in the US foreign policy priorities. In the meantime, regardless of the name of the future US President, Washington’s support for Ukraine will be maintained. The close involvement of the United States in the negotiation process for the settlement of the conflict in Donbas and de-occupation of Crimea would significantly influence the course of events, but it is difficult to predict whether this prospect will become a reality. Keywords: US foreign policy towards Ukraine, Trump administration, strategic partnership, U.S.-Ukraine bilateral relations, process of impeachment.


Author(s):  
Sang Jo Jong

This chapter examines the statutory grounds for governmental access to private-sector data in Korea. It focuses on issues such as the circumstances under which access is allowed without a warrant and how unjustified government access can take place in practice. Systematic government access to private-sector data can take place through warrants issued by a court. Notably, due to the unique truce situation, under which the Republic of Korea is technically still at war with North Korea, Korean authorities are sometimes allowed to obtain private-sector data without warrants, for national security purposes. This chapter examines the statutory grounds for governmental access to private-sector data in Korea, focusing specifically on issues such as the circumstances under which access is allowed without a warrant and how unjustified government access can take place in practice.


2021 ◽  
pp. 048661342098262
Author(s):  
Tyler Saxon

In the United States, the military is the primary channel through which many are able to obtain supports traditionally provided by the welfare state, such as access to higher education, job training, employment, health care, and so on. However, due to the nature of the military as a highly gendered institution, these social welfare functions are not as accessible for women as they are for men. This amounts to a highly gender-biased state spending pattern that subsidizes substantially more human capital development for men than for women, effectively reinforcing women’s subordinate status in the US economy. JEL classification: B54, B52, Z13


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