Four-party evolutionary game analysis of supervision for vaccine quality in major epidemics

2022 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Rongjian Xie ◽  
Yucai Jia ◽  
Yuanmei Wu ◽  
Peiyun Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Regulatory System ◽  
External Information ◽  
The Public ◽  
Leading Role ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Cost

During major epidemics, monitoring vaccine quality can ensure the public health and social stability. Considering that social media has become an important way for the public to obtain external information during the epidemic. We developed a dual regulatory system of vaccine quality with the government in the leading role and the participation of We Media, and constructed a four-party evolutionary game model (government regulatory agency, We Media, vaccine industry groups, and the public) and analyzed the stability of each game player’s strategy choice. The system’s possible equilibrium points are identified using Lyapunov’s first law. Then the game trajectory between stakeholders is simulated by MATLAB, the effects of initial intention and parameters on the evolution process and results are analyzed. The results show that to ensure the quality and safety of vaccines and stabilize network public opinion during epidemics, the government should invest in an effective supervision mechanism. By strengthening responsibility, increasing penalties, and reducing supervision costs, the probability of vaccine industry groups providing high-quality vaccines is effectively enhanced. Restricting the behavior of We Media and supervising vaccine industry groups to reduce speculation reduces the cost of government supervision and improves its efficiency.

scholarly journals Analysis of Smooth Implementation of Industry Poverty Alleviation considering Government Supervision

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Haifeng Yao ◽  
Jiangyue Fu
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Poverty Alleviation ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Parameter Design ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
The Government

Vigorous implementation of industrial poverty alleviation is the fundamental path and core power of poverty alleviation in impoverished areas. Enterprises and poor farmers are the main participants in industry poverty alleviation. Government supervision measures regulate their behaviors. This study investigates how to smoothly implement industry poverty alleviation projects considering government supervision. A game model is proposed based on the evolutionary game theory. It analyses the game processes between enterprises and poor farmers with and without government supervision based on the proposed model. It is shown that poverty alleviation projects will fail without government supervision given that the equilibrium point (0, 0) is the ultimate convergent point of the system but will possibly succeed with government supervision since the equilibrium points (0, 0) and (1, 1) are the ultimate convergent point of the system, where equilibrium point (1, 1) is our desired results. Different supervision modes have different effects on the game process. This study considers three supervision modes, namely, only reward mode, only penalty mode, and reward and penalty mode, and investigates the parameter design for the reward and penalty mode. The obtained results are helpful for the government to develop appropriate policies for the smooth implementation of industry poverty alleviation projects.

Dynamic game analysis of hybrid strategy of enterprise fulfilling social responsibility

2020 ◽  
pp. 002072092094061
Author(s):  
Xin Zhao ◽  
Hong Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Main Body ◽  
Hybrid Strategy ◽  
The Public ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
The Government ◽  
Corporate Social ◽  
The Cost

In order to analyze the game relationship of corporate social responsibility, this paper uses evolutionary game theory to construct the dynamic game of mixed strategy by using government supervision, enterprises and the public as the main body of the three-party game. The results show that in the tripartite game, the more the expected revenue of government departments, enterprises, and the public increases, the more likely it is that the government departments will adopt a strict supervision strategy and the company will choose to assume social responsibility. The higher the cost of government supervision, the higher the cost of corporate social responsibility, and the more the loss of social welfare. Then the government department adopts a general regulatory strategy, and the company chooses not to assume social responsibility, the more likely the public will give negative evaluation of the company. The conclusion is that the strict supervision of the government supervision department has greatly increased the penalty ‘cost of enterprises’ failure to perform social responsibility. This helps enterprises to consciously perform social responsibility, and thus get positive comments from the public.

scholarly journals Evolutionary game analysis of environmental pollution control under the government regulation

2022 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kui Zhou ◽  
Qi Wang ◽  
Junnan Tang
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Pollution ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Government Regulation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Incentive Strategies ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Reward And Punishment

AbstractThis paper studied a tripartite evolutionary game of stakeholders in environmental pollution control. Most previous studies on this issue are limited to a focus on system dynamics with two-party game problems and lack a spatial analysis of strategy evolution. The parameters adopted are too few, and the influencing factors considered are too simple. The purpose of the paper is to introduce more parameters to study, which will have an important impact on the strategy choices of participants and the evolution path of the strategy over time. We construct a tripartite evolutionary game model of sewage enterprises, governments and the public. We establish a payment matrix and replicator equations as our method, and we also implement parameter simulations in MATLAB. In summary, we found that the reward and punishment mechanism plays an important role in environmental pollution control. Specifically: intensifying rewards and penalties will help encourage sewage enterprises to meet the discharge standard and the public to participate in pollution control action. However, increased rewards will reduce government's willingness to adopt incentive strategies; Government's reward for public's participation in the action must be greater than the increased cost of participation; Reducing the cost of sewage enterprise can also encourage them to implement standard emissions. The research presented in this paper further improves standard emissions and designs reasonable reward and punishment mechanism.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Supervision Behavior for Public-Private Partnership Projects with Public Participation

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Congdong Li ◽  
Xiaoli Li ◽  
Yu Wang
Keyword(s):  
Private Sector ◽  
Public Participation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Public Private Partnership ◽  
Private Partnership ◽  
The Public ◽  
Private Behavior ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Participation Level ◽  
The Government

The public can directly or indirectly participate in the PPP (public-private partnership) projects and then has an impact on the project profit and public or private behavior. To explore the influence of the public participation of the PPP projects supervision behavior, this paper analyzes the mutual evolutionary regularity of the private sector and government supervision department and the influence of public participation level on public and private behavior based on evolutionary game theory. The results show that the supervision strategy is not chosen when the supervision cost of government supervision department is greater than the supervision benefit; it can make private sector consciously provide the high-quality public products/services with the improvement of public participation level. Therefore, the government should reduce the cost of public participation and improve the public participation level and influence through the application of the Internet, big data, and other advanced technologies, in order to restrain the behavior of the private sector and improve the supervision efficiency.

scholarly journals Complex Dynamic Analysis for Game Model under Different Regulatory Levels in China’s Housing Rental Market

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Lingling Mu ◽  
Xiangyu Qin ◽  
Yuan Li ◽  
Ping Liu
Keyword(s):  
Real Estate ◽  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
The Public ◽  
Rental Market ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Cost

In this paper, we construct an evolutionary game model of government and real estate operators (long-term apartment rental companies) in the housing rental market in the context of financial institutions and public participation in regulation and analyze the effects of different regulatory levels of financial institutions and the public on the evolutionary results through model solving and numerical simulation. The results show that, under five different levels of supervision, financial institutions and the public have different evolutionary and stable strategies; financial institutions’ participation in supervision can effectively reduce the cost of government supervision and promote the government’s evolution towards strict supervision. It is difficult for real estate operators to evolve naturally towards keeping their promises when the probability of the social public or financial institutions participating in regulation is low. Only when the probability of social public and financial institutions participating in regulation reaches a certain level will real estate operators be inclined to keep their promises.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game between Government and Ride-Hailing Platform: Evidence from China

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qipeng Sun ◽  
Yuqi He ◽  
Yongjie Wang ◽  
Fei Ma
Keyword(s):  
Government Regulation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Sharing Economy ◽  
Parameter Analysis ◽  
Internet Technology ◽  
Market Regulation ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
New Business ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Stability

The ride-hailing industry is a new business form that combines traditional taxi services with Internet technology and a sharing economy. However, after its emergence, countries have focused on finding ways to regulate this industry. The regulation of ride-hailing has gone through three stages: from denial of negation to laissez-faire and prudential supervision. This study focuses on the market regulation of the ride-hailing industry, discusses whether ride-hailing platforms require strict regulation under the current Internet setting, and provides evidence for this problem from the perspective of evolutionary game theory between the behavior of the government and the platforms. This study argues that both ride-hailing platforms and the government are evolutionary game players with bounded rationality, constantly adjusting their strategies through confrontation, dependence, and restriction. Therefore, this study constructs a two-dimensional game model between the government and ride-hailing platforms and analyzes the stability strategies of the two participants in different scenarios, to clarify the game behavior and the game return matrix. Assuming that loose government regulation and the standard operation of the ride-hailing platforms are the optimal Pareto equilibrium of the game system, the study concludes that this optimal equilibrium cannot be achieved under the current conditions. Through parameter analysis and sample simulation calculations, the system can be directed toward this equilibrium by reducing government supervision cost and increasing government punishment. This provides a theoretical basis for the government to regulate the ride-hailing industry from the perspective of quantitative analysis. Related implications are finally proposed, which can help the decision-makers better understand the regulation countermeasures of the government and ride-hailing platforms.

scholarly journals Analysis of a Multiparticipant Game under a Subsidy and Punishment Mechanism: An Evolutionary Theory Perspective

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Jiangchao Li ◽  
Shilei Yang
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Vital Role ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Strategy Space ◽  
Market Sentiment ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Stability

In a market with intense competition, cost pressures tempt enterprises to seek profits in ways that infringe on the interests of consumers. This is especially true when market sentiment is weak. In such situations, governments play a vital role in protecting consumers’ interests and helping struggling enterprises. We construct a tripartite game model that includes the government, enterprises, and consumers under a subsidy and punishment mechanism. We use this model to investigate the strategic choices made by the participants in an evolutionary game theory (EGT) framework. We present four stable equilibrium points as pure strategy solutions with the aid of a replicator dynamic system. Three main findings are presented in this paper. First, not all equilibrium points can be evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) when considering the potential motivations of the participants to change strategies. Second, there is an equilibrium point that satisfies the stability condition but changes periodically in its strategy space; strategy changes between participants are not synchronized. Third, the government prefers to subsidize enterprises when enterprise speculation is serious or when enterprise investment in improving production technology is high.

scholarly journals Penerapan Sertifikasi Aquaculture Stewardship Council (ASC) Terhadap Produk Udang Budidaya (Studi Kasus: Tarakan - Kalimantan Utara)

2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 89-110
Author(s):  
Radityo Pramoda ◽  
Hertria Maharani Putri
Keyword(s):  
Statistical Methods ◽  
Environmental Sustainability ◽  
Municipal Government ◽  
Regulatory System ◽  
Policy Recommendations ◽  
Government Regulations ◽  
Illegal Fishing ◽  
Presidential Decree ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Cost

ASC (Aquaculture Stewardship Council) is a label, indicating that a product that has been passed through environmental sustainability and good aquaculture practices. Objectives of this study are to identify ASC standards and national regulations, and to examine the readiness of exporters and shrimp farmers to apply ASC principles in Tarakan. This study utilizes empirical juridical and descriptive statistical methods. Results of the study indicate that: (1) ASC certification has 7 principles, 34 criteria, and 103 indicators; (2) ASC principles are supported by: 5 Laws, 4 Government Regulations, 1 Presidential Decree, 3 Regulations of the Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, and 4 Decrees of the Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries; (3) ASC certification requires high cost; (4) in general the level of readiness of exporter and shrimp fishermen still need to be improved; (5) pond land is mostly illegal. The policy recommendations of this research are: (1) the government reorganizes the national regulatory system to avoid overlapping rules and regulatory vacancies; (2) the government provides lobbies and assessors to relieve the cost of certification; (3) the government adopts the ASC principle criteria to improve competitiveness; (4) the government encourages municipal government in Tarakan to immediately resolve the problem of illegal fishing ponds.  Keywords: Application, Cultivation Stewardship Council, Aquaculture Shrimp Products ASC (Aquaculture Stewardship Council) merupakan sebuah label, bahwa produk sudah melalui prosedur keberlanjutan lingkungan dan aspek sosial praktek budidayayang baik. Tujuan penelitian ini adalah mengidentifikasi ketentuan ASC dan regulasi nasional, serta mengkaji kesiapan eksportir maupunpembudidaya Udang menerapkan prinsip ASC di Tarakan.Analisis kajian menggunakan metode yuridis empirisdan statistika deskriptif. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan: (1) sertifikasi ASC memiliki 7 prinsip, 34 kriteria, dan 103 indikator; (2) prinsip ASC didukung: 5 Undang-Undang, 4 Peraturan Pemerintah, 1 Keputusan Presiden, 3 Peraturan Menteri Kelautan dan Perikanan, dan 4 Keputusan Menteri Kelautan dan Perikanan; (3) sertifikasi ASC membutuhkan biaya mahal; (4) secara umum tingkat kesiapan eksportir dan petambak Udang masih perlu ditingkatkan; (5) lahan tambak sebagian besar ilegal. Rekomendasi kebijakan penelitian ini: (1) penataan sistem regulasi nasional untuk menghindari tumpang tindih aturan dan kekosongan pengaturan; (2) pemerintah melakukan lobi atau menyediakan tenaga penilai untuk meringankan biaya sertifikasi; (3)mengadopsi kriteria prinsip ASC untuk meningkatkan daya saing; (4) pemerintah mendorong otoritas daerah Kota Tarakan segera menuntaskan masalah lahan tambak ilegal. Kata Kunci: Penerapan,Aquaculture Stewardship Council, Produk Udang Budidaya

Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Government Supervision and Private Sector Ecological Technology Innovation Behavior for Water Environment Treatment PPP Projects on the basis of Public Participation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huimin Li ◽  
Fuqiang Wang ◽  
Lelin Lv ◽  
Qing Xia ◽  
Lunyan Wang
Keyword(s):  
Private Sector ◽  
Public Participation ◽  
Technology Innovation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Water Environment ◽  
Environmental Benefits ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
The Government ◽  
Innovation Behavior

Ecological technology innovation with environmental benefits as the core has become an inevitable choice for water environment treatment PPP projects (WETP-PPP), and government supervision and public participation are essential driving factors for eco-technological innovation. To explore the influence of the public participation on the behavior of government and private sector in the WETP-PPP, this study constructed an asymmetric evolutionary game model of government supervision and private sector ecological technology innovation behavior under public participation. The main contribution of this study is to explore the mutual evolutionary regularity of the private sector and government supervision department and the influence of public participation level on public and private behavior in different scenarios. The results showed that the government can reduce the supervision cost by increasing the public's active participation and improving environmental regulation measures to achieve a win-win situation of economic and environmental performance.

Fear Induced Stabilization in an Intraguild Predation Model

2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (04) ◽  
pp. 2050053
Author(s):  
Mainul Hossain ◽  
Nikhil Pal ◽  
Sudip Samanta ◽  
Joydev Chattopadhyay
Keyword(s):  
Growth Rate ◽  
Hopf Bifurcation ◽  
Intraguild Predation ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Stable Limit ◽  
Interior Equilibrium ◽  
The Rich ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Impact

In the present paper, we investigate the impact of fear in an intraguild predation model. We consider that the growth rate of intraguild prey (IG prey) is reduced due to the cost of fear of intraguild predator (IG predator), and the growth rate of basal prey is suppressed due to the cost of fear of both the IG prey and the IG predator. The basic mathematical results such as positively invariant space, boundedness of the solutions, persistence of the system have been investigated. We further analyze the existence and local stability of the biologically feasible equilibrium points, and also study the Hopf-bifurcation analysis of the system with respect to the fear parameter. The direction of Hopf-bifurcation and the stability properties of the periodic solutions have also been investigated. We observe that in the absence of fear, omnivory produces chaos in a three-species food chain system. However, fear can stabilize the chaos thus obtained. We also observe that the system shows bistability behavior between IG prey free equilibrium and IG predator free equilibrium, and bistability between IG prey free equilibrium and interior equilibrium. Furthermore, we observe that for a suitable set of parameter values, the system may exhibit multiple stable limit cycles. We perform extensive numerical simulations to explore the rich dynamics of a simple intraguild predation model with fear effect.

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