The Metaphor of Dissociation: Teleological, Phenomenological, Structural, Dynamical

2019 ◽  
pp. 72-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ellert R.S. Nijenhuis
Keyword(s):  
Clinical Practice ◽  
Present Article ◽  
Internal Consistency ◽  
Substance Dualism ◽  
Enactive Approach ◽  
Conceptual Clarity ◽  
Original Definition ◽  
Structural Dissociation ◽  
The One ◽  
Definition Of

Dissociation as used in psychology and psychiatry is a troubled conceptual metaphor. The main problems include conflicting definitions and a lack of internal consistency of some of these formulations. Trying to mend the situation, Van der Hart, Nijenhuis and Steele (2006) revisited Janet's original definition of dissociation, and referred to it as "structural dissociation of the personality". This term is not meant to suggest that "structural dissociation" involves a particular kind of dissociation as is sometimes thought. To prevent or repair further misunderstanding, in the present article I highlight four inherent features of dissociation of the personality: teleological, phenomenological, structural, and dynamical. The article alsoaims to bridge some metaphors that are commonly described and understood as dichotomies, implying dualisms that plague philosophy, science, and clinical practice. For example, personality is understood as an organism-environment system, involving subjects and "objects" (that may be other subjects) as co-dependent and co-constitutive partners. Regarding matter (brain/body) and mind as attributes of one substance reflects an attempt to avoid the problems of philosophical (substance) dualism, as well as the one-sidedness of philosophical materialism and idealism. The generation, maintenance, and elaboration ofdissociation is analyzed in terms of causing, that is, the mutual manifestation of a network of reciprocal powers. The joint analyses involve an enactive approach to life, and intend to achieve further conceptual clarity and consistency of the metaphor of dissociation.

What has Natural Information to do with Intentional Representation?

2001 ◽  
Vol 49 ◽  
pp. 105-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Garrett Millikan
Keyword(s):  
Informational Semantics ◽  
Original Definition ◽  
Natural Information ◽  
The One ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Definition Of Information ◽  
Flow Of Information

‘According to informational semantics, if it's necessary that a creature can't distinguish Xs from Ys, it follows that the creature can't have a concept that applies to Xs but not Ys.’ (Fodor, 1994, p. 32)There is, indeed, a form of informational semantics that has this verificationist implication. The original definition of information given in Dretske'sKnowledge and the Flow of Information(1981, hereafter KFI), when employed as a base for a theory of intentional representation or ‘content,’ has this implication. I will argue that, in fact, most of what an animal needs to know about its environment is not available as natural information of this kind. It is true, I believe, that there is one fundamental kind of perception that depends on this kind of natural information, but more sophisticated forms of inner representation do not. It is unclear, however, exactly what ‘natural information’ is supposed to mean, certainly in Fodor's, and even in Dretske's writing. In many places, Dretske seems to employ a softer notion than the one he originally defines. I will propose a softer view of natural information that is, I believe, at least hinted at by Dretske, and show that it does not have verificationist consequences. According to this soft informational semantics, a creature can perfectly well have a representation of Xs without being able to discriminate Xs from Ys.

Topology Optimization of Dynamic Systems Under Uncertain Loads: An H∞-Norm-Based Approach

2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Paolo Venini
Keyword(s):  
Topology Optimization ◽  
Structural Parameters ◽  
Goal Function ◽  
Dynamic Compliance ◽  
Case Scenario ◽  
Worst Case ◽  
Original Definition ◽  
Optimal Material ◽  
The One ◽  
Definition Of

An innovative approach to topology optimization of dynamic system is introduced that is based on the system transfer-function H∞-norm. As for the structure, the proposed strategy allows to determine the optimal material distribution that ensures the minimization of a suitable goal function, such as (an original definition of) the dynamic compliance. Load uncertainty is accounted for by means of a nonprobabilistic convex-set approach (Ben-Haim and Elishakoff, 1990, Convex Models of Uncertainty in Applied Mechanics, Elsevier Science, Amsterdam). At each iteration, the worst load is determined as the one that maximizes the current dynamic compliance so that the proposed strategy fits the so-called worst case scenario (WCS) approach. The overall approach consists of the repeated solution of the two steps (minimization of the dynamic compliance with respect to structural parameters and maximization of the dynamic compliance with respect to the acting load) until convergence is achieved. Results from representative numerical studies are eventually presented along with extensions to the proposed approach that are currently under development.

Dic cur hic?

2006 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 103-158
Author(s):  
Sascha Salatowsky
Keyword(s):  
Present Article ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Basic Problem ◽  
The Other ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Ethical Life ◽  
Theological Virtues ◽  
Aristotle's Ethics ◽  
The One ◽  
Definition Of

In order to attain a deeper understanding of Aristotelian philosophy in the Renaissance, it is necessary to consider the theological implications of given facts. This article discusses a basic problem centring on the reception of Aristotle’s Ethics. The Nicomachean Ethics was widely regarded as the basis for a virtuous ethical life, yet how could a pagan philosophy, with its concepts of happiness, virtue, justice, etc., be the basis of a Christian society? The aim of the present article is to show how Lutheran scholars solved this problem in confrontation with Catholic and Calvinist scholars of the time. The first part deals with the two basic components of Aristotle’s Ethics, namely the doctrines of happiness (Eudaimonologia) and virtue (Aretologia), and attempts to show that Aristotle’s Ethics should not be understood as a system of rules, but rather as a handbook for the cultivation of practical habits in the free human being who strives to live a good life. The second part examines two key ideological confrontations in relation to Aristotle’s philosophy: between Lutherans and Calvinists in respect of definition of theology and philosophical and theological virtues on the one hand, and between Lutherans and ›the Enthusiasts‹ in respect of the concept of virtues on the other.

A NEW ISOMORPHIC DEFINITION OF THE CROSSED CUBE AND ITS SPANNING CONNECTIVITY

2009 ◽  
Vol 10 (01n02) ◽  
pp. 149-166
Author(s):  
CHENG-KUAN LIN ◽  
CHIEN-PING CHANG ◽  
TUNG-YANG HO ◽  
JIMMY J. M. TAN ◽  
LIH-HSING HSU
Keyword(s):  
Interconnection Network ◽  
Original Definition ◽  
The One ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Crossed Cube ◽  
Symmetric Properties

In this paper, we propose a slightly different definition of the crossed cube. The interconnection network obtained form our new definition is exactly isomorphic to the one obtained from the original definition proposed by Efe. It is known that the crossed cube is not node symmetric. However, using our new definition, it reveals some relative symmetric properties of the crossed cube. We can take advantage of the symmetry to study the spanning connectivity of the crossed cube.

scholarly journals On the original formulation and on the resonance over time of Grassmann’s Law: remarks on a still open issue

2019 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-130
Author(s):  
Marianna Pozza
Keyword(s):  
Historical Linguistic ◽  
Present Article ◽  
The Other ◽  
Original Formulation ◽  
Open Issue ◽  
New Interpretation ◽  
The One ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Over Time

Abstract The present article aims to reconsider in detail the original formulation of Grassmann’s law (GL), proposed by Grassmann (1863), since the main handbooks of Indo-European linguistics often repeat an extremely concise and sometimes incomplete formulation of the phenomenon without going into the details of Grassmann’s original reasoning, from which the definition of the phonetic “law” took its shape. In fact, we intend to highlight, on the one hand, the route whereby the scholar arrived at the decisive formulation of the principle which took its name from him, on the other the research ideas already present in the article of 1863 and only partially taken into account by subsequent studies. In addition to offering an overview, as complete as possible, of the resonance and influence of GL among linguists (both within a general and a historical linguistic perspective), over the years, the intent is to show the fruitfulness of ideas that still today could be used for new studies on the topic and to offer a possible, new interpretation of this phonetic change.

Entre Filosofia e Medicina

1998 ◽  
Vol 6 (11) ◽  
pp. 63-85
Author(s):  
António Pedro Mesquita ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Clinical Practice ◽  
Present Article ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
The Other ◽  
Empirical Methods ◽  
General Survey ◽  
Ancient Medicine ◽  
The Real ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One

Any analysis of the Hippocratic anthropology must begin by taking a stand on two quite different issues. On the one hand, it must ascertain a precise and definite meaning of the word ‘Hippocratic’ in such a context, considering the historical problems surrounding the 'real' Hippocrates and the doctrinal heterogeneity of the Hippocratic collection. On the other hand, it must justify the very possibility of an anthropology within the Hippocratic tradition, by accommodating it with the obvious animadversion that its most representative works show towards any philosophical or speculative inquiry. The first problem can be solved by purely historical means, viz. by restricting the object of analysis to the texts that admittedly represent the views of the Hippocratic school. Not so with the second one, which constitutes the truesignificant problem from a philosophical point of view and with which the present article is therefore concerned. After discussing the texts where the question on the nature of man is posed (Ancient Medicine XX, On the Nature of Man I-IV), a general survey of the Hippocratic conception of the theoretical and scientific foundations of clinical practice is given, in order to understand the Statement according to which it is to medicine, and not to philosophy, that an answer to such a question truly belongs. From such a survey a thesis arises: that, according to the Hippocratic perspective, the appropriate answer to the question on the nature of man is not the one that seeks to determine what man is, even by means of the empirical methods of medicine, but the one that reshapes the question itself, thereby replacing the philosophical focus on the knowing of man, for the sake of knowledge, by the clinical focus on the caring of man, for the sake of man himself.

scholarly journals The problem of intentionality in the school of Brentano

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 82-94
Author(s):  
Vladimir V. Seliverstov ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Point Of View ◽  
Original Definition ◽  
Long Time ◽  
History Of ◽  
Franz Brentano ◽  
Bernard Bolzano ◽  
Empirical Point ◽  
The Moment ◽  
The One ◽  
Definition Of

From the moment Franz Brentano formulated his definition of intentionality, it imme­diately began to undergo modifications in the works of his students. Brentano’s original definition included reference to the scholastic tradition, but it differs from the one that was formulated by the scholastics. In his work “Psychology from an Empirical Point of View”, Brentano defines intentionality both as an orientation towards an object and as a relation to some content, but at no later time, neither in this work, nor in other published works, does he clarify the meaning of the concept of «content». In this regard, the stu­dents and interpreters of Brentano’s works had a question: does the scheme of inten­tionality consist exclusively of an intentional act and an object, or does it also include the content of a representation? Brentano’s disciples did not view this definition as clear and unambiguous. In order to clarify this concept, they often studied other similar philo­sophical conceptions in search of a more precise definition. In particular, they looked for a similar concept in the theory of Bernard Bolzano. The first version of the schema of in­tentionality, including the content of representation, appeared in the works of Hoeffler and Twardowski. For this reason, for a long time they were considered by historians to be the discoverers of the distinction between object and content. However, after the notes of Brentano’s lectures, which he also read to his students, were recovered, it became clear that Brentano himself made this distinction. In this regard, it seems extremely important to interpret the history of the relationships in the Brentano school through the prism of the discussions devoted to the definition of intentionality and the structure of an inten­tional act, as well as to understand the origins of each individual interpretation of this concept proposed by Brentano’s students

Les facteurs de la décision politique en régime démocratique

1968 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-163
Author(s):  
Stéphane Bernard
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Political Power ◽  
Social Situations ◽  
Political Decision ◽  
Political Factors ◽  
Original Definition ◽  
Standing Up ◽  
The One ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Political Decision Making

Political Decision-Making in a DemocracyAll the factors which influence political decision-making may (reasonably) be integrated into a model which combines operational concepts of power, influence, and authority. The problem-solving approach is applied to one class of decisions, defined here as those made for social situations involving both technical and political factors. Political power seems necessarily to be engaged in a twofold form of activity. On the one hand it formulates the content of decisions to be made and is thereby affected by both the technical and political definition of the problem to be resolved. On the other hand, power is both an agent and an object of influence at every stage of the decisional process. Political power appears, then, to be a more comprehensive concept than either authority or influence. Its basic constituents are found in a fusion of the function of influence with the function of defining issues authoritatively. Authority is but one kind of influence while influence itself is simply one of the two chief functions of power.Power, before it is influential, is creative, inventive of ideas, and of solutions. Incorporation of these different categories into a model provides us with a systematic representation of the decision-making process of formulation, adoption, and execution. Particular attention is devoted to differentiating those components of behaviour on which authority is based from those which make the assessment of authority possible. On the whole, authoritative decision-making seems to be circumscribed by the original definition of the problem and by the decision-maker's personal under-standing. Up to a certain point this permits us to distinguish the part played by the force of given circumstances from that attributable to the free choice of the actors in a democratic political system.

Elements and Knowledge in the Theaetetus

Elenchos ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 299-326
Author(s):  
Jie Tian
Keyword(s):  
Present Article ◽  
Necessary Conditions ◽  
The Other ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
The Third ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Adequate Definition ◽  
Dream Theory ◽  
The One ◽  
Definition Of

Abstract Plato's Theaetetus develops an inquiry concerning the definition of knowledge. Famously, after Socrates and Theaetetus have discussed the three candidates for the definition of knowledge, the end of the dialogue seems to leave us in a situation of aporia. The present article focuses on the last hypothesis raised in the dialogue and tries to determine whether this hypothesis can be seen, under appropriate qualification, as acceptable within a Platonic framework. This hypothesis is connected with a dream theory that unfolds two crucial factors for understanding the definition of knowledge, i.e. elements and logos. So the aim of this paper is twofold: on the one hand, to make clear what elements properly are; on the other hand, to find an account of logos suitable to make it a necessary condition for the definition of knowledge. As will emerge from this paper, the first two candidates for the definition of knowledge are indeed not sufficient for gaining an adequate definition, but they nonetheless foreshadow the third hypothesis and are necessary conditions for understanding the third one.

O Problema da Definição do Acidente em Aristóteles

2001 ◽  
Vol 9 (17) ◽  
pp. 103-149
Author(s):  
António Pedro Mesquita ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Present Article ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
The Other ◽  
Final Part ◽  
Posterior Analytics ◽  
The Status ◽  
Per Se ◽  
The One ◽  
Definition Of

The present article aims to clear up three different, though connected, questions: 1st. The significance of the double definition of ‘accident’ in the Topics. 2nd. The significance of the distinction be tween two types of accident (‘strict’ accident and per se accident) in the Posterior Analytics and in the Metaphysics, namely in its alleged relationship with the double definition of ‘accident’ in the Topics. 3rd. The meaning of per se accidents within the framework of the predicables, namely from the point of view of its putative identification with propria predicates. In the course of the analysis, the answers given to these three questions are the following (in inverse order to their presentation): 1. By definition, the same predicate can never be a per se accident and a proprium, except incidentally, namely when regarded ‘at a certain moment’ (pote) or ‘in relation to something else’ (pros ti). In fact, despite Aristotle’s silence about the status of per se accidents within the framework of the predicables, they have there its own peculiar logical location, namely under the first definition of ‘accident’. 2. The distinction between ‘strict’ accident and per se accident, on the one hand, and the double definition of ‘accident’, on the other, do not coalesce, though they partially overlap. The second definition of ‘accident’ in the Topics subsumes only ‘strict ’ accidents, while the first definition is generally valid for ‘strict’ accidents and per se accidents. 3. As far as an educated guess can go on historical matters, we can suppose that the second definition of ‘accident’ was conceived by Aristotle to cover the only kind of accidents recognised by him when writing the Topics, while, by that time, the first definition was thought merely as a alternative negative definition. However, it is the schema provided by the first definition that allows a precise technical definition of the two types of accidents, which nowhere can be found in Aristotle texts. In the final part of the article, we try to reconstruct this technical definition.

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