Nature

2021 ◽  
pp. 40-64
Author(s):  
Dan Taylor

Chapter 2 approaches on the problem of ‘nature’ and natural right, exploring what human beings are according to nature, and how conflicting views of nature impede or inspire human power. It begins with an exposition on the Dutch “Golden Age” and slavery, with an excursus on the colony of Brazil. Natural law and contextual justifications of slavery are introduced as a backdrop to Spinoza’s approach. It discusses the hitherto-underappreciated significance of the three political laws of TTP’s Chapter 16, before raising wider questions of the status of the free man and the slave, and Spinoza’s various formulations of freedom and slavery, before relating these back to the contested areas of nature and naturalism, the historical context of slavery in the Dutch colony of “New Holland” in Brazil, and the broader avenues of conflict and cooperation between individuals.

Author(s):  
Jetze Touber

This book investigates the biblical criticism of Spinoza from the perspective of the Dutch Reformed society in which the philosopher lived and worked. It focusses on philological investigation of the Bible: its words, its language, and the historical context in which it originated. The book charts contested issues of biblical philology in mainstream Dutch Calvinism, to determine whether Spinoza’s work on the Bible had any bearing on the Reformed understanding of the way society should engage with Scripture. Spinoza has received massive attention, both inside and outside academia. His unconventional interpretation of the Old Testament passages has been examined repeatedly over the decades. So has that of fellow ‘radicals’ (rationalists, radicals, deists, libertines, enthusiasts), against the backdrop of a society that is assumed to have been hostile, overwhelmed, static, and uniform. This book inverts this perspective and looks at how the Dutch Republic digested biblical philology and biblical criticism, including that of Spinoza. It takes into account the highly neglected area of the Reformed ministry and theology of the Dutch Golden Age. The result is that Dutch ecclesiastical history, up until now the preserve of the partisan scholarship of confessionalized church historians, is brought into dialogue with Early Modern intellectual currents. This book concludes that Spinoza, rather than simply pushing biblical scholarship in the direction of modernity, acted in an indirect way upon ongoing debates in Dutch society, shifting trends in those debates, but not always in the same direction, and not always equally profoundly, at all times, on all levels.


Author(s):  
Corrado Roversi

Are legal institutions artifacts? If artifacts are conceived as entities whose existence depends on human beings, then yes, legal institutions are, of course, artifacts. But an artifact theory of law makes a stronger claim, namely, that there is actually an explanatory gain to be had by investigating legal institutions as artifacts, or through the features of ordinary artifacts. This is the proposition explored in this chapter: that while this understanding of legal institutions makes it possible to find common ground between legal positivism and legal realism, it does not capture all of the insights offered by these two traditions. An artifact theory of law can therefore be necessary in explaining the law, but it will not suffice to that end. This chapter also posits that legal artifacts bear a relevant connection to certain conceptions of nature, thus vindicating one of the original insights behind natural law theory.


2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 96-115
Author(s):  
Shoval Shafat

The aim of the discussion in this article is to explore two different Rabbinic explanations for the status of repentance in human and divine punishment, and to emphasize the essential distinction between them. According to the first explanation the source of accepting repentance is divine mercy upon human beings. Since mercy is not a legitimate consideration in conviction or even in determination of punishment in Jewish criminal law there is no wonder why repentance does not have any role during the criminal procedures in rabbinic court. According to the second explanation the acceptance of repentance by God is similar to the acceptance of flattery and bribe by a Roman corrupted judge. God decides to accept repentance and to forgive the transgressors since it better serves God’s interests. This analogy between repentance and flattery and bribery then explains why rabbinic courts do not take repentance into account.


2008 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 274-301 ◽  
Author(s):  
K.M. Schönfeld

Doubts about the traditional, positivistic interpretation of Montesquieu's ‘bouche de la loi’-text – Reading Montesquieu in his historical context – England and France: judge made law and parlementaire ideology – Natural law context – Lex animata, lex loquens: King versus judge – The Ciceronian and English background of the ‘bouche de la loi’ – The Fronde and les Mazarinades – George Buchanan, Sir Edward Coke and Calvin's Case


2016 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 523-534
Author(s):  
Jean Rhéaume

At least two important consequences follow from the fact that human rights are based on human nature. First, they exist according to natural law even in cases where positive law does not recognize them. Secondly, they cannot evolve because the nature and purpose of the human being does not change: only their formulation and level of protection in positive law can vary according to the socio-historical context.


2010 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 317-340 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Tristram Engelhardt

AbstractOnce God is no longer recognized as the ground and the enforcer of morality, the character and force of morality undergoes a significant change, a point made by G.E.M. Anscombe in her observation that without God the significance of morality is changed, as the word criminal would be changed if there were no criminal law and criminal courts. There is no longer in principle a God's-eye perspective from which one can envisage setting moral pluralism aside. In addition, it becomes impossible to show that morality should always trump concerns of prudence, concerns for one's own non-moral interests and the interests of those to whom one is close. Immanuel Kant's attempt to maintain the unity of morality and the force of moral obligation by invoking the idea of God and the postulates of pure practical reason (i.e., God and immortality) are explored and assessed. Hegel's reconstruction of the status of moral obligation is also examined, given his attempt to eschew Kant's thing-in-itself, as well as Kant's at least possible transcendent God. Severed from any metaphysical anchor, morality gains a contingent content from socio-historical context and its enforcement from the state. Hegel's disengagement from a transcendent God marks a watershed in the place of God in philosophical reflections regarding the status of moral obligations on the European continent. Anscombe is vindicated. Absent the presence of God, there is an important change in the force of moral obligation.


2010 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-33
Author(s):  
Jennifer Spinks ◽  
Susan Broomhall

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