scholarly journals Private Monitoring and Communication in the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 80
Author(s):  
Yu Awaya
Keyword(s):  
Poisson Process ◽  
Continuous Time ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Private Monitoring ◽  
Repeated Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Informative Signals ◽  
Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

This paper provides a model of the repeated prisoner’s dilemma in which cheap-talk communication is necessary in order to achieve cooperative outcomes in a long-term relationship. The model is one of complete information. I consider a continuous time repeated prisoner’s dilemma game where informative signals about another player’s past actions arrive following a Poisson process; actions have to be held fixed for a certain time. I assume that signals are privately observed by players. I consider an environment where signals are noisy, and the correlation of signals is higher if both players cooperate. We show that, provided that players can change their actions arbitrary frequently, there exists an equilibrium with communication that strictly Pareto-dominates all equilibria without communication.

scholarly journals Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma*

2017 ◽  
Vol 133 (1) ◽  
pp. 509-551 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Embrey ◽  
Guillaume R Fréchette ◽  
Sevgi Yuksel
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Meta Analysis ◽  
Basin Of Attraction ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Repeated Game ◽  
Backward Induction ◽  
Repeated Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

Abstract More than half a century after the first experiment on the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma, evidence on whether cooperation decreases with experience—as suggested by backward induction—remains inconclusive. This article provides a meta-analysis of prior experimental research and reports the results of a new experiment to elucidate how cooperation varies with the environment in this canonical game. We describe forces that affect initial play (formation of cooperation) and unraveling (breakdown of cooperation). First, contrary to the backward induction prediction, the parameters of the repeated game have a significant effect on initial cooperation. We identify how these parameters impact the value of cooperation—as captured by the size of the basin of attraction of always defect—to account for an important part of this effect. Second, despite these initial differences, the evolution of behavior is consistent with the unraveling logic of backward induction for all parameter combinations. Importantly, despite the seemingly contradictory results across studies, this article establishes a systematic pattern of behavior: subjects converge to use threshold strategies that conditionally cooperate until a threshold round; conditional on establishing cooperation, the first defection round moves earlier with experience. Simulation results generated from a learning model estimated at the subject level provide insights into the long-term dynamics and the forces that slow down the unraveling of cooperation.

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