scholarly journals Green Manufacturing Strategy Considering Retailers’ Fairness Concerns

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (17) ◽  
pp. 4646 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhang ◽  
Zhang ◽  
Pu ◽  
Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Green Manufacturing ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Manufacturing Strategy ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Fairness Concern ◽  
High Level

This paper addresses the problem of green manufacturing decision making for a green dual-channel supply chain (SC). In the investigated SC, the manufacturer will decide whether to adopt green manufacturing under the influence of the retailer’s fairness concern-based dual-channel. Thus, we discuss two decision scenarios: the no green manufacturing strategy with retailer fairness (NM model), and green manufacturing with retailer fairness (GM model). Our study has several findings: Firstly, adopting a green manufacturing strategy is not always beneficial to supply-chain members when a retailer has fairness. In particular, when fairness is at a relatively high level, the manufacturer will not adopt green manufacturing. Secondly, under green manufacturing, the product’s green degree and subsidies have a positive impact on the price and demand and the members’ profit and utility. Besides, the subsidies and retailer fairness have a counter effect on the optimal decision. Thirdly, comparing the two scenarios (NM & GM), we found that the channel price of the GM model is lower than the NM model. Finally, from the perspective of the supply chain system, the system tends toward the manufacturer adopting green manufacturing and maintaining retailer fairness concerns at a lower level.

scholarly journals Pricing Strategies in Dual-Channel Reverse Supply Chains Considering Fairness Concern

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (9) ◽  
pp. 1657 ◽  
Author(s):  
Di Wu ◽  
Juhong Chen ◽  
Ruyu Yan ◽  
Ruijun Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Transfer Price ◽  
Internet Technology ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Fairness Concern ◽  
Offline Channels

The fierce competition in the recycling industry and the rapid development of internet technology has prompted recycling centers to develop a dual-channel reverse supply chain with both offline and online recycling channels. After the introduction of online channels, recycling centers and third-party recyclers (TPR) have paid attention to the division of profits in supply chain systems and the behavior of fairness concerns. Therefore, it is necessary to help recycling enterprises make pricing decisions in consideration of fairness concerns. This paper is aimed at answering the following two main questions: (1) When the recycling center or TPR have fairness concerns, how does the optimal pricing and revenue of supply chain members change when both sides are neutral? (2) When the fairness concern coefficient changes, how does the overall revenue of the supply chain system change? How should supply chain members adjust their pricing decisions to maximize their own profits? In order to solve the above problems, Stackelberg game models were made from three aspects: both sides are neutral, only the TPR has fairness concerns, and only the recycling center has fairness concerns. Based on the results of the example analyses for the model, we found that when only the TPR has fairness concerns, the profit of the recycling center and the transfer price of offline channels will decrease, while the profit of TPR is the opposite. Furthermore, when only a recycling center has fairness concerns, it will lead to the reduction of not only the recycling price and transfer price of offline channels, but also the profits of the entire supply chain system. Specially, whether it is for a recycling center or TPR, a lower level of fairness concern coefficient has a stronger impact on pricing and revenue than at high levels.

A game theoretic analysis of dual-channel supply chain with nash bargaining fairness concern

2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 244-259
Author(s):  
Abhishek Sharma ◽  
Deepika Jain
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Nash Bargaining Solution ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Bargaining Solution ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Fairness Concern ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of fairness concerns of the retailer on the pricing policies of the supply chain partners, their individual profits, and the overall performance of a dual-channel supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one retailer. First, the authors model the dual-channel supply chain under retailer’s fairness concern. Second, the authors derive the optimal pricing policies of the channel members. Third, the authors analyze the effects of retailer’s fairness and bargaining power on the pricing strategies and profit functions of the dual-channel supply chain system. Design/methodology/approach The authors adopt the manufacturer-led Stackelberg game theoretic framework, where the dominant manufacturer’s pricing decisions are based on the retailer’s pricing decision. The paper considers Nash bargaining solution as the fairness reference point to formulate the utility function of the fair-retailer. The paper uses this approach because it endogenously accounts for the competitive power and cooperative contribution of the channel members when they interact. Findings The authors find that the retailer’s fairness concerns are not always beneficial for its better performance. If the retailer is moderately sensitive towards its fairness, it will positively influence its performance. However, if the fairness concern becomes too high then it will negatively impact the retailer’s performance because it results in customers’ migration towards direct online channel for buying the products. In addition, if the retailer’s fairness concerns are mild, the manufacturer’s prices will decrease in retailer’s bargaining power, which is opposite otherwise. Originality/value The authors use Nash bargaining solution model as the fairness reference in the context of dual-channel supply chain, which is comparatively a recent approach and has been used independently from dual-channel supply chain system.

scholarly journals Research of Dual-channel Supply Chain Decision with Consideration of Low-carbon and Fairness Concerns

2021 ◽  
Vol 275 ◽  
pp. 02062
Author(s):  
Guoshuai Niu ◽  
Qi Wei
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Single Channel ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Supply ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Fairness Concern ◽  
Double Channel

With in-depth implementation of policies on energy conservation and emission reduction and rising of low-carbon production practice in enterprises, low-carbon supply chain has gradually become a research issue which causes extensive attentions from scholars. However, most existing researches focus on supply chain decision and coordination under the background of single channel or mere consideration of fairness concerns of retailers. Therefore, the fairness concerns of manufacturers were taken into account in the double-channel low-carbon supply chain. A double-channel low-carbon supply chain model was constructed to research the influence of manufacturers’ fairness concerns to the optimal decision-making of all parties in the supply chain and to the overall performance of supply chain. The research results suggested that: with improvement of manufacturers’ fairness concern coefficient, the decision-making of supply chain members demonstrated different changing strength; the manufacturers’ fairness concern caused harm to overall profit of supply chain.

scholarly journals A Stochastic Differential Game in the Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Third-Party Collecting and Fairness Concerns

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (8) ◽  
pp. 2241 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jianmin Xiao ◽  
Zongsheng Huang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Return Rate ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
The Third ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Fairness Concern

This paper investigates the optimal return control problem in a closed-loop supply chain consisted of one manufacturer, one retailer, and one third-party collector, in the presence of stochastic return disturbance and fairness concern of followers. We formulate the stochastic differential game-theoretic models and resolve the feedback Stackelberg equilibriums without and with fairness concern. We also derive the evolutionary paths of the stochastic return rate and the value functions of the supply chain members under the optimal control strategies. We find that the feedback equilibrium exists only under a specific condition, and the expectation and variance of the return rate both approach the stable state for a specific closed-loop supply chain system. We further discussed the impact of fairness concerns on the supply chain system. The manufacturer would shift profit to the retailer by lowering the wholesale price, and the stable expected return rate will be lower in the supply chain with fairness concerns, as the third party will have less incentive to collect used products, considering unfairness. The manufacturer should set a higher transfer subsidy to incentivize the third party to collect when the third party is concerned with fairness.

scholarly journals Pricing Decisions of a Supply Chain with Multichannel Retailer under Fairness Concerns

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xueping Zhen ◽  
Dan Shi ◽  
Sang-Bing Tsai ◽  
Wei Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Selling Price ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Fairness Concern ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
Offline Channels

With the rapid development of the Internet, many traditional retailers have built their online channels. The fairness concern may play an important role in a dual-channel supply chain with a multichannel retailer. This paper establishes a Stackelberg game model in which a manufacturer produces and sells products through direct online channel and a retailer sells directly to consumers through online and offline channels. The manufacturer’s fairness concern (advantageous inequity) and the retailer’s fairness concern (disadvantageous inequity) are considered. Four scenarios are investigated: no fairness concern (NF), the retailer fairness concern (RF), the manufacturer fairness concern (MF), and both the manufacturer and the retailer fairness concern (MRF). The theoretical analysis shows that if the manufacturer’s advantageous inequity concern is low, the profit of the whole supply chain in the MRF scenario is the greatest. Otherwise, the supply chain profit in the NF or RF scenario is the greatest. That is, the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s fairness concern may increase the profit of the supply chain. This study also finds that the manufacturer’s advantageous inequity concern can increase the social welfare. The retailer should not concern about fairness if the manufacturer has high fairness concern. Besides, this paper shows that the manufacturer’s selling price cannot be affected by the fairness concern. Adjusting the wholesale price is the only thing that the manufacturer can do to reduce disadvantageous or advantageous inequity. In the RF scenario, the role of the retailer’s disadvantageous inequity concern is to reallocate the supply chain profit. Our findings provide some managerial insights on the pricing decision when the multichannel retailer and the manufacturer consider the fairness.

scholarly journals The Impact of Rebate Distribution on Fairness Concerns in Supply Chains

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (7) ◽  
pp. 778
Author(s):  
Xi Jiang ◽  
Jinsheng Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Fairness Perception ◽  
Effort Level ◽  
Profit Distribution ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Normal Method ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Fairness Concern ◽  
The Impact

The reasonable distribution of supply chain profits among supply chain members is the core of the stability of a supply chain. Manufacturer rebates are a normal method to improve the performance of a supply chain and balance profit distribution. Based on consideration of the behavior preferences of supply chain members, in this paper, we study the influence of rebate distribution on supply chain utility. We establish a supply chain utility model, including the proportion of distribution, fairness concern coefficient and effort level, and discuss three different situations of supply chain members. The results show that (i) a manufacturer’s rebate can more effectively improve the utility in a supply chain with fairness perception; (ii) with other conditions unchanged, the fairness perception of supply chain members will have a positive impact on their own utility; and (iii) at the same time, when the party who has more discourse power in the supply chain has a sense of fairness, this is conducive to realizing the stable development of the supply chain through changes in the proportion of rebate distribution.

scholarly journals The Complexity Analysis in Dual-Channel Supply Chain Based on Fairness Concern and Different Business Objectives

Complexity ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Li Qiu-xiang ◽  
Zhang Yu-hao ◽  
Huang Yi-min
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Control Method ◽  
Complexity Analysis ◽  
Business Objectives ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Fairness Concern ◽  
High Level ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Operation

We study a dual-channel supply chain which consists of one dual-channel manufacturer and one traditional retailer considering fairness concern. The manufacturer takes the market share as one of its business objectives in the competition game. We are devoted to establishing a vertical Nash game model and analyzing the price evolution of the model via the method of complexity theory and take adaptive adjustment control method to control the system’s chaotic state. The results show that an excessive price adjustment speed will hurt the system’s stability as well as profit of the supply chain. A high level fair caring for retailer will push the system to fall into chaos earlier, while a higher level fair caring for manufacturer will enlarge the stability region of the system. Setting the different objectives by the manufacturer will cause drastic competition in dual-channel supply chain. The research of this paper is of great significance to the decision-makers’ price decision and supply chain operation management.

scholarly journals The Stability and Complexity Analysis of a Low-Carbon Supply Chain Considering Fairness Concern Behavior and Sales Service

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (15) ◽  
pp. 2711 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qiuxiang Li ◽  
Xingli Chen ◽  
Yimin Huang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Stable Range ◽  
Direct Channel ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Fairness Concern

This paper studies a low-carbon dual-channel supply chain in which a manufacturer sells products through the direct channel and traditional channel, and a retailer sells products through the traditional channel. The manufacturer considers carbon emission reduction and has fairness concern behavior. The retailer provides sales service in the traditional channel and considers fairness concern behavior. The objective of this paper is to analyze the effects of different parameter values on the price stability and utility of the supply chain system emphatically using 2D bifurcation diagram, parameter plot basin, the basins of attraction, chaos attractor and sensitivity to the initial value, etc. The results find that the retailer’s fairness concern behavior shrinks the stability of the supply chain system more than that of the manufacturer’s fairness concern behavior. The system stability region decreases with the increase of carbon emission reduction level and the retailer’s fairness concern. The customers’ preference for the direct channel decreases the stable range of the direct channel, while it enlarges the stable range of the traditional channel. The supply chain system enters into chaos through flip bifurcation with the increase of price adjustment speed. In a stable state, the manufacture improving customer’s preference for the direct channel and the retailer choosing the appropriate fairness concern level can achieve the maximum utility separately. In a chaotic state, the average utilities of the manufacturer and retailer all decline, while that of the retailer declines even more. By selecting appropriate control parameter, the low-carbon dual-channel supply chain system can return to a stable state from chaos again. The research of this paper is of great significance to price decisions of participants and supply chain operation management.

Optimal Decision-Making of Low-Carbon Supply Chain Incorporating Fairness Concerns

2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 283-294 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guangxing Wei ◽  
Yanling Yao ◽  
Yanhong Qin
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Supply ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Optimal Decision Making ◽  
Fairness Concern

Abstract The optimal decision-making of the low-carbon supply chain incorporating fairness concerns, such as the effort of reducing carbon emissions, the whole sale price and retail price, is analyzed by taking the Nash bargaining solution as the fairness reference point. The following conclusions are found. Firstly, the wholesale price is strongly influenced by the fairness concern of the manufacturer but weakly influenced by that of the retailer, although both statistically significantly. Secondly, both the manufacturer’s and retailer’s fairness concerns reduce carbon emissions dramatically to nearly the same extent. Thirdly, the effect of the manufacturer’s fairness concern on the retail price is so tiny that it can almost be ignored, while the retailer’s fairness concern changes the retail price remarkably.

scholarly journals The Impacts of Fairness Concern and Different Business Objectives on the Complexity of Dual-Channel Value Chains

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qiuxiang Li ◽  
Yuhao Zhang ◽  
Yimin Huang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Chaotic State ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Fairness Concern ◽  
High Level ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

This paper considers a Stackelberg game model in a dual-channel supply chain, which is composed of a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer and retailer consider fairness concern in the market competition, and the manufacturer takes market share and profit as his/her business objectives. The entropy complexity and dynamic characteristic of the dual-channel system are analyzed through mathematical analysis and numerical simulation, such as local stability, bifurcation, entropy, and chaos. The results show that, with the increase of price adjustment speed, the dual-channel supply chain is more complex and falls into a chaotic state in which system entropy increases; the stability of the dual-channel supply chain will be robust with the increase of weight of market share and weaken with the increase of the fairness concern level of the manufacturer and retailer. The high level of fairness concern of the manufacturer and retailer is always disadvantageous to the leading manufacturer but not always bad for the follower retailer. The performance of the dual-channel supply chain is improved with a high level of the manufacturer’s fairness concern and reduced with a high level of the retailer’s fairness concern. We also find the retailer will gain more profits in the chaotic state than the stable state in the Stackelberg game model. The variable feedback control method is applied to control the chaos of the dual-channel supply chain, and choosing appropriate control parameters can make the dual-channel supply chain system return to the stable state from the chaotic state, or delay the system to enter the bifurcation state. The research results can provide a guideline for enterprise decision-making.

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