scholarly journals Knowledge friction in universities, approach from game theory

Author(s):  
Marianela Talavera-Ruz ◽  
Graciela Lara- Gómez ◽  
Macario Valdez-Reséndiz

In today's market economies, organizations see knowledge as one of their most valuable and strategic resources and seek to properly manage it so that it becomes a competitive advantage (Teece, 1988; Hamel and Prahalad, 1990, Drucker, 1994; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Boisot, 1998; Spender, 1996; Senge, 1990). Although many organizations make significant investments in technology and tools to promote knowledge sharing, cultural, behavioral, and structural aspects are the main determinants of success (Sharma and Bhattacharya, 2013). Organizational knowledge processes are, by their nature, generally social and complex. The behaviors related to sharing knowledge of organizational agents are full of situations of conflict of interest or dilemmas in which they receive different payments based on their strategic decisions. Such situations can be modeled as games. This article presents the approach to a particular dilemma, that of the knowledge friction in an Institution of Higher Education through Game Theory, describing a non-cooperative game model that allows showing the scope of said situation according to the decisions considered to be done by employees and employer and their related payments, exploring different decision-making scenarios.

Author(s):  
Pramod Kumar Goyal ◽  
Pawan Singh

In a heterogeneous wireless network (HWN) environment, performing an efficient vertical handoff requires the efficient qualitative evaluation of all stakeholders like wireless networks (WN) and mobile users (MU) and mutual selection of best WN-MU. In the literature, most of the work deals with both these requirements jointly in the techniques proposed by them for the vertical handoffs (VHO) in HWNs, leaving very little scope to manipulate the above requirements independently. This may result in inefficient vertical handoffs. Hence, this chapter proposed a generalized two-stage two players, iterative non-cooperative game model. This model presents a modular framework that separates the quantitative evaluation of WNs and MUs (at Stage 1) from the game formulation and solution (at Stage 2) for mutual selection of best WN-MU pair for VHO. The simulation results show a substantial reduction in the number of vertical handoffs with the proposed game theory-based two-stage model as compared to a single-stage non-game theory method like multiple attribute decision making.


Author(s):  
Liting Jing ◽  
Zhi Li ◽  
Xiang Peng ◽  
Jiquan Li ◽  
Shaofei Jiang

In the early stages of the product design, multiple principle solutions are obtained through function solving, and a large number of conceptual schemes are generated by combination. Therefore, scheme decisions are important factors in the concept design. The existing decision methods primarily focus on the satisfaction of economic needs, and the impact of technical indicators on the technical performance of the scheme, while ignoring the conflict of needs between the two subject objectives in the decision process. Actual decisions need to be weighed against each other’s expectations. In addition, the qualitative interactive objectives will affect the decision direction of the conceptual scheme. Herein, we propose a relative equilibrium decision approach for concept design based on the fuzzy decision-making trial and evaluation laboratory-cooperative game model. This model is primarily divided into two parts. One is to solve the impact relationship between the objectives, and the objectives’ weights are obtained through fuzzy decision-making trial and evaluation laboratory (FDEMATEL). The second is to incorporate the objectives’ weights and impact utility into the cooperative game model, to reasonably weigh the relative interests of the two subjects to meet the corresponding interactions, and to obtain the scheme with the largest overall design desirability. Finally, the case study proves that this decision model can identify the optimal scheme. This model is proven to be robust by comparison with other methods.


2011 ◽  
Vol 230-232 ◽  
pp. 600-604
Author(s):  
Xin Ma

Various participants in the supply chain must combine their own quality control and the relevant coordination decision-making with other enterprises to ensure they have strong competition position in the supply chain. Transactions among the manufacturers and retailers with the existence of asymmetric information in the electronic production system, as a result, the game will existent among them. In this paper, application of signal game theory to quality control of retailers are studied and the signaling game model of equilibrium to satisfy the three conditions are also be analysis.


Mathematics ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (5) ◽  
pp. 678 ◽  
Author(s):  
Song-Kyoo (Amang) Kim

This paper deals with a standard stochastic game model with a continuum of states under the duel-type setup. It newly proposes a hybrid model of game theory and the fluctuation process, which could be applied for various practical decision making situations. The unique theoretical stochastic game model is targeted to analyze a two-person duel-type game in the time domain. The parameters for strategic decisions including the moments of crossings, prior crossings, and the optimal number of iterations to get the highest winning chance are obtained by the compact closed joint functional. This paper also demonstrates the usage of a new time based stochastic game model by analyzing a conventional duel game model in the distance domain and briefly explains how to build strategies for an atypical business case to show how this theoretical model works.


Author(s):  
Hongyu Long ◽  
Hongyong Liu ◽  
Xingwei Li ◽  
Longjun Chen

The low efficiency of the closed-loop supply chain in construction and demolition waste (CDW) recycling has restricted the green development of China’s construction industry. Additionally, the government’s reward–penalty mechanism has a huge influence on green development. This study aimed to investigate the effect of green development performance (GDP) and the government’s reward–penalty mechanism on the decision-making process of production and recycling units, as well as to reveal the optimal strategies under different conditions. Therefore, the strategies’ evolutionary paths of production and recycling units were investigated by using evolutionary game theory. Firstly, an evolutionary game model between production units and recycling units was proposed under the government’s reward–penalty mechanism. Then, the evolutionary stability strategies in different scenarios were discussed. Finally, the effects of the relevant parameters on the evolutionary paths of the game model were analyzed using numerical simulations. The main conclusions are as follows. (1) When the range of GDP changes, the evolutionary stable strategy changes accordingly. GDP plays a positive role in promoting the high-quality development of the CDW recycling supply chain, but an increase in GDP can easily lead to the simultaneous motivation of free-riding. (2) The government’s reward–penalty mechanism effectively regulates the decision-making process of production and recycling units. An increase in the subsidy rate and supervision probability helps to reduce free-riding behavior. Moreover, the incentive effect of the subsidy probability on recycling units is more obvious, while the effect of the supervision probability on improving the motivation of active participation for production units is more remarkable. This paper not only provides a decision-making basis to ensure production and recycling units to make optimal strategy choices under different conditions but also provides a reference for the government to formulate a reasonable reward–penalty mechanism that is conducive to a macro-control market.


Author(s):  
Kasey Barr ◽  
Alex Mintz

This chapter examines the effect of group dynamics on the 2016 decision within the administration of President Barack Obama to lead the international coalition in a mission to liberate Raqqa, Syria, from the Islamic State. The authors show that whereas the groupthink syndrome characterized the decision-making process of the US-led coalition’s decision to attack Raqqa, it was polythink that characterized the decision-making dynamics both in the US-led coalition and within the inner circle of Obama’s own foreign policy advisors. Through case-study analysis, the authors illustrate that groupthink is more likely in strategic decisions, whereas polythink is more likely in tactical decisions.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Zhu Bai ◽  
Mingxia Huang ◽  
Shuai Bian ◽  
Huandong Wu

The emergence of online car-hailing service provides an innovative approach to vehicle booking but has negatively influenced the taxi industry in China. This paper modeled taxi service mode choice based on evolutionary game theory (EGT). The modes included the dispatching and online car-hailing modes. We constructed an EGT framework, including determining the strategies and the payoff matrix. We introduced different behaviors, including taxi company management, driver operation, and passenger choice. This allowed us to model the impact of these behaviors on the evolving process of service mode choice. The results show that adjustments in taxi company, driver, and passenger behaviors impact the evolutionary path and convergence speed of our evolutionary game model. However, it also reveals that, regardless of adjustments, the stable states in the game model remain unchanged. The conclusion provides a basis for studying taxi system operation and management.


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