scholarly journals An Old Procedure with new Solutions for the Rule of Law Crisis

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Franziska-Marie Laura Hilpert

Suggested citation:  Franziska-Marie Laura Hilpert, 'An Old Procedure with new Solutions for the Rule of Law Crisis' (2019) 2(2) NJEL 1. While commentators for the past years, have highlighted that there is no effective enforcement mechanism after accession for the values of the European Union which are enshrined in Article 2 TEU, the Juncker Commission has announced in 2017 that it will be ‘bigger and more ambitious on big things, and smaller and more modest on small things’ thus applying a more strategic approach to enforcement in terms of handling infringements. This Article thus analyses two cases brought by the Juncker Commission after 2017 and on their bases seeks to show that the infringement procedure, when applied strategically, is and remains an effective enforcement mechanism even for the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU in the ‘rule of law crisis’. Thus, by way of analysis of the case C-619/18 Commission v Poland and its comparison with similar cases which have not been as effective, it is shown how the infringement procedure can prevent the enforcement of the most controversial provisions regarding the judiciary in Hungary and Poland and ensure the separation of powers, which is essential for the rule of law. Moreover, by comparison of the Commission’s request and the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union in C-235/17 Commission v Hungary it is shown how the Charter could become a significant legal instrument in the Commissions infringement policy towards Member States that are undermining fundamental rights and the rule of law. This Article thereby aims to contribute to the discussion on how to effectively enforce the values of the EU enshrined in Article 2 TEU through an existing enforcement mechanism.

2013 ◽  
Vol 14 (10) ◽  
pp. 1959-1979 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Dawson ◽  
Elise Muir

According to Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, the European Union is a political and economic union founded on a respect for fundamental rights and the rule of law, referred to hereafter as EU fundamental values. The central place of this commitment in the EU Treaties suggests a founding assumption: That the EU is a Union of states who themselves see human rights and the rule of law as irrevocable parts of their political and legal order. Reminiscent of the entry of Jorg Haider's far-right Freedom Party into the Austrian government in 2000, the events of 2012 have done much to shake that assumption; questioning both how interwoven the rule of law tradition is across the present-day EU, and the role the EU ought to play in policing potential violations of fundamental rights carried out via the constitutional frameworks of its Member States. Much attention in this field, much like the focus of this paper, has been placed on events in one state in particular: Hungary.


Author(s):  
Miguel Poiares Maduro ◽  
Benedita Menezes Queiroz

The rule of law is under threat in the European Union. Systemic violations of fundamental rights are affecting the rule of law, democracy, and judicial independence in some Member States and consequently the EU legal order. The level of interdependence between the Member States and the EU legal order is such that systemic violations of those principles in the Member States end up impacting on EU compliance with the same principles. Article 7 TEU did not prove, however, to be the most effective tool to face these problems due to its political nature. The EU’s intervention in the form of infringement actions to safeguard the rule of law at the national level may be a suitable action to address some these serious violations of fundamental rights. Despite of the earlier hesitation to take a bolder action in this regard, the EU Commission, after the Court of Justice’s recent decisions in Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portuguese and LM, brought infringement proceedings against Poland challenging this country reforms that put into question the independence of its judiciary. The Court established its power of judicial review over the rule of law in the Member States in C-619/18 Commission v Poland. Ultimately, this decision highlighted the role of EU law in safeguarding the rule of law in its Member States, but more importantly in safeguarding the rule of law in the EU legal order as a whole.


Author(s):  
Aida TORRES PÉREZ

Abstract This contribution will tackle a central question for the architecture of fundamental rights protection in the EU: can we envision a Charter that fully applies to the Member States, even beyond the limits of its scope of application? To improve our understanding of the boundaries of the Charter and the potential for further expansion, I will examine the legal avenues through which the CJEU has extended the scope of application of EU fundamental rights in fields of state powers. While the latent pull of citizenship towards a more expansive application of the Charter has not been fully realized, the principle of effective judicial protection (Article 19(1) TEU) has recently shown potential for protection under EU law beyond the boundaries of the Charter. As will be argued, effective judicial protection may well become a doorway for full application of the Charter to the Member States. While such an outcome might currently seem politically unsound, I contend that a progressive case-by-case expansion of the applicability of the Charter to the Member States would be welcome from the standpoint of a robust notion of the rule of law in the EU.


Author(s):  
Artur Nowak-Far

AbstractAt present, the European rule of law enforcement framework under Article 7 TEU (RLF) is vulnerable to unguaranteed, discretionary influences of the Member States. This vulnerability arises from its procedural format which requires high thresholds in decision-making with the effect that this procedure is prone to be terminated by the EU Member States likely to be scrutinized under it, if only they collude. Yet, the Framework may prove effective to correct serious breaches against human rights (in the context of ineffective rule of law standards). The European Commission is bound to pursue the RLF effectiveness for the sake of achieving relative uniformity of application of EU law (at large), and making the European Union a credible actor and co-creator of international legal order. The RLF is an important tool for the maintenance of relative stability of human rights and the rule of law in the EU despite natural divergence propensity resulting from the procedural autonomy of the EU Member States. By achieving this stability, the EU achieves significant political weight in international dialogue concerning human rights and the rule of law and preserves a high level of its global credibility in this context. Thus, RLF increases the EU’s effectiveness in promoting the European model of their identification and enforcement.


2018 ◽  
Vol 64 (4) ◽  
pp. 552-560 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marek Safjan

In some countries of central Europe the rule of law is directly threatened by a new type of legislation based on the zeal of the political majority to establish a completely different political system than the one that was built after the collapse of the communist system. From that perspective, there is little place for the principle of separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary is threatened. This contribution discusses the multilevel dimension of the rule of law principle in the EU, issues in the context of the disrespect for the rule of law as a case of systemic deficiencies, followed by a brief discussion of the Copenhagen accession criteria. The article concludes that the rule of law principle as recognised under EU law is by no means of a merely symbolic nature, and that domestic legislation abolishing key safeguards of the rule of law can be scrutinized not only under the EU Charter of fundamental rights, where applicable, but also under the TEU. Without the solidarity of all Europeans, however, the preservation of our basic values and the future of the EU are in serious danger.


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivana Damjanovic ◽  
Nicolas de Sadeleer

In Opinion 1/17 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled that the new Investment Court System (ICS) in the Canada–EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) is compatible with the EU constitutional framework. This article examines the CJEU’s analysis of the ICS in its Opinion through the prism of EU values and objectives. Given the judicial nature of the ICS, the article unfolds around the concept of the rule of law. The scope and the content of this core EU value are considered under both EU law and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In particular, the ICS is analysed in light of the two core rule-of-law requirements: equal treatment and the independence of courts, enshrined in Articles 20 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR). Importantly, in Opinion 1/17 the CJEU for the first time applied Article 47 CFR to a court outside the EU judicial system. While the CJEU ruled that the ICS complies with the CFR rule-of-law criteria, this article argues that it nevertheless falls short of the rule-of-law standards required for judicial bodies under EU law. The article demonstrates that the CJEU prioritises free and fair trade as the CETA’s core objective, rather than the rule of law, and endorses the ICS as the conditio sine qua non of guaranteeing such trade. The Court’s findings have wider consequences for the rule of law in international law as the EU continues to pursue the establishment of a Multilateral Investment Court (MIC).


2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 157-171
Author(s):  
Adnan Mahmutovic ◽  
Helza Nova Lita

This paper discusses the distinctiveness of the European Union with focus on the Rule of Law and its importance for the EU integration process. Rule of Law is a notion that is very frequently used, but at the same time quite controversial as it is not so easy always to reach generally accepted meaning. Therefore, this paper provides a analysis of the EU Rule of Law  as multidimensional legal principle gravitating between values and principles. The paper acknowledges that a concept of the EU rule of law can be the subject of diverse interpretations and implementation. High-ranking government officials of a two EU member states, Poland and Hungary, have argued recently that a concept of the EU rule of law lacks well-defined rules and remains the subject of much debate. Therefore, the paper provides for better understanding of the concept itself within the specific supranational legal environment. Also, the paper argues that the future of the EU and its integrations depends largely on the respect of the rule of law that remains to be a core and the element of unity within Europe’s legal space. The relationship between the principles and values upon which the EU is founded remain close and interrelated. The EU Rule of law with all its distinctiveness can be concluded with certainty that it reflects a specific character and nature of the EU legal system.


2020 ◽  
pp. 75-100
Author(s):  
Robert Schütze

This chapter addresses the question of whether the EU has a constitution. It explores the formal constitutionalist credentials of the Union legal order and shows that the Union has claimed that the EU Treaties constitute the highest law in Europe. It then examines the constitutional nature of the Union from a ‘democratic’ perspective. Finally, it evaluates the Union legal order through the lens of liberal constitutionalism. This ‘classic’ constitutionalism assesses the legal nature of a document by insisting on a separation of powers and the existence of fundamental rights.


Author(s):  
Charlotte Reyns

Admissibility of questions for preliminary ruling – Independence of courts and tribunals in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union as Dorsch Consult criterion under Article 267 TFEU – Independence of courts and tribunals in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union as element of the Rule of Law value under Article 19 TEU – Structural inadmissibility of questions for preliminary ruling as perverse consequence of the attempts to safeguard independence of the EU judiciary


2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 69-88
Author(s):  
Xavier Groussot ◽  
Niels Kirst ◽  
Patrick Leisure

The Court ofJustice ofthe European Union’s (CJEU, Court) SEGRO judgment is more than just a recent addition to the debate on the so-called rule of law crisis in the European Union. As this case note shows, SEGRO touches on the most fundamental aspects of the European Union and its relation to the Member States. From an economic perspective, the Court in SEGRO’s treatment ofproperty rights and the ability ofeconomic actors to rely on their lawfully concluded contracts forms the undercurrent of economic investment in the Union. From a functional perspective, the case is perhaps indicative of a wider change in the role of the Court with respect to national courts’ margin of discretion. From a normative perspective, SEGRO gives rise to an important discussion on the difference between fundamental rights and economic freedoms in the EU since the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, as well as ‘constitutional homogeneity’ in the EU after Hungary’s legislative reforms. Finally, from an evolutionary perspective, SEGRO marks another iteration in perhaps a wider shift in the trajectory of the Court with respect to questions that menace the integrity of the functioning of the European Union. This case note first examines the background (I) and facts of the case (II). Then it analyses the Opinion of the Advocate General (III) and the findings of the Court (IV). It concludes with a discussion based not only on an analysis of the SEGRO case (V), but also going beyond the case by analysing the most recent jurisprudential developments concerning Hungary and the issue of the (non-respect) of the Rule of Law in the European Union(VI).


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