Familiengerechtigkeit in der sozialen Pflegeversicherung

2020 ◽  
Vol 69 (8-9) ◽  
pp. 627-641

Zusammenfassung Ausgehend von Beiträgen des Wissenschaftlichen Beirats für Familienfragen zum Verhältnis Familie und Sozialversicherung beleuchten wir in diesem Aufsatz die Frage der Familiengerechtigkeit in der sozialen Pflegeversicherung. Ein Großteil der Pflegearbeit in Deutschland wird innerhalb der Familie erbracht, gleichzeitig gewährleisten Familien die nachhaltige Finanzierung der Pflegeversicherung. Demographische Entwicklungen und veränderte Verantwortungskonzepte stellen diese Leistungserbringung vor Herausforderungen. Wir argumentieren, dass Familien auf der Beitrags- wie auf der Leistungsseite mehr ­Unterstützung benötigen, z. B. bei der arbeitsrechtlichen und finanziellen Absicherung pflegender Angehöriger, um die bestehende Schieflage zwischen stationärer und häuslicher Versorgung zu mildern. Abstract: The Role of Families in the Social Insurance System Based on previous reports of the Scientific Advisory Board for Family Affairs on the role of families in the social insurance system, this essay examines the aspect of family fairness in long-term care insurance. The majority of care work in Germany is provided within the family, while at the same time families ensure sustainable financing of long-term care insurance. Demographic change and changing concepts of responsibility challenge these modes of care provision. We argue that families need more support on the contribution as well as the benefit side, e. g. by securing labour rights and financial protection of caring relatives to alleviate the existing imbalances between institutional and home care.

Author(s):  
Pierre Pestieau ◽  
Mathieu Lefebvre

This chapter is concerned with the rise in long-term care needs. Long-term care concerns individuals who are no longer able to carry out basic daily activities. Most of the care is currently provided by informal caregivers, mainly the family, while the role of formal care provided by the state or the market remains small. The chapter explains, however, why informal care is expected to decline and analyses the low private insurance development, the so-called long-term care insurance puzzle. These two factors, the decreasing role of the family and a thin insurance market, plead for the development of a full fledge social insurance for long-term care. The chapter then looks at the optimal design of such an insurance.


2013 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 401-428 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chiara Canta ◽  
Pierre Pestieau

Abstract: Long-term care (LTC) is mainly provided by the family and subsidiarily by the market and the government. To understand the role of these three institutions, it is important to understand the motives and the working of family solidarity. In this paper, we focus on the case when LTC is provided by children to their dependent parents out of some norm that has been inculcated to them during their childhood by some exemplary behavior of their parents towards their own parents. In the first part, we look at the interaction between the family and the market in providing for LTC. The key parameters are the probability of dependence, the probability of having a norm-abiding child and the loading factor. In the second part, we introduce the government which has a double mission: correct for a prevailing externality and redistribute resources across heterogeneous households.


2007 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Torsten Sundmacher

SummaryThe Social Long-term Care Insurance (Gesetzliche Pflegeversicherung, GPV) is in a crisis which will clearly intensify without reforms. An important solution strategy is the introduction of competition elements. This concerns the competition between the Long-term Care Insurance as well as the competition between the service providers. In comparison to the Social Health Insurance (Gesetzliche Krankenvereicherung, GKV) this coordination procedure can be found up to now very rarely. It is examined with the help of the market failure theory which market problems can be found in the area of long-term care. Here, nursing goods as well as the market for nursing insurances are examined. In comparison to the GKV, the lacking consumer’s sovereignty and problems with principal-agent-relations aggravate the situation in the GPV. However, other market failures are rather less important. An enlarged discussion of differences between GPV and GKV leads to the question of the institutional arrangement. This concerns on the one hand the possible amount of market and competition in the GPV as well as, on the other hand, the relation between GKV and GPV. In particular the interface problems between both social insurance systems are discussed.


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