John Stuart Mill, liberty, and the harm principle

Author(s):  
Roger Kennedy
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Uyiosa Omoregie

Misinformation propagation in its current form is a global problem that requires urgent solutions. Historically, instances of misinformation publicly propagated can be found as far back as the sixth century AD.Scholars and researchers have generally settled for a definition of ‘information disorder’ that reveals three variants: misinformation, disinformation and malinformation. What should be of paramount importance, in the fight against information disorders, is the potential of false information to cause harm. The ‘harm principle’ was proposed by the British philosopher John Stuart Mill in 1859 and needs an upgrade for the social media age. One such upgrade is proposed by Cass Sunstein.


Utilitas ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Anna Folland

Abstract This article defends the Harm Principle, commonly attributed to John Stuart Mill, against recent criticism. Some philosophers think that this principle should be rejected, because of severe difficulties with finding an account of harm to plug into it. I examine the criticism and find it unforceful. Finally, I identify a faulty assumption behind this type of criticism, namely that the Harm Principle is plausible only if there is a full-blown, and problem-free, account of harm, which proponents of the principle can refer to.


Ethics ◽  
1996 ◽  
Vol 106 (3) ◽  
pp. 621-632 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Vernon

Author(s):  
Jeremy Horder

I turn my attention to the theoretical or moral justification for the offence of misconduct in public office. I argue that the offence of misconduct in office is only tenuously connected to the ‘harm principle’ justification for criminalization. I suggest that the offence is better explained by what I call the ‘role’ theory of criminalization. I also consider the legitimate scope of the offence: the kinds of misconduct that it should, and should not, cover. In that regard, we will see that codes of conduct that govern officials—a vital written element to the UK’s constitution—play a role not merely in setting boundaries but also in minimizing rule of law uncertainty about the kind of misconduct that may be found to fall within the scope of the offence.


Author(s):  
Anna Elisabetta Galeotti ◽  
Federica Liveriero

AbstractTraditionally, an adequate strategy to deal with the tension between liberty and security has been toleration, for the latter allows the maximization of individual liberty without endangering security, since it embraces the limits set by the harm principle and the principle of self-defense of the liberal order. The area outside the boundary clearly requires repressive measures to protect the security and the rights of all. In this paper, we focus on the balance of liberty and security afforded by toleration, analyzing how this strategy works in highly conflictual contexts and sorting out the different sets of reason that might motivate individual to assume a tolerant attitude. We contend that toleration represents a reliable political solution to conflicts potentially threatening social security when it is coupled with social tolerance. Hence, we examine the reasons the agents may have for endorsing toleration despite disagreement and disapproval. In the range of these reasons, we argue that the right reasons are those preserving the moral and epistemic integrity of the agent. The right reasons are however not accessible to everyone, as for example is the case with (non-violent) religious fundamentalists. Only prudential reasons for toleration seem to be available to them. And yet, we argue that an open and inclusive democracy should in principle be hospitable towards prudential and pragmatic reasons as well, which may potentially lay the grounds for future cooperation. We conclude therefore that the tolerant society has room for the fundamentalists, granted that they do not resort to violence.


2015 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 185-211
Author(s):  
Bernard E. Harcourt

This simple sentence from John Stuart Mill’s “Introductory” to On Liberty—pulled out of context and denuded of Mill’s sophisticated philosophical treatment—became a foundational reference of Anglo-American criminal law and helped shape the course of penal legislation, enforcement, and theory during the twenteith century.


2014 ◽  
Vol 55 (129) ◽  
pp. 99-110
Author(s):  
Cinara Nahra

In this article I present a possible solution for the classic problem of the apparent incompatibility between Mill's Greatest Happiness Principle and his Principle of Liberty arguing that in the other-regarding sphere the judgments of experience and knowledge accumulated through history have moral and legal force, whilst in the self-regarding sphere the judgments of the experienced people only have prudential value and the reason for this is the idea according to which each of us is a better judge than anyone else to decide what causes us pain and which kind of pleasure we prefer (the so-called epistemological argument). Considering that the Greatest Happiness Principle is nothing but the aggregate of each person's happiness, given the epistemological claim we conclude that, by leaving people free even to cause harm to themselves, we still would be maximizing happiness, so both principles (the Greatest Happiness Principle and the Principle of Liberty) could be compatible.


Legal Theory ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 77-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Larry Alexander

The hallmark of modern liberalism is its embrace of the Millian harm principle and its antipathy to legal moralism. In this article I consider whether aesthetic regulations can be justified under the harm principle as that principle has been elaborated by Joel Feinberg. I conclude that aesthetic and other regulations that most liberals regard as unproblematic are actually instances of legal moralism.


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