A Realist Perspective on Bayesian Cognitive Science

2019 ◽  
pp. 40-73
Author(s):  
Michael Rescorla
Synthese ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 195 (11) ◽  
pp. 4817-4838 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matteo Colombo

2011 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 194-196 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nick Chater ◽  
Noah Goodman ◽  
Thomas L. Griffiths ◽  
Charles Kemp ◽  
Mike Oaksford ◽  
...  

AbstractIf Bayesian Fundamentalism existed, Jones & Love's (J&L's) arguments would provide a necessary corrective. But it does not. Bayesian cognitive science is deeply concerned with characterizing algorithms and representations, and, ultimately, implementations in neural circuits; it pays close attention to environmental structure and the constraints of behavioral data, when available; and it rigorously compares multiple models, both within and across papers. J&L's recommendation of Bayesian Enlightenment corresponds to past, present, and, we hope, future practice in Bayesian cognitive science.


2020 ◽  
Vol 29 (5) ◽  
pp. 506-512
Author(s):  
Nick Chater ◽  
Jian-Qiao Zhu ◽  
Jake Spicer ◽  
Joakim Sundh ◽  
Pablo León-Villagrá ◽  
...  

In Bayesian cognitive science, the mind is seen as a spectacular probabilistic-inference machine. But judgment and decision-making (JDM) researchers have spent half a century uncovering how dramatically and systematically people depart from rational norms. In this article, we outline recent research that opens up the possibility of an unexpected reconciliation. The key hypothesis is that the brain neither represents nor calculates with probabilities but approximates probabilistic calculations by drawing samples from memory or mental simulation. Sampling models diverge from perfect probabilistic calculations in ways that capture many classic JDM findings, which offers the hope of an integrated explanation of classic heuristics and biases, including availability, representativeness, and anchoring and adjustment.


2017 ◽  
Vol 68 (2) ◽  
pp. 451-484 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matteo Colombo ◽  
Stephan Hartmann

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Derek Powell

Bayesian theories of cognitive science hold that cognition is fundamentally probabilistic, but people’s explicit probability judgments often violate the laws of probability. Two recent proposals, the “Probability Theory plus Noise” (Costello & Watts, 2014) and “Bayesian Sampler” (Zhu et al., 2020) theories of probability judgments, both seek to account for these biases while maintaining that mental credences are fundamentally probabilistic. These theories fit quite differently into the larger project of Bayesian cognitive science, but their many similarities complicate comparisons of their predictive accuracy. In particular, comparing the models demands a careful accounting of model complexity. Here, I cast these theories into a Bayesian data analysis framework that supports principled model comparison using information criteria. Comparing the fits of both models on data collected by Zhu and colleagues (2020) I find the data are best explained by a modified version of the Bayesian Sampler model under which people may hold informative priors about probabilities.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles P. Davis ◽  
Gerry T. M. Altmann ◽  
Eiling Yee

Abstract Gilead et al.'s approach to human cognition places abstraction and prediction at the heart of “mental travel” under a “representational diversity” perspective that embraces foundational concepts in cognitive science. But, it gives insufficient credit to the possibility that the process of abstraction produces a gradient, and underestimates the importance of a highly influential domain in predictive cognition: language, and related, the emergence of experientially based structure through time.


Author(s):  
Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr
Keyword(s):  

2003 ◽  
Vol 48 (6) ◽  
pp. 745-748 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Mahoney
Keyword(s):  

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