The Making of EMU: Political Economy Explanations of European Monetary Integration

2016 ◽  
pp. 93-124
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Monetary Integration ◽  
European Monetary

Choosing union: monetary politics and Maastricht

1993 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wayne Sandholtz
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
European Community ◽  
Monetary Union ◽  
International Political Economy ◽  
Monetary Integration ◽  
Political Leaders ◽  
European Monetary ◽  
Monetary Regime ◽  
National Leaders ◽  
Heads Of State

At their Maastricht summit, heads of state of the European Community (EC) countries agreed to establish a single currency and a common central bank by the end of the century. For students of international political economy, the treaty on monetary union offers intriguing puzzles: Why did EC governments commit themselves to such a far-reaching sacrifice of sovereignty? Why did national political leaders in some cases outrun public opinion in their enthusiasm for monetary integration? This study seeks a political explanation of the choices that produced the late-1980s movement for monetary union in Europe. It examines the conversion to monetary discipline in several EC states during the 1980s, arguing that the shift toward anti-inflationary rigor was a necessary precondition for discussions on monetary union. The article outlines three general options for a European monetary regime, based variously on unilateral commitments, multilateral arrangements, and full integration. Treating national preference formation as endogenous and requiring explanation, the article weighs five propositions that explain the motives and preferences of national leaders.

The Effect of Membership in the European Monetary Union on Trade Between Member Countries (An Empirical Study)

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ihor Soroka
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Union ◽  
European Monetary Union ◽  
Bilateral Trade ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
Monetary Integration ◽  
European Monetary ◽  
Trade Relations ◽  
Euro Adoption ◽  
Short Period ◽  
Short Run

The question of whether or not to adopt the euro is a very important one, not only for the 13 European Union members that do not share the same currency, but also for future EU candidates. Current literature on the effect of the euro on trade is scarce since the European Monetary Union (EMU) was officially created in 1999, and up until recently there has not been enough data to analyze this issue. This paper aims to estimate the effect of the euro on trade between member countries using the standard gravity model of trade. Using data from current 25 EU members over the period from 1997 to 2004, I show that higher trade volumes between EMU members cannot be attributed to the adoption of the euro. I find evidence that the euro adoption has had a short-run effect on bilateral trade and that this effect is eliminated over a short period of time. My findings suggest that members of the EMU trade on average from 8.8% to 47% more compared to non-members depending on the type of regression used, while members of the Free Trade Agreement trade 61.3% more. The effect of the euro on trade is eliminated as soon as I control for country-pair specific effects that include the FTA effect as well as history of trade relations between two countries. I conclude that the adoption of the euro should be seen as a final step in the European economic and monetary integration for countries that already benefit from relatively high volumes of bilateral trade. Full text availale at: https://doi.org/10.22215/rera.v2i1.166

Leopold Kohr theorist of economic decentralisation

2021 ◽  
pp. 15-19
Author(s):  
Stefano Solari
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Monetary Union ◽  
European Monetary Union ◽  
Theoretical Argument ◽  
European Monetary ◽  
Social Scientists ◽  
Political Studies ◽  
Diseconomies Of Scale ◽  
Rela Tions

The work of Leopold Kohr has attracted attention from social scientists in the field of international political studies, but few political economists have studied his theoretical argument in detail. Few students have tried to unite economic and polit-ical arguments to understand his contribution in a more analytical way. We will argue that Kohr's principal theory (diseconomies of scale) was inherently econom-ic, an attempt to elaborate on the concept of scale in a broader perspective and in a more complex way, including the idea of quality and, in particular, power rela-tions. In this paper, we try to make sense of Kohr's idea of decentralisation by studying his contributions from a political economy perspective. Moreover, con-clusions will be drawn that relate Kohr's view to present-day governance problems in the European Monetary Union, in which actual governance reflects all dangers that this scholar feared.

Book Reviews

2015 ◽  
Vol 53 (2) ◽  
pp. 365-367
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Political Economy ◽  
Exchange Rates ◽  
Latin American ◽  
Currency Crises ◽  
The United States ◽  
Exchange Rate Policy ◽  
Monetary Integration ◽  
The Political ◽  
Currency Policy

Benjamin J. Cohen of University of California, Santa Barbara reviews “Currency Politics: The Political Economy of Exchange Rate Policy”, by Jeffry A. Frieden. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Analyzes the politics surrounding exchange rates, including the influence of industries on the political process. Discusses the political economy of currency choice; a theory of currency policy preferences; the United States─from greenbacks to gold, 1862-79; the United States─silver threats among the gold, 1880-96; European monetary integration─from Bretton Woods to the euro and beyond; Latin American currency policy, 1970-2010; the political economy of Latin American currency crises; and the politics of exchange rates─implications and extensions.” Frieden is Professor of Government at Harvard University.

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