scholarly journals Unification of the Case-law within the Civil Procedure System of Romania

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 87-100
Author(s):  
Laura Cristina Carcia

The present article contains the main legal practice unification mechanisms, as regulated by the Romanian legislator in accordance with the current Civil Procedure Code, as well as those partaking to the Supreme Court jurisprudence in conjuncture with the lower courts by granting a uniform settlement on the legal issues comprised by the litigations referred to. The presentation starts off with the referral in the interest of the law, a traditional instrument within the national civil procedure legal sphere of activity, it continues with the notification of the Supreme Court for settling certain legal matters, a novelty at national level and of whose practical utility has already been recognised, and it ends by making reference to the second appeal, as an extraordinary means of challenge, with a relatively reduced efficiency, at present, in settling the different interpretations of the legal norms.

1967 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 210-231 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ernst Livneh

The new Israel Civil Procedure Rules, 1963 re-enact in rr. 269–82, with certain amendments, rr. 241–50 of the Palestinian Civil Procedure Rules, 1938 dealing with “Summary Procedure on Specially Endorsed Statement of Claim”, which in their turn were a colonial version of Order XIV of the English Rules of the Supreme Court. A glance at some recent judgments in Israel shows a surprising number of cases in which doubts have arisen as to the application and scope of the Summary Procedure in general and the defendant's right to be heard in particular. One may wonder whether litigants and lower courts quite understand the rules of the game or whether the game is after all not as easy as might be expected of a summary procedure. And indeed, compared with institutions in continental Europe, where scores of thousands of claims are disposed of without discussion and complaint, our Summary Procedure seems inelegant and burdensome on plaintiff and defendant alike. It is the object of this study to compare it, and the procedure under the English Order XIV, with those European institutions. In view of the gap between Anglo-Israel and Continental notions of civil procedure it may be useful also to sketch the history of the various forms of action, viz. the (summary) trial by documents, the non-litigious executory instruments and the conditional command to pay.


2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-34
Author(s):  
Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi

Case law shows that private prosecutions have been part of Mauritian law at least since 1873. In Mauritius there are two types of private prosecutions: private prosecutions by individuals; and private prosecutions by statutory bodies. Neither the Mauritian constitution nor legislation provides for the right to institute a private prosecution. Because of the fact that Mauritian legislation is not detailed on the issue of locus standi to institute private prosecutions and does not address the issue of whether or not the Director of Public Prosecutions has to give reasons when he takes over and discontinues a private prosecution, the Supreme Court has had to address these issues. The Mauritian Supreme Court has held, inter alia, that a private prosecution may only be instituted by an aggrieved party (even in lower courts where this is not a statutory requirement) and that the Director of Public Prosecutions may take over and discontinue a private prosecution without giving reasons for his decision. However, the Supreme Court does not define “an aggrieved party.” In this article the author takes issue with the Court’s findings in these cases and, relying on legislation from other African countries, recommends how the law could be amended to strengthen the private prosecutor’s position.


Lex Russica ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 19-27
Author(s):  
O. N. Nizamieva

The article has analyzed the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on family disputes that involve property issues, revealed features of implementation of functions of the highest court in this field. First, it is stated that the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation reviews decisions of lower courts mainly in cases where the application of family law rules is contradictory and unsettled. It is necessary to fill in a gap in family law, to resolve conflicts between certain legal norms, to choose between several possible interpretations of the law. Second, the judicial panels of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, making a determination on a particular case, clarify the meaning of legal norms, and sometimes under the guise of interpretation in fact correct ill-considered or outdated norms of family law. Third, the High Court reviews cases where there is a typical and widespread error in the application of a very clear and defined rule. Fourth, in individual legal acts it is possible to observe the concretization or change of the previously designated legal stances while maintaining the legislative rules in the same form. Using certain examples of cases considered by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on family disputes concerning property, the paper has demonstrated the mechanism of possible transformation of abstract, non-personified and doctrinally oriented provisions contained in the definitions of judicial boards of the Supreme Court to general legal regulators. The author has determined certain problems of legal regulation of property relations in the family that have not been settled by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation.


Author(s):  
Viktor Aleksandrovich Sharonov

The subject of this research is the legal norms on the procedure for excluding the property necessary for debtor’s professional activity from the bankruptcy estate. The article covers the question on the possibility of excluding property necessary for the debtor to conduct professional activity, the value of which is 10,000 rubles or higher, from the bankruptcy estate. The goal of this works consists in consideration of a broader interpretation of provisions of the Paragraph 5 of the Part 1 of the Article 446 of the Civil Procedure Code of the Russian Federation jointly with clarifications of the Paragraph 2 of the Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of December 25, 2018 No. 48 “On Certain Questions related to the Peculiarities of Formation and Distribution of the Bankruptcy Estate in Cases of Bankruptcy of Citizens” applicable to property of the debtor within the framework of insolvency (bankruptcy) procedure. The author analyzes the relevant civil legislation and insolvency (bankruptcy) law, as well as case law on topic. This article is one of the first attempts to systematize the relevant case law on the subject of exclusion of property necessary for debtor to conduct professional activity from the bankruptcy estate. Based on the results of analysis of the case law, national civil legislation and insolvency (bankruptcy)l law, the conclusion is made on impossibility of exclusion of property used by the debtor for professional activity, the value of which exceeds 10,000 rubles, from the bankruptcy estate in view of the failure of the economic model used by the citizen to ensure a normal life. The author questions the need to extend executive privilege onto the debtor’s property, which is required to conduct professional activity under the insolvency (bankruptcy) law.


Media Iuris ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 200
Author(s):  
Ajrina Yuka Ardhira ◽  
Ghansham Anand

Mediation is a duty which must be taken by the parties wishing to settle its dispute in the Court as specified in the Civil Procedure Code and in accordance with Article 130 HIR and 154 RGB. To improve the regulation of mediation in the Court, the Supreme Court shall issue its Regulation, namely the Supreme Court Regulation No. 1 of 2016 on Mediation Procedures in the Court. Where the regulations on mediation as stipulated in the Supreme Court Regulation No. 1 of 2016 use good faith in its formal conditions. And with such a condition the Supreme Court expects the success rate of mediation in the first level to increase so as to reduce the number of cases accumulated at the Supreme Court. Good faith as a duty to the parties in the Supreme Court Regulation Number 1 Year 2016 is made clear in Article 7 paragraph (1), where there are legal consequences for parties that are considered not having good intentions by doing things listed in Article 7 paragraph (2) , namely Article 22 for the plaintiff and Article 23 for the defendant. 


2017 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-180
Author(s):  
Atanas Ivanov

Abstract The right of the party concerned to a cassation appeal is result of specific inspection performed by the Supreme Court of Cassation where examined is the presence of conditions, foreseen in art. 280, par. 1 of Civil-Procedure Code. The right of cassation, however, shall incur from the presence of appellate judgment [1], and not from the specific inspection of Supreme Court of Cassation. The cassation appeal is submitted when the resolution is void, impermissible or inaccurate. This is why the right of cassation appeal is presented and guaranteed by the law opportunity of an individual to oblige Supreme Court of Cassation to rule on the first stage of cassation proceeding - the proceeding on allowing the cassation appeal estimating the statutory criteria in art. 280 of Civil-Procedure Code.


Author(s):  
I Komang Wiantara

The existence of mediation in the settlement of civil disputes in the courts is regulated in the Supreme Court Regulation No. 1 of 2016 concerning Mediation Procedures in the Court which contains ten principles including: mediation must be taken, party autonomy, mediation in good faith, time efficiency, mediator certification, mediator responsibility , confidentiality, financing, repetition of mediation, peace agreements outside the court, become integral parts in resolving disputes in court. In addition, mediation in the court strengthened peaceful efforts as stated in the Civil Procedure Code. The purpose of this study is to understand and analyze the legal strength of mediation in the Court. This study uses a normative juridical research method using the statutory approach. Study show that due to its consensual and collaborative nature, mediation always results in a dispute resolution in a win-win solution that is strengthened to become a Peace Deed, which has Executorial power like a Court Decision. Eksistensi mediasi dalam penyelesaian sengketa perdata di pengadilan diatur dalam Peraturan Mahkamah Agung Republik Indonesia Nomor 1 Tahun 2016 Tentang Prosedur Mediasi Di Pengadilan yang memuat sepuluh prinsip meliputi: mediasi wajib ditempuh, otonomi para pihak, mediasi dengan itikad baik, efisiensi waktu, sertifikasi mediator, tanggung jawab mediator, kerahasiaan, pembiayaan, pengulangan mediasi, kesepakatan perdamaian di luar pengadilan, menjadi bagian dalam integral dalam penyelesaian sengketa di pengadilan. Selain itu mediasi pada pengadilan memperkuat upaya damai sebagaimana yang tertuang di dalam hukum acara Perdata. Tujuan penelitian ini untuk memahami dan menganalisis kekuatan hukum mediasi menurut Peraturan Mahkamah Agung Republik Indonesia Nomor 1 Tahun 2016 Tentang Prosedur Mediasi Di Pengadilan. Kajian ini menggunakan metode penelitian yuridis normatif dengan menggunakan pendekatan perundang-undangan. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa karena sifatnya yang konsensual dan kolaboratif, maka mediasi selalu menghasilkan penyelesaian sengketa dengan cara sama-sama menguntungkan bagi para pihak (win-win solution) yang dikuatkan menjadi Akta Perdamaian, yang memiliki kekuatan Eksekutorial layaknya Putusan Pengadilan.


Author(s):  
Aaron Baker

Abstract The ‘range of reasonable responses’ (RORR) test for assessing the fairness of a dismissal under section 98(4) ERA 1996 started life as a mistake and never recovered. Where the statute tells judges a dismissal is unfair if an employer acted ‘unreasonably’, the RORR tells them this refers to a special kind of ‘employer reasonableness’. In a setting where the only question is whether a dismissal is too harsh or not it is senseless to ask anyone, including a judge, to behave as if a dismissal they consider too harsh is nevertheless not too harsh. Yet this is what the RORR has always asked Employment Tribunal judges to do, with predictable results. Because they are told that they may not use their own idea of what counts as reasonable, they have no choice but to assume that ‘employer reasonableness’ tolerates more harshness than ‘reasonableness’. Lady Hale, possibly viewing the matter in the same light, appears to have invited a Supreme Court challenge to the RORR in Reilly v Sandwell Metropolitan Borough Council. This article argues that the Supreme Court must do away with the RORR because it artificially makes it harder to succeed in an unfair dismissal claim, it is doctrinally confused, and incremental efforts by the lower courts to resolve these problems within the RORR framework inevitably fail. The answer must involve distinguishing between a ‘standard for decision’ and a ‘standard of review’. The RORR tried to perform both functions by distorting the standard for decision to address standard of review concerns. Recent Supreme Court case law on proportionality, however, has made it clear this is the wrong approach. What the Court should install, in place of the RORR, is (a) a clear standard for decision, not subject to modification over standard of review concerns, and (b) targeted guidance about how tribunals should focus their inquiry and where to give deference to employers.


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