Transposition and Implementation of EIA Directive in some EU Member States (with special emphasis on transport infrastructure cases)

elni Review ◽  
2007 ◽  
pp. 18-24
Author(s):  
Pavel Černý ◽  
Jerzy Jendrośka

One of the main goals of the Directive 85/337/EEC, on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment (“EIA Directive”), expressed in its Preamble, is to ensure that projects that are likely to have significant environmental impact proceed only after prior assessment of their likely effect on the environment, based on appropriate information supplied by the developer and with proper avenues for public participation. The European Court of Justice (ECD) repeatedly narrowed down the (originally large) scope of discretion of the member states in deciding whether a project shall be subject to EIA or not by requiring the environmental impact assessment for any project which is likely to have serious impacts de facto. Central to this article is a description of the typical and most important gaps of implementation of the EIA directive, emerging from the specific traffic infrastructure cases. Prior to that, some general remarks on the typical characteristics and problems concerning transposition of the EIA Directive are made.

Teisė ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 113 ◽  
pp. 123-138
Author(s):  
Vilius Kuzminskas

The article discloses the fixed exclusion regulation of Clause 346 in the Treaty of Function of the European Union in different EU member states. A further assessment of different relevant judicial approaches to regulation are disclosed and evaluated in accordance with the European Court of Justice case law and procurement in the defense area doctrine.


2003 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 521-534 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eva Micheler

Few decisions of the European Court of Justice have received as much attention as the 1999 judgement in Centros.1 This decision provided private international lawyers with an opportunity to examine choice of law in relation to companies against the background of European law. It also caused company lawyers to re-examine their national legislation in the light of foreign rules.


Author(s):  
Kamila Danilovna Shaibakova

The subject of this research is the norms of international legal acts, legislations of the EU member-states, decisions of foreign national courts, as well as decisions of the European Court on Human Rights and European Court of Justice. A hypothesis is advanced that within the framework of the European arrest warrant there are new trends associated namely with the desire to strengthen the system of protection of rights of the extradited individuals, which can negatively affect functionality of the procedure as a whole. Thus, a number of cases of the national courts (for example Artur Celmer case) and Court of the European Union (Pál Aranyosi and Robert Căldăraru case), as well as provisions of the constitutional courts lead to the fact that the principle of mutual recognition of court decision is used with caution. The article examines the case law of national courts of the EU member-states, as well as practice of the European Court of Justice and European arrest warrant. The author compared the decisions of the aforementioned courts for confirming the hypothesis that the protection of extradited individuals plays a significant role in the context of operation of the European arrest warrant. The intention to provide legal guarantees to individuals extradited in the context of the European arrest warrant, which loses its main influence; particularly the procedure is interrupted due to absence of guarantees of protection of rights in case of extradition, as well as raises doubt towards judicial systems and their decisions of some EU member-states brought forth by political actions of these countries. Moreover, protection of rights and guarantee of fair trial increases.


2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (2) ◽  
pp. 468-475 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ágoston Mohay ◽  
Norbert Tóth

In a case of first impression, the Constitutional Court of Hungary (CCH or Court) ruled on November 30, 2016 that, in exceptional cases, it is competent to consider whether Hungary's obligations to the European Union (EU) violate fundamental individual rights (including human dignity) or Hungarian sovereignty as protected by the Hungarian Constitution. The decision places Hungary squarely within the growing group of EU member states whose constitutional courts have decided that, despite the decisions of the European Court of Justice regarding the primacy of EU law, EU member states are not compelled to violate their domestic constitutional obligations in carrying out their shared EU commitments.


2011 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Lookofsky

In determining the boundaries of supranational legislation some courts adopt an expansionist (dynamic) line. To take a well-known regional example, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has long been engaged in an exercise in expansionist interpretation, thus broadening the scope of European Union legislation at the expense of the political discretion of EU Member States. Though surely seeking to advance what it sees as the Union’s best interests, the ECJ sometimes “runs amok,” actively extending regional rules in ways that constrain national sovereignty beyond what the Members had originally intended. Or, as one of my Copenhagen colleagues  once put it: the ECJ is “running wild.”


Author(s):  
Nigel Foster

This chapter examines the procedural law of the European Union (EU), focusing on Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). It explains that Article 267 is the reference procedure by which courts in member states can endorse questions concerning EU law to the European Court of Justice (CoJ). Under this Article, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has the jurisdiction to provide preliminary rulings on the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies of the Union and on the interpretation of the Treaties.


2009 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 291-314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tobias Lock

The article explores the limits of the ECJ's exclusive jurisdiction by addressing two main issues: firstly, whether there are exceptions to that exclusivity, such as the application of the CILFIT case law or the exclusion of Community law from the dispute. Secondly, it asks whether other international courts must respect the ECJ's jurisdiction over a case. The article commences by briefly discussing the ECJ's exclusive jurisdiction as it was established in Opinion 1/91 and the Mox Plant-Case and draws conclusions from this case law. It then addresses the above-mentioned points and comes to the conclusion that there are generally no exceptions to the ECJ's exclusive jurisdiction and that the only option open to Member States is to exclude Community law from a dispute (and even that option is subject to limitations). Furthermore, after exploring several routes advanced in the academic discussion, the article comes to the conclusion that other courts must respect the ECJ's jurisdiction and as a consequence declare the case inadmissible.


1998 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karen J. Alter

To what extent can the European Court of Justice, an international court, make decisions that go against the interests of European Union member states? Neofunctionalist accounts imply that because the Court is a legal body it has vast political autonomy from the member states, whereas neorealist accounts imply that because member states can sanction the ECJ, the Court has no significant political autonomy. Neither theory can explain why the Court, which was once politically weak and did not stray far from the interests of European governments, now boldly rules against their interests. In explaining how the Court escaped member state control, this article develops a general hypothesis of the autonomy of the ECJ, focusing on how differing time horizons of political and judicial actors, support for the Court within the national judiciaries, and decision-making rules at the supranational level limit the member states' ability to control the Court.


2006 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-3 ◽  

Mutual trust is at the heart of the European Union. Although the Union lacks a general mechanism to enforce its rules and decisions, member states usually comply with them. This remarkable fact can in part be explained by self interest: although individual rules and decisions may be found harmful and are ducked from time to time, all member states know they win by sticking to the rules of the game. The member state that grudgingly applies a rule or a decision, trusts all the others to do the same most of the time. If this were not so, the system would break down, in spite of the European Court of Justice denying the rule of reciprocity legal status in the Union.


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