scholarly journals Legal philosophy and the study of legal reasoning

2021 ◽  
Vol 69 (4) ◽  
pp. 795-811
Author(s):  
Torben Spaak

In this paper, I argue that legal philosophers ought to focus more on problems of legal reasoning. This is a field with many philosophically interesting questions to consider, but also, a field in which legal philosophers can contribute the most to the study and the practice of law. Neither legal practitioners nor legal scholars reason with the same care and precision as philosophers do. Against this background, I suggest that the following three types of questions regarding legal reasoning are especially worthy of serious consideration. The first is that of the relevance of the theory of reasons holism to legal reasoning. The second is the question of how to analyze (first-order) legal statements in a way that does not undermine the rationality of legal reasoning. And the third is the question of whether legal arguments are to be understood as deductive arguments, inductive arguments, or both, and if so how.

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Reuben Binns

There are various arguments in favour of tempering algorithmic decision-making with human judgement. One common family of arguments appeal to concepts and criteria derived from legal philosophy about the nature of law and legal reasoning, and argue that algorithmic systems cannot satisfy them (but humans can). This paper argues that among the latter family of arguments, there is often an implicit appeal to the notion that each case needs to be assessed on its own merits, without comparison to or generalisation from previous cases. This notion of ‘individual justice’ has featured in jurisprudential debates about the granularity of rules and tests, and the (in)justice of discrimination, but has not yet been explicitly imported into debates about justice and algorithmic decision-making. This paper has several aims. The first is to provide an overview of the concept of individual justice and distinguish it from related but distinct arguments about the value of human discretion. Equipped with this account of human judgement as a guarantor of individual justice, the second aim is to consider its place within and beside algorithmic decision-making. It argues that in so far as individual justice is valuable, it can only be meaningfully served through human judgement, because it antithetical to the kind of pre-determined reasoning that characterises algorithmic systems. This suggests that – to the extent that individual justice is deemed important – a requirement for human intervention and oversight over algorithmic decisions is necessary. The third aim is to consider how individual justice relates to other dimensions of justice, namely consistency and fairness or non-discrimination. Finally, the article discusses two challenges that are raised by this account. The first challenge concerns how individual justice can be accommodated alongside other dimensions of justice in the socio-technical contexts in which humans-in-the-loop are situated. The second concerns the potential inequities in individual justice that might result from an uneven application of human judgement in algorithmic settings.


1979 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-109
Author(s):  
B. Coupal ◽  
M. de Broissia

Abstract The movement of oil slicks on open waters has been predicted, using both deterministic and stochastic methods. The first method, named slick rose, consists in locating an area specifying the position of the slick during the first hours after the spill. The second method combines a deterministic approach for the simulation of current parameters to a stochastic method simulating the wind parameters. A Markov chain of the first order followed by a Monte Carlo approach enables the simulation of both phenomena. The third method presented in this paper describes a mass balance on the spilt oil, solved by the method of finite elements. The three methods are complementary to each other and constitute an important point for a contingency plan.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rafael Viana Ribeiro

Legal reasoning is increasingly quantified. Developers in the market and public institutions in the legal system are making use of massive databases of court opinions and other legal communications to craft algorithms to assess the effectiveness of legal arguments or predict court judgments; tasks that were once seen as the exclusive province of seasoned lawyers’ obscure knowledge. New legal technologies promise to search heaps of documents for useful evidence, and to analyze dozens of factors to quantify a lawsuit’s odds of success. Legal quantification initiatives depend on the availability of reliable data about the past behavior of courts that institutional actors have attempted to control. The development of initiatives in legal quantification is visible as public bodies craft their own tools for internal use and access by the public, and private companies create new ways to valorize the “raw data” provided by courts and lawyers by generating information useful to the strategies of legal professionals, as well as to the investors that re-valorize legal activity by securitizing legal risk through litigation funding.


2019 ◽  
pp. 107-116
Author(s):  
Karin Kukkonen

In the chapters that follow, the third-order probability design is developed. The third-order probability design revolves around how expectations about second- and first-order predictions are developed through structural patterns yielded by genre (III.1), textual gaps and shadow stories (III.2), and intertextual references to unfamiliar texts (III.3). The final chapter of the section, then, traces the tension between flexibility and constraint in probability designs.


Axioms ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Malec

The aim of this article is to present a method of creating deontic logics as axiomatic theories built on first-order predicate logic with identity. In the article, these theories are constructed as theories of legal events or as theories of acts. Legal events are understood as sequences (strings) of elementary situations in Wolniewicz′s sense. On the other hand, acts are understood as two-element legal events: the first element of a sequence is a choice situation (a situation that will be changed by an act), and the second element of this sequence is a chosen situation (a situation that arises as a result of that act). In this approach, legal rules (i.e., orders, bans, permits) are treated as sets of legal events. The article presents four deontic systems for legal events: AEP, AEPF, AEPOF, AEPOFI. In the first system, all legal events are permitted; in the second, they are permitted or forbidden; in the third, they are permitted, ordered or forbidden; and in the fourth, they are permitted, ordered, forbidden or irrelevant. Then, we present a deontic logic for acts (AAPOF), in which every act is permitted, ordered or forbidden. The theorems of this logic reflect deontic relations between acts as well as between acts and their parts. The direct inspiration to develop the approach presented in the article was the book Ontology of Situations by Boguslaw Wolniewicz, and indirectly, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.


1993 ◽  
Vol 07 (01n03) ◽  
pp. 624-629 ◽  
Author(s):  
ERIC FAWCETT ◽  
DAVID NOAKES

The weak first-order Néel transition in Cr was explained by Young and Sokoloff (1974) as being associated with the strain-wave second harmonic of the spin-density wave (SDW). Kotani (1975) developed a theory of higher harmonics of the SDW in Cr and its dilute alloys, which indicates an inverse relation between the amplitude of the strain wave and the value of the incommensurability parameter, δ=1−Q, Q being the SDW wave vector. This effect was observed by Iida et al. (1981), who found that the strain-wave amplitude A2/S1 relative to that of the SDW decreases as V is doped into Cr and δ increases, but remains roughly constant in CrMn alloys as δ decreases and the system approaches commensurability. The ratio S3/S1 of the amplitudes of the third harmonic and the fundamental, on the other hand, increases progressively more rapidly as δ decreases. The present work confirms that the magnitude of the first-order step in S1 at the Néel transition is roughly the same in Cr+0.18 at % Re as in pure Cr (Lebech and Mikke 1972), the values of δ at the transition being 0.32 and 0.35, respectively, whereas in Cr+0.2 at % V having δ=0.42 the Néel transition is continuous.


2008 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 365-379 ◽  
Author(s):  

AbstractIn the Gouvernement de la Communauté française and Gouvernement wallon case, the Court of Justice was mainly faced with the question of the applicability of the Community law provisions governing free movement of persons in "internal situations" i.e., situations in which EU citizens who are nationals of the host Member States, may not invoke the protection of Community law due to the lack of a cross-border element. The Court resists the call of its AG, but its reply does not give a definitive answer to the situation of those nationals who have exercised, to some extent, their right to free movement. In the Eind case, the Court was confronted with the question whether the third country family member of a national of the host Member State, who has no right of residence in that State, nevertheless enjoys a right of family reunification there upon the return of that national from another Member State where he exercised his right to free movement. The Court answers that question positively, but its legal reasoning is questionable.


2013 ◽  
Vol 141 (9) ◽  
pp. 3037-3051 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul D. Williams

Abstract The leapfrog time-stepping scheme makes no amplitude errors when integrating linear oscillations. Unfortunately, the Robert–Asselin filter, which is used to damp the computational mode, introduces first-order amplitude errors. The Robert–Asselin–Williams (RAW) filter, which was recently proposed as an improvement, eliminates the first-order amplitude errors and yields third-order amplitude accuracy. However, it has not previously been shown how to further improve the accuracy by eliminating the third- and higher-order amplitude errors. Here, it is shown that leapfrogging over a suitably weighted blend of the filtered and unfiltered tendencies eliminates the third-order amplitude errors and yields fifth-order amplitude accuracy. It is further shown that the use of a more discriminating (1, −4, 6, −4, 1) filter instead of a (1, −2, 1) filter eliminates the fifth-order amplitude errors and yields seventh-order amplitude accuracy. Other related schemes are obtained by varying the values of the filter parameters, and it is found that several combinations offer an appealing compromise of stability and accuracy. The proposed new schemes are tested in numerical integrations of a simple nonlinear system. They appear to be attractive alternatives to the filtered leapfrog schemes currently used in many atmosphere and ocean models.


1973 ◽  
Vol 28 (9) ◽  
pp. 1443-1453
Author(s):  
O. Gehre ◽  
H. M. Mayer ◽  
M. Tutter

Three experiments are described in which the relative motion of media or structures causes nonreciprocal effects of first order in ν/c. The first two experiments deal respectively with the Fresnel effect due to the motion of a normal dielectric and the electron drift in the plasma of a glow discharge. The third experiment is a microwave analogon to the historical experiments of Harress, Pogany and Sagnac. To our knowledge these are the first investigations of the well-known effects under conditions where the transverse dimensions of the waves are comparable to the wave length. Under such conditions the nonreciprocal effects when expressed in fringe shifts (or phase angle) remain small. They could, however, be detected after the development of an elaborate microwave interferometry which could resolve fringe shifts down to the order of 10-6.


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