scholarly journals CONVERGÊNCIA E DIVERGÊNCIA NOS NÍVEIS DE RENDA PER CAPITA: UMA CRÍTICA À APLICABILIDADE DOS MODELOS NEOCLÁSSICOS DE CRESCIMENTO ECONÔMICO

2004 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Almeida Fonseca ◽  
José Luís Oreiro

O artigo pretende analisar em que medida os modelos neoclássicos de crescimento econômico – mais especificamente, o modelo de Solow (1956, 1957), o modelo de Mankiw, Romer e Weill (1992) e o modelo de Romer (1990) – são capazes de explicar a divergência global nos níveis de renda per capita nos últimos dois séculos e a convergência nos níveis de renda per capita e o catch-up ocorridos entre Europa e Estados Unidos no período do Pós Segunda Guerra Mundial. Com efeito, trata-se de uma confrontação entre teoria e prática, de modo a analisar de que forma tais modelos explicam (ou não) os fatos supramencionados. No trabalho, demonstra-se que a ocorrência dos fatos anteriormente mencionados deveu-se fundamentalmente às diferenças do progresso técnico existente entre as economias (no caso da divergência) e à redução de tais disparidades entre os Estados Unidos e a Europa no período de tempo imediatamente após a 2.a Guerra Mundial (no caso da convergência e do catch-up). Na verdade, tenta-se demonstrar que os modelos apresentados não conseguem explicar satisfatoriamente os fatos ocorridos, sendo válidos apenas em casos específicos. O que o artigo se propõe a expor é que a realidade do crescimento econômico mundial é bastante diferente das conclusões dos modelos neoclássicos considerados. Abstract This work intends to analyze in which way the neoclassical growth models – more specifically, Solow (1956, 1957), Mankiw, Romer and Weill (1992) and Romer (1990) – are capable to explain the global divergence on the levels of per capita income over the last two centuries and the convergence on the levels of per capita income and the catch-up occurred between Europe and the United States after World War II. In fact, it is a confrontation between theory and practice, in order to view in which way these models explain (or not) the above-mentioned facts. During the present work, we demonstrate that the occurrence of these facts were mainly caused by differences on technological progress between economies (case of divergence) and the reduction of such disparities between the United States and Europe on the period of time immediately after World War II (case of convergence and catch-up). In fact, we try to demonstrate that these models are incapable to give a satisfactory explanation to the occurred facts, being only valid on specific cases. The work tries to propose that the reality of global economic growth differs considerably from the conclusions of the considered neoclassical growth models.

1989 ◽  
Vol 83 (2) ◽  
pp. 567-573 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert S. Erikson

This analysis demonstrates that the relative growth of per capita income change is an important determinant of post-World War II presidential election outcomes. Per capita income change is even a better predictor of presidential election outcomes than the electorate's relative attraction to the Democratic and Republican candidates as calibrated in National Election Study surveys. The significance of this finding is discussed.


1980 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 277-301 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Allman

Is there indeed a new or renewed demographic transition? The evidence suggests that there is. A rapidly growing number of countries of diverse cultural background have entered the natality transition since World War II and after a 25-year lapse in such entries. In these countries the transition is moving much faster than it did in Europe. This is probably related to the fact that progress in general is moving much faster in such matters as urbanization, education, health, communication, and often per capita income.


2005 ◽  
Vol 37 (9) ◽  
pp. 1613-1636 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter B Nelson

Many advanced economies have an aging population that relies heavily on government pensions, social security, and privately held investment-based income. In the United States the geography of social security and investment income (collectively called nonearnings income) is uneven. Furthermore, the ways in which migration serves to redistribute such income across space remain unstudied. This paper highlights regions in the United States that are becoming increasingly attractive to nonearnings income through migration. Overall, there is a consistent Rustbelt-to-Sunbelt shift in nonearnings income due to migration. These income shifts, however, are quite distinct between metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas. Starting in the late 1980s, nonmetropolitan portions of the Rustbelt enjoyed net gains in nonearnings income through migration processes. Therefore, it appears that the migration systems which drew income away from the nonmetropolitan north during the 1970s are now shifting to some degree. Analysis further indicates that migration contributes to greater levels of economic disparity across space. Whereas flows of social security income are highly influenced by the aggregate level of migration, flows of investment income are more influenced by differentials in migrants' per capita income levels. Regions such as the Plains are attracting migrants with relatively low per capita nonearnings income whereas the Rocky Mountain and New England regions are attracting individuals with high per capita income. Destinations such as the Rocky Mountains and New England are likely to enjoy significant economic benefits as new sources of income arrive which are tied to migration, but the Plains region is left with less-well-off populations, which pose significant social and economic problems in such sending regions. As the population in the United States and other advanced economies ages, these processes of nonearnings income migration become increasingly important in shaping local and regional economic conditions.


1979 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bent Hansen

The attempt to estimate per capita income for Egypt from 1886/1887 to 1937, presented in this paper, is part of an effort to evaluate British colonial economic policyduring the period of the British occupation of Egypt. For such an evaluation national income estimates covering the whole period would be very helpful. National income estimates worth the name, however, go back only to 1935–1939, and for years earlier than the 1950s they are of very poor quality. Compared with so many other lessdeveloped countries, Egypt has relatively rich statistics extending backward to the decades before World War I; but they do not really suffice for building up a national income series from either the production or the expenditure side, and from the income side there is hardly any information. In this situation, which both development economists and economic historians know only too well, the problem is how to make maximal use of existing production and expenditure indicators in order to come out with some idea of what per capita income developments may have looked like. Apart from gauging per capita income in Egypt during half a century before World War II, the paper serves more generally to illustrate a methodology that may find application for other countries.


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