The U.S. Maritime Strategy in the Pacific during the Cold War

Author(s):  
Narushige Michishita
Author(s):  
Dean Aszkielowicz

After the Second World War, the Australian military prosecuted almost a thousand alleged Japanese war criminals. These prosecutions were not only an attempt to punish Japan for its wartime militarism, but also a move to exert influence over the future course of Japanese society, politics, and foreign policy, as well as to cement Australia’s position in the Pacific as a regional power. During the Allied occupation of Japan (1945-52), Australia energetically pursued Japanese war criminals, and took a tough stance on Japan in general. The U.S. authorities, who dominated the Occupation, initially took the same line. As the Cold War in Asia intensified in the late 1940s and early 1950s, however, the U.S. government ceased to consider Japan a threat to Pacific security, and instead began to cultivate Japan as a potential democratic ally against communism. By the end of the Occupation, U.S. officials were firmly committed to pursuing good relations with the Japanese government. Gradually, in the 1950s, the Australian government came to share the U.S. view of Japan. As Japan shifted in official thinking from being a former foe, to a potential economic and political partner, concerns about the guilt of individual Japanese soldiers made way for pragmatism and political gain. The war criminals became entangled with Australian moves to establish good relations with Japan, and to draw the U.S. into a close alliance. Variations to their sentences - through repatriation to Japan, and later through parole or other forms of early release - became diplomatic bargaining chips. By the end of 1957, all of the surviving war criminals prosecuted by Australia had been released.


Author(s):  
Brian D. Laslie

Kuter followed his herculean efforts in DC by going to the Marianas Islands in May 1945 to become deputy commander of Army Air Forces, Pacific Ocean Area, and to help operate the U.S. Army Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific. His work here shifted away from bombardment and into aerial transport. Kuter was eventually named commander of the new Military Air Transport Service. Kuter, as head of MATS, became involved in the earliest days of the Cold War including the Berlin Airlift. This shows the rise and importance of massive air transport as an air force mission. The same way Kuter helped give rise to important theories on bombardment, he now did the same for airlift.


Author(s):  
Kenyon Zimmer

This concluding chapter discusses how the Second World War presented the remnants of the anarchist movement with another seemingly impossible choice between ideology and necessity. Fascism represented all the anarchists despised, and its destruction of the once powerful anarchist movements of Southern and Central Europe only heightened their hatred of it. Anarchists also bore no love for British and French colonialism or the U.S. government, and were sworn enemies of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, as the Allies battled fascism in Europe but left Franco's Spain untouched, the war in the Pacific was steeped in brutality and racism. In such circumstances, no consistent anarchist position existed. Nor did the Cold War that followed leave room for anarchist politics in a world sharply divided between the Soviet-centered Left and anticommunist Right.


2015 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 287-304
Author(s):  
Raphael B. Folsom

The writings of the U.S. scholar Philip Wayne Powell have had an enduring influence on the historiography of colonial Mexico and the Spanish borderlands. But his writings have never been examined as a unified corpus, and so the deeply reactionary political ideology that lay behind them has never been well understood. By analyzing Powell’s political convictions, this article shows how contemporary scholarship on the conquest of northern Mexico can emerge from Powell’s long shadow. Los escritos del estudioso estadounidense Philip Wayne Powell han ejercido una influencia perdurable sobre la historiografía del México colonial y las zonas fronterizas españolas. Sin embargo, dichos escritos nunca han sido examinados como un corpus unificado, de manera que la ideología política profundamente reaccionaria detrás de ellos nunca ha sido bien comprendida. Al analizar las convicciones políticas de Powell, el presente artículo muestra cómo puede surgir un conocimiento contemporáneo sobre la conquista del norte de México a partir de la larga sombra de Powell.


1996 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 465-493 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcia Olander

The years following World War Two produced a strong resurgence of U.S. intervention in Central America and the Caribbean couched in Cold War terms. Although the U.S. intervention in Guatemala to overthrow the government of Jacobo Arbenz in 1954 has generally been seen as the first case of Cold War covert anti-Communist intervention in Latin America, several scholars have raised questions about U.S. involvement in a 1948 Costa Rican civil war in which Communism played a critical role. In a 1993 article in The Americas, Kyle Longley argued that “the U.S. response to the Costa Rican Revolution of 1948, not the Guatemalan affair, marked the origins of the Cold War in Latin America.” The U.S. “actively interfered,” and achieved “comparable results in Costa Rica as in Guatemala: the removal of a perceived Communist threat.” Other authors have argued, even, that the U.S. had prepared an invasion force in the Panama Canal Zone to pacify the country. The fifty years of Cold War anti-Communism entitles one to be skeptical of U.S. non-intervention in a Central American conflict involving Communism. Costa Ricans, aware of a long tradition of U.S. intervention in the region, also assumed that the U.S. would intervene. Most, if not all, were expecting intervention and one key government figure described U.S. pressure as like “the air, which is felt, even if it cannot be seen.” Yet, historians must do more than just “feel” intervention. Subsequent Cold War intervention may make it difficult to appraise the 1948 events in Costa Rica objectively. Statements like Longley's that “it is hard to believe that in early 1948 … Washington would not favor policies that ensured the removal of the [Communist Party] Vanguard,” although logical, do not coincide with the facts of the U.S. role in the conflict.


1998 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 14-16
Author(s):  
Daniel P. Volman

Studies of U.S. government relations with Africa have generally focused on the role of the executive branch, specifically by examining and analyzing the views and activities of administration officials and the members of executive branch bureaucracies. This is only natural, given the predominant role that the executive branch has historically played in the development and implementation of U.S. policy toward the continent. However, the U.S. Congress has always played an important role in determining U.S. policy toward Africa due to its constitutional authority over the appropriation and authorization of funding for all foreign operations conducted by the executive branch. Furthermore, Congress enacted legislation on several occasions during the Cold War period that directly affected U.S. policy. For example, Congress approved the Clark Amendment prohibiting U.S. intervention in Angola (although it later voted to repeal the amendment) and also passed the 1986 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, which imposed sanctions on South Africa over the veto of the Reagan administration.


2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 109-157 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas K. Robb ◽  
David James Gill

This article explains the origins of the Australia–New Zealand–United States (ANZUS) Treaty by highlighting U.S. ambitions in the Pacific region after World War II. Three clarifications to the historiography merit attention. First, an alliance with Australia and New Zealand reflected the pursuit of U.S. interests rather than the skill of antipodean diplomacy. Despite initial reservations in Washington, geostrategic anxiety and economic ambition ultimately spurred cooperation. The U.S. government's eventual recourse to coercive diplomacy against the other ANZUS members, and the exclusion of Britain from the alliance, substantiate claims of self-interest. Second, the historiography neglects the economic rationale underlying the U.S. commitment to Pacific security. Regional cooperation ensured the revival of Japan, the avoidance of discriminatory trade policies, and the stability of the Bretton Woods monetary system. Third, scholars have unduly played down and misunderstood the concept of race. U.S. foreign policy elites invoked ideas about a “White Man's Club” in Asia to obscure the pursuit of U.S. interests in the region and to ensure British exclusion from the treaty.


2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 23-44
Author(s):  
Adam Potočňák

The article holistically analyses current strategies for the use and development of nuclear forces of the USA and Russia and analytically reflects their mutual doctrinal interactions. It deals with the conditions under which the U.S. and Russia may opt for using their nuclear weapons and reflects also related issues of modernization and development of their actual nuclear forces. The author argues that both superpowers did not manage to abandon the Cold War logic or avoid erroneous, distorted or exaggerated assumptions about the intentions of the other side. The text concludes with a summary of possible changes and adaptations of the American nuclear strategy under the Biden administration as part of the assumed strategy update expected for 2022.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document