scholarly journals De anima ii 5 on the Activation of the Senses

2012 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-104
Author(s):  
John Bowin ◽  
Keyword(s):  
De Anima ◽  
Méthexis ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-121
Author(s):  
David Redmond

Aristotle identifies the eye as the organ of sight, the ear as the organ of hearing, and the nose as the organ of smell. However, rather than identify the flesh as the organ of touch and that particular bit of flesh, the tongue, as the organ of taste, Aristotle makes what he admits to be the surprising claim that the organ of both touch and taste is located further inward (near the heart). The flesh is merely the medium that comes between the sense organ and their respective sense objects. Focusing on the sense of touch in particular, I consider what reasons Aristotle offers in support of this claim. After carefully wading through De Anima 2.11, I argue that the only argument that Aristotle offers there relies on an assumption about the unity of the senses that provides as much support for alternative views about the organ and medium of touch as it does for the view that Aristotle endorses.


2020 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 300-316
Author(s):  
Richard Kearney

Abstract This essay explores Aristotle’s discovery of touch as the most universal and philosophical of the senses. It analyses his central insight in the De Anima that tactile flesh is a “medium not an organ,” unpacking both its metaphysical and ethical implications. The essay concludes with a discussion of how contemporary phenomenology—from Husserl to Merleau-Ponty and Irigaray—re-describes Aristotle’s seminal intuition regarding the model of “double reversible sensation.”


Vivarium ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 57 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 244-267
Author(s):  
Cecilia Trifogli

AbstractIn a passage of De Anima II, chapter 12 (424a17-24), Aristotle makes a general claim about the senses, which is condensed in the formula that the senses are receptive of the sensible forms without the matter. While it is clear that this formula must play an important theoretical role in Aristotle’s account, it is far from clear what it exactly means. Its interpretation is still a focus of controversy among contemporary scholars. In this article the author presents the exegeses of this formula proposed by the two most authoritative commentators on De anima from the second half of the thirteenth century, namely, Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome. Both commentators assume that with this formula and in particular with the qualification “without the matter” Aristotle intends to characterize an “intentional” reception of a form, and to contrast it with a “natural” reception, but they give different accounts of intentionality.


Apeiron ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 415-443 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Robert Koons

Abstract In the De Anima, Aristotle claims that the five senses are infallible about their proper objects. I contend that this claim means that sight is infallible about its proper object in its most specific form, i. e. sight is infallible about red or green and not merely about color in general. This robust claim is justified by Aristotle’s teleological principle that nature does nothing in vain. Additionally, drawing on Aristotle’s comparison of perception and one’s understanding of the essences, I defend a conception of the senses in which the structure of their contents is simple rather than predicative and show how this coheres better with the rest of my interpretation.


1956 ◽  
Vol 1 (6) ◽  
pp. 177-177
Author(s):  
LEO M. HURVICH
Keyword(s):  

1986 ◽  
Vol 31 (10) ◽  
pp. 820-820
Author(s):  
No authorship indicated
Keyword(s):  

1893 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Gray M'Kendrick ◽  
William Snodgrass
Keyword(s):  

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