Setting the Stage

The Last Card ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 113-129

This chapter begins by looking at two trips to Iraq: the first by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and the second by National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley. Hadley's trip in November of 2006 was particularly crucial—it was meant to gauge prospects for a change in course, and to determine whether Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was a viable partner. Back in Washington, the Republican Party's loss of control of both houses of Congress in the midterm elections, along with Bush's eventual firing of Donald Rumsfeld, interacted with the growing intellectual ferment inside government and led Bush to launch and publicly announce a formal review of strategy in Iraq. Rumsfeld's replacement, Robert Gates, while named to the post in early November, would not formally take charge for another month. Time was now of the essence for the president. He was losing the war in Iraq, and, as Stephen Cambone, the undersecretary of defense for intelligence, put it, “he was losing the war here at home.”

Significance Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s agreement in Ankara to work together has reduced the possibility of a clash between Turkish and US forces in Syria. Almost simultaneously, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim announced in Berlin a new era in Turkish-German relations, a change confirmed by the release of a German newspaper correspondent in Turkey, after a year in prison on spying charges. Impacts The Trump administration will now speed up appointing a new ambassador to Ankara. Turkey will continue to woo German business and investors. The application of diplomatic pressure to release detained foreign journalists may influence how they operate in Turkey in future. Improved relations abroad will enable Erdogan to tighten his grip at home.


2005 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 203-207

Ha'Aretz's lengthy interview with Dov Weisglass, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's ““point man”” with Washington and probably his closest advisor, was conducted by Ari Shavit and published first in excerpts and two days later in its entirety. In addition to bringing into sharp contrast the contradiction between Israel's declaratory policies and assurances and its actual policies and intentions——and in so doing eliciting a swift ““clarification”” from the Prime Minister's Office——the interview also conveys a sense of the intimacy and easy camaraderie that characterizes U.S.-Israeli interactions. The full text is available at www.haaretz.com. Tell me about the dynamics of the relationship between you [and U.S. national security advisor Condoleezza Rice], and whether it's an unusual relationship.


1978 ◽  
Vol 8 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 111-111

Vice President Mondale has been participating extensively in Africa-related foreign policy matters since taking office in January, 1977. The Vice President works closely with Secretary of State Vance and Ambassador to the United Nations Andrew Young in the development of Africa-related policy recommendations for consideration by the President. The Vice President also participates in meetings with visiting African leaders and monitors political developments in Africa. Finally, at the President’s request, Vice President Mondale met with Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa to explain the new Administration’s policies toward southern Africa. Information on the Vice President’s staff’s involvement in Africa-related matters was requested but not received.


2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 624-651
Author(s):  
Leon Gooberman

John Redwood was appointed Secretary of State for Wales in 1993. He pursued a radical right- wing agenda for two turbulent years before resigning to unsuccessfully challenge John Major for the premiership. This article examines this period to make two arguments. One is that Redwood's imposition of a morally-charged Thatcherite agenda challenged and inadvertently discredited the Conservatives and the institutions through which they governed. This loss of credibility then enabled his opponents to magnify pre-existing discontent and secure a narrow victory in the 1997 devolution referendum. The other argument is that Redwood's period in Wales demonstrates the counterproductive potential of ideological dedication. His plan to overthrow the prime minister failed, he damaged his party and he helped facilitate devolution, outcomes that were the opposite of his intentions.


Janez Lenarčič is currently serving as Commissioner for Crisis Management in the European Commission, a mandate he took up in December 2019. In this capacity, he is responsible for EU civil protection as well as humanitarian aid. Mr Lenarčič served as Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Slovenia to the European Union (EU) in Brussels from 2016 to 2019. From 2014 to 2016, he held the Secretary of State position in the cabinet of the Slovenian Prime Minister. His previous experience also includes the position of Director of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, in Warsaw, from 2008 to 2014. He has also served as Secretary of State for European Affairs, including representing Slovenia during the Lisbon Treaty negotiations in 2007 and later representing the Slovenian EU Council Presidency to the European Parliament in 2008. In 2002 and 2003 he held the position of State Secretary in the cabinet of the Slovenian Prime Minister, after which he served as Slovenian Ambassador to the OSCE. In 2005, he was also Chairman of the Permanent Council of the OSCE in Vienna. In 2000 he served as Adviser to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the following year he became the Diplomatic Adviser to the then Slovenian Prime Minister. Between 1994 and 1999 he was posted to Slovenia's Permanent Representation to the United Nations (UN) in New York, where he also served as the alternate representative of Slovenia on the UN Security Council. Mr Lenarčič holds a degree in international law from Ljubljana University.


Author(s):  
Trinh T. Minh-ha

This chapter discusses the aftermath of bin Laden's death and the war in Iraq. In questioning the meaning of victory during wartime, the chapter examines how bin Laden's memory endures and the contentions surrounding his death and legacy. It also questions the sense of American patriotism in the aftermath of his death before turning to the larger questions of the Patriot Act and national security, in considering what it means to be a free citizen in a post-bin Laden world. Finally, the chapter turns toward U.S. foreign policy, particularly of the circumstances surrounding the United States' occupation of and departure from Iraq—which, while signaling the end of one war, appears to be the prelude to another.


Author(s):  
Thomas E. Webb

Essential Cases: Public Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case document summarizes the facts and decision in A (and others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56, House of Lords. This case concerned the Human Rights Act 1998, the willingness of the courts to engage with national security matters and, by extension, considered how key constitutional principles should shape the courts’ approach. The document also includes supporting commentary from author Thomas Webb.


Worldview ◽  
1970 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 7-10
Author(s):  
Ernest W. Lefever

There is accumulating evidence that President Nixon appreciates more fully than his immediate predecessors the moral and political limits of American power and influence in the larger world, primarily because he understands the vital distinction between national security and political reform. He knows that the U. S. Government's mandate abroad is far more limited than it is at home.It was in his speech in Rumania in August, 1969 that Mr. Nixon most clearly distinguished the proper domains, of domestic and foreign policy: “We seek normal relations with all countries, regardless of their domestic systems. We stand ready to reciprocate the efforts of any country that seeks normal relations with us.” He added: “We know mankind cannot build a just and lasting peace until all nations recognize and respect the sovereignty and rights of other nations.”


1979 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 46-65 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alfred Gollin

In December 1905 R.B. Haldane, later Viscount Haldane of Cloan, became Secretary of State for War. Among his fellow politicians Haldane, at this time, was looked on as an intriguer who combined habitual meddling in high places with a curious and remarkable interest in German philosophy. The Prime Minister of the day, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, who had good reason to dislike Haldane, nicknamed him “Schopenhauer.” Both men knew that the War Office had ruined the reputations of several of Haldane's predecessors. “We shall now see,” remarked Campbell-Bannerman, in a phrase that later became famous, “how Schopenhauer gets on in the Kailyard.” Despite this unpromising start Haldane's military reforms were so successful that they established his reputation in history as one of the great servants of the state in the pre-1914 era. His work and accomplishments in the field of military aviation, however, have been criticized very severely. In fact, the matter is so complicated that one aviation authority has written of the record in this area that “Haldane's actions behind the scenes may never be known with certainty.”Even some of his closest subordinates in the field of military aeronautics were very critical of Haldane's attitude and outlook. In February 1911 a major step was taken when, by an Army Order, a unit known as the Air Battalion of the Royal Engineers was created. This Battalion was entrusted with the duty of training a “body of expert airmen.” The Battalion's first commander was Major Sir Alexander Bannerman, an officer who knew little about airplanes, but was instead a balloon expert with experience in the South African and Russo-Japanese wars.


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