Designing and Developing Exercises to Enhance Capability - A Meta Analytic View

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 745-761
Author(s):  
Geeva Varghese ◽  
Thomas Coolbaugh

ABSTRACT A robust preparedness framework is essential to maximize response effectiveness and safeguard success. Exercises are an integral part of oil spill preparedness and emergency management. Exercises enhance the capability of an organization to respond by validating plans and procedures and seeking affirmations on assumptions and stakeholder expectations. Since planning and preparing for exercises can be costly and time consuming, it is important that lessons learned are accurately captured, widely communicated and implemented in a timely manner so that they can lead to measurable improvements in the way we prepare and respond to incidents. On average, international Oil Spill Response Organizations (OSRO) may be involved in thirty to forty oil spill response exercises in a given year, ranging from small scale exercises testing communication between various stakeholders to highly complex, multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional scenarios. Participation in multiple exercises in various capacities ranging from planning, designing and facilitation to participation, performance and capability assurance as an Oil Spill Response Organization, presents varied opportunities to view and analyze exercises from both ends of the spectrum, as a planner as well as a participant. A meta-analysis of these exercises offers a unique opportunity to systematically identify recurring areas for improvement and to examine new avenues to explore and test capabilities with operators who have established robust exercise programs. A key outcome of this would be to translate learnings into important enhancements for industry’s collective response and preparedness capability. This paper presents a meta-analysis view of recent OSRO-industry exercises with a focus on a comparative assessment of specific After Action Reviews (AAR). The purpose is to identify common themes in terms of lessons learned and areas for improvement, especially when designing and planning future exercises. It also considers whether exercises have evolved to incorporate changing response capabilities and realistically testing any increased information requirements of the stakeholder community. Finally, it will also examine how successfully companies have sought out emerging technologies that will positively impact preparedness, response and recovery. It is anticipated that the recommendations put forward from this meta-analysis will assist operators in realizing the full benefits of the time and effort invested in exercise programs.

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 1388-1399
Author(s):  
Wade A. Narin van Court ◽  
Mark B. Robinson

ABSTRACT Oil terminals maintain and assess their oil spill response readiness by conducting drills and exercises in general accordance with the Preparedness for Response Exercise Program (PREP) guidelines; however, they often do not realize the full benefits of the time and effort they invest in their exercise programs. Specifically, the way many terminals conduct and evaluate their drill and exercise programs does not provide an in-depth understanding of the capabilities and competencies of their personnel and their response contractors. URS Corporation (URS) recently performed a meta-analysis of tabletop exercises (TTX), equipment deployment exercises (EDX), and unannounced spill equipment deployment drills (UDD) that we facilitated at terminals around the United States. The meta-analysis was performed as a combined review of the after action reports from the various exercises to identify common lessons learned and areas for improvement. Specifically, the objective of the meta-analysis was to develop recommendations, based on an in-depth understanding of the identified common lessons learned and insights from our exercise facilitators, to enhance or improve terminals' oil spill response performance when implemented in the design of future drills and exercises. Based on our study, URS identified and developed recommendations to address the following areas for improvement: training/exercises did not build on previous efforts; TTX were “walk through” or discussion type of exercises and not conducted in “real time”; UDD were conducted in similar ways each time and did not “stress the system”; exercises and drills did not involve upper level (e.g., regional or corporate) personnel who may have significant roles in the response; terminal personnel did not have relationships with staff of industries, contractors, and/or agencies in their area; terminal personnel were not familiar with the Geographic Response Plans or Area Contingency Plans for their area; and exercise programs and post-exercise reviews and critiques did not effectively assess all 15 response plan components. By implementing the recommendations from our meta-analysis, terminals can expect to obtain significantly greater benefits in terms of competence and confidence to respond to oil spills for a modest investment in additional time, cost, and effort.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 2098-2111
Author(s):  
Kelly Lynn Schnapp ◽  
Joseph Leonard ◽  
Michael Drieu ◽  
Bryan Rogers

ABSTRACT This paper seeks to better prepare the oil spill response community for incorporating well control into a response organization, based on conditional considerations rather than long and firmly held assumptions. Techniques used to control a well, after a blowout, are more closely related to technical well drilling and control activities rather than to operations intended to address oil in the environment. When oil is released from a well in the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), response organizers need to consider various factors influencing the organization that may exist at the time. These include a working knowledge of well control by response leadership; strength of responder relationships; and response complexity (to include authority, stakeholder and public expectations). This is particularly true when incorporating the well control support function in the oil spill response operational planning processes, usually facilitated by the Incident Command System (ICS). Within the last three years, complex well control operations were uniquely incorporated into response organizations during two Government Initiated Unannounced Exercises (GIUEs) and during the DEEPWATER HORIZON incident. Three options will be presented. Considerations for incorporating well control into a response organization will be presented using the case studies noted previously and by comparing similar lessons learned from the salvage industry in the late 1990's. Options presented help demonstrate that response organization flexibility is key to a successful response. This paper seeks to illuminate options surrounding placement of well control within an incident command structure based upon unique incident situational realities.


1995 ◽  
Vol 1995 (1) ◽  
pp. 513-522 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos Villoria ◽  
Elia Gomez ◽  
Nelson García Tavel

ABSTRACT In November 1993, the first drill of the Venezuelan national oil spill contingency plan (VNCP) was carried out to evaluate both the response capability of the plan to cope with an emergency and the effectiveness of the regional response organization to manage the given scenario. During four days of intensive work, 800 participants, evaluators, and controllers of the drill made decisions and took actions to mobilize resources and pollution countermeasure equipment for cleanup operations. To measure the effectiveness of the response actions, 23 oil spill response processes were evaluated based on flow charts or decision trees designed for each process. In summary, the drill covered all areas related to response actions in the case of an oil spill (alert, notification, evaluation, decision-making, mobilization, field response, and postmortem), evaluating the ability of the VNCP to cope with a major emergency and identifying weaknesses in order to improve the response capability.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 2017031
Author(s):  
Steven Buschang

Texas produces nearly twice and much oil as the next highest producing U.S. state and has approximately 3300 miles of sensitive jurisdictional shoreline boarding the second highest area of our nation's oil production, the Gulf of Mexico. It is home to over 27 operating refineries and hosts 3 of the top 10 busiest ports in the nation. Since 1991, the Texas General Land Office (TGLO) has built an oil spill prevention and response program that is arguably the premier state oil spill program in the nation; one that responds 24/7 to over 600 reported spills per year, certifies, audits and inspects over 600 oil handling facilities, administers an abandoned vessel removal program, an oily bilge facility program, and has an ongoing oil spill R&D program and its own state Scientific Support Coordinator, ensuring that prevention, planning and response activities are state of the science. The TGLO produces the Texas Oil Spill Toolkit, now in its 17th edition, which is a spill planning and response resource for the western Gulf of Mexico, and houses a collection of plans and documents in a single, easy to use online/off-line .html format. Plans include up-to-date Area Committee Plans (ACP) and pre-planning documents, all aligned with the National Response Framework (NRF). Included are Regional Response Team VI (RRT) documents and guidance, pre-authorization plans and mapping for alternative spill response, Priority Protection Areas (PPA), Environmental Sensitivity Index Maps (ESI), and site specific Geographic Response Plans (GRP). This paper describes the conception, history and evolution of the building and operation of a state response organization in an era of “less government”.


2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 905-908
Author(s):  
Mark Boben ◽  
Liu Yuheng

ABSTRACT Oil spill response along the coast of China has been recognized as an important issue by the Chinese government. The Bohai Sea in particular, is an area of high oil exploration and production activity, with offshore developments comprising platforms and FPSO's (floating, production, storage and off-loading) together with associated vessels and pipelines. Major shipping lanes from the East China Sea into China also pass through the offshore oil fields. For the oil companies operating in the area, the prospect of an accidental oil spill is a concern from both a domestic and international perspective. In 2000, the companies involved in upstream activities in the Bohai Sea began discussions with the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) to develop an oil spill response capability. Led by ConocoPhillips, the international oil companies worked with CNOOC to build a framework for developing an oil spill response organization (OSRO) to provide appropriate services within the Bohai Sea. The key tenet for this OSRO, was to be able to perform to international standards. In 2002, the CNOOC executive management, through its subsidiary, Bohai Corporation(COOBC) committed to establishing a commercial oil spill response organization, Bohai Environmental Services Ltd. (BES). The BES remit is focused on the Bohai Sea, but with the eventual goal of providing response services along the wider China coastal region and eventually fulfilling a longer term vision of expanding into the international market. This Paper describes the standards required by the international oil companies and how BES was conceived and organized to meet them.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 104-123
Author(s):  
Yvonne Najah Addassi ◽  
Julie Yamamoto ◽  
Thomas M. Cullen

ABSTRACT The Refugio Oil Spill occurred on May 19, 2015, due to the failure of an underground pipeline, owned and operated by a subsidiary of Plains All-American Pipeline near Highway 101 in Santa Barbara County. The Responsible Party initially estimated the amount of crude oil released at about 104,000 gallons, with 21,000 gallons reaching the ocean. A Unified Command (UC) was established consisting of Incident Commanders from the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), California Department of Fish and Wildlife (CDFW) Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR), Santa Barbara County, and Plains Pipeline with additional participation by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and California State Parks. Within hours, the CDFW closed fisheries and the following day Governor Brown declared a state of emergency for Santa Barbara County. The released oil caused heavy oiling of both on and offshore areas at Refugio State Beach and impacted other areas of Santa Barbara and Ventura. A number of factors created unique challenges for the management of this response. In addition to direct natural resource impacts, the closure of beaches and fisheries occurred days before the Memorial Day weekend resulting in losses for local businesses and lost opportunities for the public. The Santa Barbara community, with its history with oil spills and environmental activism, was extremely concerned and interested in involvement, including the use of volunteers on beaches. Also this area of the coast has significant tribal and archeologic resources that required sensitive handling and coordination. Finally, this area of California’s coast is a known natural seep area which created the need to distinguish spilled from ‘naturally occurring’ oil. Most emergency responses, including oil spills, follow a similar pattern of command establishment, response and cleanup phases, followed by non-response phase monitoring, cleanup and restoration. This paper will analyze the Refugio oil spill response in three primary focus areas: 1) identify the ways in which this spill response was unique and required innovative and novel solutions; 2) identify the ways in which this response benefited from the ‘lessons’ learned from both the Deepwater Horizon and Cosco Busan oil spills; and 3) provide a summary of OSPR’s response evaluation report for Refugio, with specific focus on how the lessons learned and best practices will inform future planning efforts within California.


1997 ◽  
Vol 1997 (1) ◽  
pp. 513-515
Author(s):  
John H. Giesen ◽  
Jon D. MacArthur

ABSTRACT Faced with training and travel dollar constraints, California's Department of Fish and Game and the 11th U.S. Coast Guard District worked to form a multiorganizational partnership designed to leverage required resources to conduct a premier operational-level oil spill response training program in the state. The partnership included no less than six major organizations from both the public and private sectors, each playing critical roles in planning and conducting the training. Major hurdles overcome were curriculum development and operational support. Both of these challenges were resolved through a unified management approach in which the ultimate objective became success of the course. The lessons learned from the program provide guidance and rationale for future such efforts.


1997 ◽  
Vol 1997 (1) ◽  
pp. 737-742
Author(s):  
LT Tina M. Burke ◽  
LT John P. Flynn

ABSTRACT In recent years, the usefulness of the incident command system (ICS) has received much attention. Much of the oil industry and several government agencies involved in all types of emergency response have been using ICS for many years. In addition, the U.S. Coast Guard formally adopted the national interagency incident management system (NIIMS) ICS as the response management system of choice in February of 1996. The response to the tank barge North Cape grounding was a complex multiagency effort that brought with it many of the issues and problems responders face when dealing with crisis situations. This paper describes the ICS-based organization that was established to respond to the major North Cape oil spill, analyzes the organization compared to standard ICS, and discusses how the ICS framework and principles contributed to the success of the response. It also explains how closer conformity to standard ICS could have remedied many of the issues that later surfaced as lessons learned, resulting in improved response efficiency. The North Cape response provides a vivid example of how ICS is a helpful management tool that, if rigorously learned and applied in a widespread fashion, can greatly enhance the nation's oil spill response posture.


2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (1) ◽  
pp. 457-460 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tony Harmer

ABSTRACT This paper provides an overview of the incident at the Tupras Oil Refinery in Izmit, Turkey following the August 1999 earthquake, including the scenarios encountered and lessons learned. Oil spill operations are not simply confined to “at-sea incidents” and can be situated within areas of complete devastation, where priority for the cleanup of leaking oil is simply an afterthought. A good example of this would be Kuwait during the Gulf War and the strategic destruction of the oil fields.


1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 709-714
Author(s):  
Evan C. Thayer ◽  
Ilse Snoeks

ABSTRACT Oil spill response workers can face a variety of health concerns when a spill occurs in a remote area. Potential food, water, and disease hazards need to be addressed for both fly-in supervisory personnel and local cleanup crews. Pre-spill planning activities should consider a variety of scenarios covering a range of spills in the geographic areas of responsibility. Topics to address should include medical screening of oil spill response team members, vaccination/shots, travel kits, special clothing needs, disease control informational handouts, food and water sources, evaluation of medical personnel and facilities and identification of medical evacuation plans. Activities occurring during the spill cleanup period might include medical screening of food handlers and local workers, confirming the availability of local medical facilities and evacuation routes, conducting routine clinic operations, checking the sources and handling of food and water, checking housing conditions, implementing a disease vector control program, and providing training related to local environmental hazards. Post-cleanup activities would include safe disposal of medical and other waste, providing post-spill medical exams, and documenting lessons learned during the spill. Successfully controlling health issues during a spill may only be possible if an appropriate level of planning is conducted.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document