5. Neoliberalism

2020 ◽  
pp. 88-107
Author(s):  
Jennifer Sterling-Folker
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
International Cooperation ◽  
World Trade ◽  
International Institutions ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Principal Agent Theory ◽  
Agent Theory ◽  
The World ◽  
Hegemonic Stability

This chapter examines the neoliberalist argument that international institutions promote international cooperation. While neoliberalism acknowledges that cooperation can be difficult to achieve in anarchic conditions, it insists that institutions allow states to overcome a variety of collective action impediments. The central concern of neoliberal analysis is how institutions do so, and how they might be redesigned to more efficiently obtain cooperative outcomes. This chapter considers three questions that are relevant for understanding neoliberal contributions: How did neoliberalism emerge? What are the barriers to international cooperation? How does neoliberalism study international institutions? The chapter uses the World Trade Organization as a case study to illustrate the importance of institutional design for international free trade cooperation. Along the way, various concepts such as interdependence, hegemonic stability, hegemon, bargaining, defection, compliance, autonomy, and principal–agent theory are discussed, along with the game known as Prisoner’s Dilemma.

5. Neoliberalism

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer Sterling-Folker
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
International Cooperation ◽  
World Trade ◽  
International Institutions ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Principal Agent Theory ◽  
Agent Theory ◽  
The World ◽  
Hegemonic Stability

This chapter examines the neoliberalist argument that international institutions promote international cooperation. While neoliberalism acknowledges that cooperation can be difficult to achieve in anarchic conditions, it insists that institutions allow states to overcome a variety of collective action impediments. The central concern of neoliberal analysis is how institutions do so, and how they might be redesigned to more efficiently obtain cooperative outcomes. This chapter considers three questions that are relevant for understanding neoliberal contributions: How did neoliberalism emerge? What are the barriers to international cooperation? How does neoliberalism study international institutions. The chapter uses the World Trade Organization as a case study to illustrate the importance of institutional design for international free trade cooperation. Along the way, various concepts such as interdependence, hegemonic stability, hegemon, bargaining, defection, compliance, autonomy, and principal–agent theory are discussed, along with the game known as Prisoner's Dilemma.

Agreement

Why Delegate? ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 97-114
Author(s):  
Neil J. Mitchell
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Selection Process ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
World Cup ◽  
Principal Agent Theory ◽  
Sort It ◽  
Agent Theory ◽  
The World ◽  
Initial Selection

Principals delegate in order to resolve disagreements. We would be unwilling to invest energy in any sort of enterprise or activity, without a method to resolve the disputes that may arise. We grant someone the authority to interpret rules. Whether disciplining players in the NFL, deciding which country will host the soccer World Cup or settling disputes between governments in the World Trade Organization, principals turn to a dispute-resolving agent to sort it out. This chapter discusses the use of delegation to solve disagreements. Some scholars depart from principal-agent theory to use the term trustee to describe the autonomy in this type of delegation relationship, but this is an unnecessary departure. The key to controlling this agent lies in the initial selection process.

scholarly journals The Future of Amicus Participation at the WTO: Implications of the Sardines Decision and Suggestions for Further Developments

2005 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 449-470 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Keller
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
International Institutions ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Public Access ◽  
Democratic Participation ◽  
Global Society ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
The World ◽  
The Future

In today's increasingly interdependent global society, international institutions formerly committed to operating as insular systems recognizing only states as legitimate participants have come under pressure to open their processes to public view and participation. The World Trade Organization (WTO) in particular has been widely criticized for its lack of transparency and democratic participation. Nowhere has this criticism been more prevalent than in the arena of dispute settlement. The controversy over the acceptance of amicus briefs at the WTO reflects the tensions among WTO members and non-members concerning greater public access to dispute settlement proceedings. This battle has been fought primarily through the Appellate Body and its important series of decisions on amicus briefs.

Africa-Asia Relations since the End of “Unipolar” Globalization: Focus on Education and Research

2013 ◽  
Vol 12 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 118-139
Author(s):  
Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
International Cooperation ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Institutional Support ◽  
Social Progress ◽  
Japan International Cooperation Agency ◽  
Historical Perspectives ◽  
The World ◽  
Political Leverage

Abstract The role of education and research in social progress is vital. Since China was admitted into the World Trade Organization in 2001, its economic, financial and trade assistance with Africa has intensified, reflecting certain aspects of the claims associated with the Bandung Conference in 1955. And Japanese relations with Africa, which were at their peak from the end of 1980s through the beginning of the 1990s, have steadily been declining. Furthermore, as China has become the second largest economy in the World since 2010, it has begun projecting its influential power in Africa. Despite the newfound emergence of Chinese power in Africa, it is Japan that has created the strongest institutional support of its activities in the name of new Japan International Cooperation Agency ( JICA), which redefines Japan relationship with Africa through the TICAD initiative. The competition between these two powers can benefit Africa if she can build her political leverage in her own capacity to identify her priorities with confidence and determination. Using comparative and historical perspectives, this article focuses on the examination of the new trends regarding Chinese and Japanese assistance to Africa with a particular focus on education and research.

The Politics of Judicial Economy at the World Trade Organization

2010 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
pp. 257-279 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc L. Busch ◽  
Krzysztof J. Pelc
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
International Institutions ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Legal Decisions ◽  
The World ◽  
The Future ◽  
Future Consequences ◽  
Judicial Economy

AbstractInternational institutions often moderate the legal decisions they render. World Trade Organization (WTO) panels do this by exercising judicial economy. This practice, which is evident in 41 percent of all rulings, involves the decision not to rule on some of the litigants' arguments. The constraint is that it can be appealed. We argue that panels exercise judicial economy when the wider membership is ambivalent about the future consequences of a broader ruling. This is proxied by the “mixed” (that is, nonpartisan) third-party submissions, which are informative because they are costly, jeopardizing a more decisive legal victory that would benefit these governments too. We empirically test this hypothesis, and find that mixed third-party submissions increase the odds of judicial economy by upwards of 68 percent. This suggests that panels invoke judicial economy to politically appease the wider WTO membership, and not just to gain the litigants' compliance in the case at hand.

Legitimating Behind the Smoke Screen in the Battle Over Clove Cigarettes

2019 ◽  
pp. 127-160
Author(s):  
Sivan Shlomo Agon
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Goal Attainment ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The World ◽  
Dispute Settlement System

Recent years have confronted the World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement System (DSS) with an intense wave of complex linkage disputes. US-Clove Cigarettes, which stands at the centre of this chapter, serves as the second case study in the investigation into the DSS’s goal-attainment endeavours in this category of WTO disputes. The chapter begins with a review of several jurisprudential milestones leading from the early US-Shrimp, examined in Chapter 5, to the more recent US-Clove Cigarettes, examined here, with a view to portraying the legitimation continuum of which the latter dispute forms a part. The chapter then discusses the intricate legitimacy setting in which US-Clove Cigarettes unfolded and, through a close goal-oriented analysis, shows how the intensified legitimacy concerns aroused shaped the goals pursued by the DSS and the judicial choices made towards their achievement. The chapter concludes by linking the goal-attainment efforts identified to the broader DSS goal-based effectiveness framework advanced in the book.

International institutions: weak commitments and costly signals

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 353-380 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa L. Martin
Keyword(s):  
World Trade ◽  
International Institutions ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Empirical Work ◽  
Costly Signaling ◽  
Weak Institutions ◽  
The World ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Costly Signals ◽  
Commitment Devices

As commitment devices, international institutions encourage cooperation by imposing costs on members who do not live up to their commitments. However, the costs that institutions can impose are limited, so that their commitment capacity is weak. Institutions can also impose costs as a condition of membership, allowing them to serve as costly signals. A model of weak commitment and costly signaling leads to a number of hypotheses about patterns of cooperation, institutional membership, and states’ preferences over institutional design. For example, existing members of an institution should impose higherex antecosts when a potential new member could either gain significant benefits from reneging on their commitments in the future, and when the new member expects to gain high benefits from future cooperation. These results are consistent with empirical work on institutions including peacekeeping and the World Trade Organization.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document